Vote narratives have no lasting relevance for Russians
Campaigning focused on making Russia 'more Russian', but officials now admit it was all about the president
The package of constitutional amendments passed in a 'people's vote' entered into force on July 4. The changes enable Vladimir Putin to run for the presidency again in 2024 and 2030, despite his repeated promises not to do so. As the authorities went all-out to secure the right result, the early voting process was less than transparent and there were numerous reports of abuses and fraud on the day.
What next
Pre-vote campaigning focused on bolstering the Russian state, but the Kremlin is now presenting the result as a personal victory for Putin. Neither narrative will have lasting traction for a population focused on its own hardship, or for a government trying to steer Russia's economy through adverse circumstances with no prospect of rapid improvement.
Subsidiary Impacts
- The key short-term factor for political uncertainty is the duration of the COVID-19 crisis.
- The Kremlin has deflected blame from itself so far but a deepening health crisis could make this unsustainable.
- Following claims of vote-rigging, election commission chief Ella Pamfilova may be sacrificed ahead of the parliamentary elections.
Analysis
The constitutional amendments were passed in 84 of Russia's 85 regions, with 77.9% in favour overall and 21.3% against, on a 68.0% turnout achieved by conducting online and in-person voting for five days before the ballot date (see RUSSIA: Putin secures his future - July 3, 2020).
The new constitutional rules allow Putin to seek two more terms, taking him to 2036. Other changes establish immunity for former presidents, alter procedures for appointing ministers and expand the powers of the Constitutional Court.
The concerted official campaign made no mention of Putin's future and instead focused on general ideological themes: Russian sovereignty and strength, steadfast refusal to cede territories such as Crimea, 'traditional family values' and so on. All this is already enshrined in state policy and practice, and will not really be bolstered by a rewritten constitution.
Once the vote was over, Kremlin spokesman Dmitry Peskov changed the narrative: this was, he said, a "triumphal referendum on trust in President Putin". State Duma speaker Vyacheslav Volodin used similar language.
This messaging appears to be directed at any Russian elite members thinking of positioning themselves for a post-Putin era. Succession, and discussion of it, are now off the agenda until the 2030s (see RUSSIA: Putin plan easier to sell to elite than public - March 16, 2020).
Constitutional change will have little practical meaning for most Russians
Neither message -- Russia's unique greatness or trust in Putin -- amounts to a viable, forward-looking platform that will inspire a population facing further impoverishment because of the dual economic impacts of COVID-19 and low oil prices, with no prospect of significant recovery (see PROSPECTS H2 2020: Russian politics - June 12, 2020 and see RUSSIA: Sound finances will help during dual shocks - June 5, 2020)
Super-support and rejection
The voting showed patterns similar to trends of recent years. Areas under tighter political control produced hard-to-believe results: Chechnya (98% in support of the amendments), Tuva (97%) and Crimea (90%).
Support was significantly lower in Siberia and the Far East. Large 'no' votes were recorded in Yakutia (41%), Irkutsk (36%) and Khabarovsk (37%) -- higher than in Moscow (35%).
Low turnout correlated strongly with a higher 'no' vote. In 16 regions where under 50% of the electorate voted, close to one-third of voters opposed the amendments. Khabarovsk and Irkutsk showed the lowest turnout of any region, at around 40%. Both regions have elected opposition governors in the recent past.
In Moscow, turnout was higher (54%), partly due to electronic voting. Voting here followed district-level patterns established in recent elections. The boycott campaign led by anti-corruption campaigner Alexey Navalny and the Yabloko party may have depressed turnout in districts where opposition support is high.
The 'no' vote was strong in many central Moscow districts, where more than 40% voted against the amendments. The gentrification of some outlying suburbs appears to have strengthened the 'no' vote there, too. Hostility to the amendments was not just a middle-class affair: there were strong 'no' vote in less affluent parts of the city. Local issues appear to have contributed in several north-eastern districts.
Local grievances had an impact elsewhere. In the one region that rejected the constitutional changes, the energy-rich Nenets autonomous region, voter were expressing opposition to a planned merger with neighbouring Arkhangelsk region.
In Arkhangelsk itself, a large protest vote was evident in districts that have seen campaigns against waste disposal policies over recent years, specifically the sense that Moscow and other wealthier areas dump their waste on them.
Ballot-rigging
Reports of electoral fraud are supported by statistical analysis that showed large anomalies in vote distribution. Examples include:
- reports of numerous cases of multiple voting;
- evidence of ballot stuffing in the Moscow district of Ramenka that resulted in the cancellation of the vote;
- a journalist assaulted and seriously injured at a polling station in St Petersburg; and
- ballot papers reportedly modified in Yakutia to boost the 'yes' vote.
The preceding week of voting was used to mobilise turnout among state employees, and this system may be applied in future elections. The electronic voting experiment was not an unmitigated success for the Kremlin. It did significantly boost turnout -- 93% in Moscow -- but it also increased the opposition vote. In Moscow, 38% of votes were against the amendments, and in Nizhny Novgorod region the figure was 40%.
Despite concerns about electronic voting including fake voter registration, voters were able to decrypt their ballot choices, allowing for some monitoring of the count.
The Central Electoral Commission (CEC) was heavily criticised, and the Communist Party has called for an official investigation. Voting procedures were lax at times, the counting system 'malfunctioned' (turnout data varied unaccountably through the day) and the CEC broke the convention of not reporting exit polls until the vote was over.
Implications for political management
The Kremlin will decide what lessons to draw; these will shape elections at regional level in September and then to the State Duma in 2021.
One likely response is to address some specific grievances that contributed to the 'no' vote. Nenets region has announced that it will not support plans for a merger with Arkhangelsk. The initial response in May was to defer until next year -- but not abandon -- plans for a local referendum on the merger.
The Kremlin will note with satisfaction that opposition forces proved incapable of formulating and delivering a coherent boycott or 'no' vote strategy. This may be somewhat misleading: the effects of COVID-19 lockdown made it difficult to mobilise and the campaign against the amendments was by its very nature negative rather than offering an alternative; this will not be true of future elections.
The sense that ballot-rigging has become blatant and accepted could provide a focal point for protest in next year's Duma elections. Resentment at this could compound the hardship caused by the COVID-19 crisis, building more hostile public sentiment.
The large 'no' vote despite a heavily orchestrated campaign has electoral implications
With these risks in mind, the authorities may consider bringing the Duma elections forward. They could argue that changes to the political structure set out in the amended constitution should happen sooner rather than later. However, rescheduling would bring its own dangers, such as voter fatigue.
The fundamental lesson may that although the constitutional vote was held in circumstances heavily weighted in the authorities' favour, 16 million Russians voted 'no' and many more did not vote at all. This expression of opposition will be much more visible in Duma elections.
