A new US-Iran war will play out in Iraq and beyond

Analysis

The killing of Soleimani and Muhandis is the latest in a series of escalations between Iran and the United States in the region and, most recently, in Iraq. Tehran perceived a rising threat from Washington in 2019, as economic sanctions tightened, contributing to a bout of popular protests.

This coincided with mass anti-government demonstrations in Lebanon and Iraq, which became increasingly opposed to pro-Iranian forces seeking to preserve the status quo -- and which Tehran portrayed as part of a wider US conspiracy. Iran-backed Iraqi militias, notably Kata'ib Hezbollah, launched a series of strikes against Iraqi bases hosting US forces.

The latest of these, on December 28, killed a US civilian contractor, and the following day the Pentagon retaliated against Kata'ib Hezbollah sites, killing 25 fighters. The militias blockaded the US embassy in Baghdad, but did no serious damage and on January 1 withdrew, citing the promise of parliamentary action to rescind the invitation to US forces in Iraq (see IRAQ: US-Iran fight may see more strikes and new polls - January 2, 2020).

Washington ups the ante

At this point, the ball seemed to be in the militias' court, with the expectation that they would somehow strike back against US interests to avenge their casualties. However, the US action, looking to the wider regional context, pre-empted this. As Soleimani flew in from Beirut and was met by Muhandis, likely to discuss how to respond to the earlier US strikes, their convoy was bombed.

This constitutes a significant escalation. It raises the stakes not only with Iraq, where Muhandis is formally a senior military officer, but also, massively, with Iran. Soleimani was the most important figure in Tehran's regional policy, a popular hero in many quarters, and a possible future presidential contender.

From the US side, the move seems in part to have been opportunistic, with two senior, hostile figures putting themselves in a vulnerable position at a time when tensions were high. Earlier official statements were warning against rather than threatening escalation, and the US embassy's urgent call for citizens to leave Iraq came only today.

However, it also likely reflects strategic calculations at the Pentagon that Iran has been controlling the pace of regional confrontation for too long, with Soleimani a core enemy responsible for US military deaths over some decades. The killing signals that Tehran cannot assume that Washington's retaliatory actions will stay within predictable limits. Decisionmakers also likely assessed that it would remove the lynchpin in Iran's network of regional proxies, damaging its capacity to act in the region.

Tehran weighs its options

Although the leadership in Iran will take the US message, it has no choice but to respond forcefully. The death of Soleimani is potentially a huge blow to its prestige, unless he is quickly transformed into a martyr to be overwhelmingly avenged.

The Quds Force chief, whose mystique had increased in recent years with frequent photographs of him leading on regional battlefields, was the most popular political figure in the country, according to an August 2019 poll conducted by the University of Maryland, with 59% of people "very" and 23% "somewhat" favourable towards him.

Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei announced three days of national mourning and promised "harsh vengeance" -- a pledge echoed by all senior officials including President Hassan Rouhani, who has had his differences with the IRGC. An IRGC spokesman also said the "tough response" would take in Israel, jointly blamed for the action.

The new situation will further empower Iranian conservatives and could fatally weaken last-ditch international efforts to salvage the 2015 nuclear deal (see PROSPECTS 2020: Gulf states - November 15, 2019). Tehran's increasing nuclear activities and its missile programme are likely to be key issues of contention -- and possible future focus of military attack -- as relations with Washington deteriorate further.

Such a pattern of escalation could be used by the Iranian government to generate solidarity against an external enemy and to justify economic privations and political repression.

In Iraq

In terms of immediate retaliation, Tehran can consider a variety of options, in the region and beyond, to strike back against US and allied interests. However, the most obvious and immediate battleground is still Iraq, where the Iran-backed militias have their own imperative to seek revenge and vindication.

Caretaker Prime Minister Adel Abdel-Mahdi described the killing of Muhandis as an "aggression" against Iraq that broke the conditions of the US troop presence, warning of regional war. Senior Shia figures who are not aligned with Iran, including populist politician Moqtada al-Sadr and religious leader Ayatollah Ali al-Sistani, also condemned the violation of Iraqi sovereignty.

Protesters in Tahrir Square, who blame Soleimani for orchestrating the crackdown that has killed hundreds of them, were seen rejoicing at the news. However, others expressed concern that they might become a target for even more violent militia retaliation -- and at the very least, that their concerns will be sidelined by a new confrontation.

Further violence is likely, and friends of the United States will be vulnerable, extending and deepening the country's political crisis.

And beyond

The death of Soleimani also has wider regional implications. His career consisted of the long-term build-up of pro-Iranian "resistance" networks, not only in Iraq, but also in Syria, Lebanon, Gaza and Yemen.

