Russia's Putin clarifies options but not his future
The prime minister has handed in his notice as the president sets out plans for systemic change
Prime Minister Dmitry Medvedev and his government resigned yesterday shortly after President Vladimir Putin's parliamentary address setting out a plan for constitutional reform. Without explicitly saying so, the proposals create a menu of options for Putin's future role now that he has made it clear he will not be president after 2024. Putin has been under pressure to make his intentions clear, especially as the established elite must fear the loss of their patron.
What next
Putin's roadmap indicates the next president will be less powerful than he, although the terms of the final political settlement are deliberately unclear. He says the constitutional reforms can be approved by parliament -- this could be done in months or even weeks -- but has also suggested a 'public vote', possibly some kind of referendum, which would be a complex exercise. Medvedev's replacement, Mikhail Mishustin, will be tasked with delivering growth and development but with little political clout. He may be an interim figure.
Subsidiary Impacts
- Further statements by Putin are likely to be just as ambiguous on his plans for himself and the state.
- The prospect of a weaker presidency is a setback for elite figures biding their time to make a bid.
- Once a new cabinet settles in, it will come under close scrutiny for its delivery of Putin's national development goals.
Analysis
Putin's proposals would transform the political system into a semi-presidential structure with parliament the source of much executive power, although the next president will retain significant authority (see RUSSIA: Putin offers guarded plan for political change - January 15, 2020).
The changes will shift the balance of power between president and parliament and elevate the State Council from an informal into a formal institution. These three institutions offer him a selection of post-2024 roles, allowing him to manoeuvre and choose his route nearer the end of his term -- even sooner, if he decides to step down earlier.
The new arrangements will come into force only after Putin leaves office. Key points include the following:
- The State Duma (lower chamber of parliament), not the president as now, appoints the prime minister, who in turn nominates cabinet ministers; the president is not allowed to reject their nominations.
- The president can still dismiss the prime minister and the government for poor performance, and can also dissolve parliament.
- The president still controls the armed forces and security services.
- The Federation Council (upper chamber) gains greater powers to dismiss supreme and constitutional court judges.
- The State Council, an assembly comprising selected regional governors, political party leaders and the upper and lower chamber speakers that advises the president, is given a formal constitutional role. Putin currently chairs the council.
Tax chief promoted
Soon after Putin concluded his televised address, he met Medvedev. Government ministers (who by then had gone back to their offices) were summoned to a meeting to hear of their dismissal. Senior officials told media they were unaware this was going to happen.
Putin offered Medvedev the deputy chairmanship (a new post) of the Security Council, on which top army and security service officials sit.
This looks like a definite signal that Medvedev is not part of Putin's future plans.
The Medvedev government has often been criticised for failing to stimulate GDP growth and recently for lagging behind on delivering the 'National Projects' that require investment to make Russia richer, better connected, more competitive, healthier and more educated (see RUSSIA: State plans will weigh on regional finances - January 9, 2020).
Medvedev may be out of the picture for good
Mishustin says he will make changes to government and focus on delivering the National Projects. As head of the Federal Tax Service, he has been praised for digitalising the tax return system to curb corruption.
He is a technocrat with no political baggage to enmesh him in intra-elite politics, installed to deliver economic and governance results and steer Russia safely through the constitutional change period.
Putin leaves his options open
The changes in themselves provide insufficient clarity to say what Putin is planning (if he knows himself), but create scope for a range of scenarios. All have the unspoken premise that the new president can be controlled by the current elite and cannot easily replace the powerful heads of state corporations, security service heads and others, and deprive them of their assets (see RUSSIA: Succession talk reflects drift and uncertainty - October 28, 2019).
Events in Kyrgyzstan, where former President Almazbek Atambayev is on trial and his associates have been ousted by his successor Sooronbay Jeenbekov, whom he carefully handpicked, serve as a warning of the risks of 'winner takes all' (see KYRGYZSTAN: Former leader's arrest dents democracy - August 14, 2019).
Putin as prime minister
If Putin becomes prime minister under a new president, he will have an independent power base in parliament, and can potentially build the role into something stronger.
This option entails problems:
- Putin would have to focus principally on domestic issues in an unpromising economic environment. His preference in recent years has been foreign policy. He must also turn around the public image of a parliament and governing United Russia that are consistently much less popular than he is as president.
- He can only be a strong prime minister if the president remains weak. That president will serve six years, not four as was the case when Putin ceded the presidency to Medvedev in 2008. In that time, a president could gain power and popularity, and elite support could shift to him/her. Putin would be vulnerable to summary dismissal.
- Finally, the shift in executive power is a challenge to the Kremlin, as an institution with its own authority independent of who is president.
'Father of the nation' role
If Putin uses the State Council as his vehicle, this new (in formal terms) institution represents a challenge to the established institutions of state. The primary risks here are that as the new body tries to acquire powers, the result will be duplication and confusion.
Still, this scenario would allow Putin to ease himself out of active politics, opting in only when he wants to correct the political course.
Kazakhstan's 'leader of the nation' model, where Nursultan Nazarbayev ostensibly gave way to his successor President Kassym-Jomart Tokayev, now serves as a bad example. As Nazarbayev appears at events at home and abroad in a quasi-presidential role, Kazakhstan appears to have two heads of state -- and crucially, two sources of political patronage (see KAZAKHSTAN: Tokayev weakened by ceding power - October 22, 2019).
Parliamentary leader
Putin could become speaker of the State Duma or, less likely, the Federation Council, once both have greater powers.
The argument against this, for now, is that a truly powerful parliament still looks an unlikely prospect -- and the president will still have superior powers. Optics also matter: this job shift would also look like a demotion. Putin himself has never taken parliament seriously.
Party boss
Putin could wield indirect political power as head of United Russia, a role now held by Medvedev. This is a less likely scenario since United Russia has never behaved as a ruling party and its popularity (together with Medvedev's) has plummeted in the opinion polls over recent years.
Mixed roles
It is quite possible that Putin will decide on more than one of the above options, combining two roles to create a sense of authority greater than its constituent parts.
Quiet retirement
All these scenarios assume that Putin wants to hold most or de facto all political power through the 2020s.
He might also leave the political scene. This requires him -- and at least as importantly, his elite supporters and dependents -- to be confident that the new president will do them no harm.
It may be wrong to assume Putin plans to direct politics after 2024
This model was tried by Leonid Kuchma when he stepped down as Ukrainian president in 2005. Before leaving office, he strengthened parliament so that his successor would be constrained by legislators.
Managing public expectations
Putin will want to ensure constitutional changes are embedded in advance of any further moves, so that people get used to them. He will be acutely mindful of the link between Russia's constantly disappointing economic progress and popular resentment about poverty, wages outstripped by inflation, and miscellaneous concerns about waste disposal and state corruption.
He will also be mindful of the protests of 2011-12 ahead of his return to the presidency. A survey conducted by Paul Chaisty and Stephen Whitefield (2013) at the University of Oxford found that most respondents (52%) were against presidents changing the constitution to stay in power. Significantly, these respondents were the most likely to support protests. Repeated in 2018, the poll showed a lower proportion (43%) were against changes that would enable Putin to stay in office but that this category was again most likely to back protests.