In the longer term, the main question is how far the loss of Soleimani will hamper Tehran's regional operations and reduce its influence. He had three major assets in his role -- military effectiveness, personal connections and legendary prestige:

• The first is likely replicable: the IRGC has other competent commanders, including Brigadier General Ismail Ghani, an experienced Quds Force officer who was today named as his successor.
• The second will be much more difficult to rebuild, although it could be done in time.
• The third is irreplaceable but could potentially be repurposed as a source of solidarity and rallying point for future operations.

In the shorter term, Soleimani-linked networks are all possible instruments for Tehran to use to extract vengeance.

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Beyond Iraq, the most effective force belongs to Lebanese Hezbollah, which has significant forces in Syria as well as international cells (see LEBANON: Army faces rising pressure over Hezbollah - August 13, 2018). Its leader, Hassan Nasrallah, has also vowed to punish Soleimani's killers.

For a large-scale operation, its most obvious target would be neighbouring Israel. Although many Israeli politicians have welcomed Soleimani's death, there is concern that the country could be hit by a potential Iranian backlash.

Israeli Prime Minister Binyamin Netanyahu cut short an official trip to Greece in the wake of Soleimani's killing, while Defence Minister Naftali Bennett chaired a meeting of security chiefs in Tel Aviv as the armed forces were put on heightened alert. A ski resort in the Golan Heights, near the border with Syria, was closed today for fear of rocket fire from Iranian-backed armed groups operating in southern Syria.

However, attacking Israel could carry heavy domestic costs for Lebanese Hezbollah. Smaller, deniable, terrorist-style attacks on US assets in the region and beyond are a more likely rejoinder.

Another option for the IRGC, with input from Hezbollah and possibly assistance from Yemen's Huthis, is to return to the mid-2019 pattern of attacks on US Gulf allies' oil installations and shipping. The clear success of September's surgical attacks on Saudi oil facilities at Abqaiq and Khurais may make this an attractive proposition (see PROSPECTS 2020: Gulf states - November 15, 2019).

The fear of such a retaliation caused a hike in international oil prices today, on the news of Soleimani's death. Other powers with an interest in the Middle East -- including China, Russia, France and the United Kingdom -- are calling for de-escalation, with varying degrees of criticism of the US action.

US political implications

If Iran's response consists of an attack on US assets, US President Donald Trump will face congressional pressure from many legislators to respond in kind, although a few may still demand restraint. Since the Soleimani killing, Trump has already gained plaudits from members of Congress welcoming his tough line on threats to US national security, but others have cautioned that Iran's expected deadly response puts US personnel at risk.

Election considerations

Trump's decision whether to escalate further would then depend on how much control he feels he has over the process ahead. A key determinant would be if US lives were lost: it would be far more difficult for the president not to react if military or diplomatic personnel were injured or killed in Iran's response.

Trump has already drawn a parallel between the blockade of the US embassy in Baghdad and the deadly 2012 attack on the US embassy in Benghazi, Libya. Such comparisons could easily be enough to spur a US counter-reaction.

However, an Iranian response that obliges him to retaliate once again -- perhaps with a more direct focus on Tehran -- is a risk for Trump in an election year. On the campaign trail, it will be far harder to sell a de facto war with Iran to voters than the image of a tough president looking out for US interests in international affairs. The preference will be to rely on aircraft and missiles rather than ground forces.

Trump's opponents seeking the 2020 Democratic presidential nomination are already painting his strike on Soleimani as rash, arguing it increases the danger level facing the United States and the risk of war and wider Middle Eastern instability. As the 2020 election process gets further underway, this will be a key part of the foreign policy debate (see UNITED STATES: Foreign policy narrative turns to 2020 - October 7, 2019).

The US route to potential de-escalation is therefore bound up with domestic political imperatives. As president, Trump calls the shots in military matters, but past presidents have been reined in by officers such as defence secretaries; that could be a route out of further escalation, though many of Trump's senior national security appointees are newly appointed.

If the Democrats won the House of Representatives and Senate this November, after January 2021 they would likely initiate further moves to try to constrain a re-elected Trump's foreign policy powers, but Trump would make full use of his veto power (see UNITED STATES: War Powers fight will grow - April 5, 2019). Concerns within Congress that Trump seemingly did not involve the legislature in his decision to make the strike and over whether his decision to make the strike was legally founded are nothing new and will likely come to nothing.

Foreign relations

With wide international criticism of the strike, there is a possibility that this and potential further escalatory actions could strain US relationships with key allies. For example, reports today suggest that UK Prime Minister Boris Johnson was not informed of the attack in advance.

Meanwhile, North Korea will note the unexpected US action and will watch closely how the situation unfolds. Pyongyang's patience has worn thin with the Trump administration, which wants rapprochement and denuclearisation, over the lack of sanctions relief.

US policy towards Iran and North Korea is not parallel (for one, North Korea is already nuclear-armed) but Pyongyang will analyse what it takes for the administration to initiate a strike, or to back down.