Russia and China will not rush to fill Afghan void
Moscow and Beijing have more to worry about than rejoice at in the new Afghanistan
Western commentary that Russia and China are keen to exploit the US absence from Afghanistan overstates their willingness actively to insert themselves as security actors. For both states, a swift takeover of power in Afghanistan is preferable to either prolonged civil war or a power vacuum. Their objectives are more defensive than acquisitive: averting broader regional instability, preventing jihadist expansion in their spheres of influence and in Russia's case, blocking large refugee flows.
What next
It is doubtful that diplomatic recognition will be followed by more substantial economic or military engagement by either China or Russia. Instead, their priorities will be containment, perhaps with some judicious assistance for Afghanistan, pressing the Taliban to deal with jihadist groups of particular concern and strengthening relationships in Central Asia.
Subsidiary Impacts
- Afghanistan's relevance to the Chinese-Russian relationship is likely to diminish.
- Russia and China will gain some leverage from deciding whether Afghanistan retains observer status in the Shanghai Cooperation Organisation.
- Russia has made it clear it wants no large refugee flows to Central Asia, still less to its own territory.
Analysis
For most of the last two decades, Russia and China have had the best of both worlds, criticising Washington's military presence and questioning talk of withdrawal.
Both have derived some pleasure from the undignified Western exit from Afghanistan. Russian commentary is already using the narrative of defeat in Afghanistan to question Western democracy-building efforts abroad and NATO's capacity.
Russian and Chinese media are portraying Ukraine and Taiwan as weak states comparable to Afghanistan and questioning whether they could expect US support in a military emergency.
Russia and China will use the situation in and around Afghanistan to advance broader interests in Eurasia. Through various diplomatic formats, they will position themselves as regional leaders.
Diplomatic efforts will primarily involve regional states. Russia reacted sceptically to the proposals for a G20 debate on Afghanistan. Beijing and Moscow have experimented with various formats for negotiations, with overlapping and different regional partners, but none has evolved into a durable platform.
Afghanistan offers Russia a relatively cheap way to demonstrate great-power credentials. It prepared the ground by hosting Taliban delegations in Moscow several times.
Beijing's ties with Islamabad provide a particular avenue for engaging with and exercising influence over the Taliban.
Timing recognition
Neither Beijing nor Moscow can wholeheartedly welcome an Islamic fundamentalist group running a country bordering Chinese and Central Asian territory. Unlike in 1996 (when the Taliban first captured Kabul), this time they were at least prepared for it.
As realists, they will not be as dismayed as other states by the new Afghan cabinet, entirely Taliban-staffed and decidedly not 'inclusive', as was promised (see AFGHANISTAN: Cabinet reflects intra-Taliban balance - September 8, 2021 and see AFGHANISTAN: Taliban pause to decide how to rule - August 16, 2021).
They are likely to take a pragmatic approach and recognise the Taliban government. Both have a preference for political status quos but are able to adapt if a new arrangement emerges, as long as it is not pro-Western.
Neither was invested in the Afghan governments of 2001-21.
Diplomatic recognition is likely, but acceptance will not be unreserved
A day after the Taliban captured Kabul, Chinese foreign ministry spokesperson Hua Chunying said her government was ready to develop "good-neighbourly, friendly and cooperative relations with Afghanistan", but stopped short of promising recognition.
Chinese Foreign Minister Wang Yi met a Taliban delegation in late July (see AFGHANISTAN/CHINA: Taliban may not live up to pledges - July 28, 2021).
Russia's special envoy and veteran Afghan policy guru Zamir Kabulov claimed that he found the Taliban more amenable to negotiations than the "puppet" government of President Mohammad Ashraf Ghani (see AFGHANISTAN/RUSSIA: Moscow claims success - August 17, 2021). At the same time, Russia's foreign ministry has said a decision to remove the Taliban from its list of terrorist organisations depends on the group's actions in government.
For both countries, engagement will be cautious. Beyond recognition, deeper involvement may not follow.
Trusting the Taliban
Alongside outreach to the new Afghan government, officials in Moscow and Beijing will scrutinise Taliban adherence to promises not to offer sanctuary to global jihadists. After all, this is one of the commitments contained in the February 2020 US-Taliban agreement that triggered peace talks and the US withdrawal process, and the Taliban have reneged on most of the rest (see AFGHANISTAN: Islamic State risk is Taliban priority - September 8, 2021).
Main concerns
Russia has repeatedly warned of the presence of Islamic State and Central Asian-origin jihadists close to the borders of Tajikistan and Uzbekistan, and one argument it used during the Taliban's rapid advance through northern Afghanistan was that the group would clear them out.
Beijing's main preoccupation is the presence of Uighur militants in Afghanistan. Meeting Taliban representatives in July, Foreign Minister Wang Yi urged them to clamp down on the East Turkestan Islamic Movement. The Taliban gave general assurances that Afghanistan would "not be used against any country's security", though nothing specific on the Uighurs.
Strategic responses
China maintains a paramilitary police outpost in eastern Tajikistan to keep an eye on the Wakhan Corridor, the route up to the Afghan-Xinjiang frontier. This implies a defensive approach rather than power projection (see CHINA: Beijing will build buffer with Afghanistan - December 4, 2018).
Beijing does not advertise its security presence in Tajikistan, probably to reassure Moscow about its intentions and acknowledge that Central Asia security is still (mostly) Russia's domain.
Russia has maintained its largest foreign military presence in Tajikistan since 1991, and has been up-arming forces there, based well inside the country. The Afghan crisis may allow it to pressure Tajikistan to allow troops to be deployed on the Afghan border (Russian frontier troops left in 2005) (see CENTRAL ASIA/AFGHANISTAN: Moscow engages with Taliban - July 13, 2021).
Moscow will strive to build greater defence cooperation with the southern Central Asian states, both through and outside the Collective Security Treaty Organisation (CSTO).
It recently conducted wargames with Uzbekistan, not a CSTO member (see UZBEKISTAN-RUSSIA: Wargames show rare unity - July 20, 2021). The Russian airbase in Kyrgyzstan offers useful additional strike capacity. Only Turkmenistan seems determined to go its own way and seek a separate accommodation with the Taliban.
Chinese investment
The promise of substantial Chinese investment in Afghan reconstruction has been mentioned repeatedly, often in reports citing unnamed officials. So has the lure of Afghanistan's untapped mineral wealth.
The likelihood of such investment materialising needs to be weighed against China's aversion to high security risks, its opportunities to invest at lower cost elsewhere and the limited political gains of a relationship with the Taliban.
Years of conflict have left Afghanistan outside the framework of China's Belt and Road Initiative and the China Pakistan Economic Corridor. Beijing's positive rhetoric about the Taliban might suggest it will rush to include Afghanistan in the mix, but it has many reasons for restraint.
The direct route through the 90-kilometre Chinese-Afghan border is inaccessible, through mountainous territory without a proper road, and Beijing may hesitate to upgrade it, for security reasons.
China will weigh mining opportunities against security risks
Taliban spokesman Suhail Shaheen said in July that the group would welcome Chinese investment in Afghan reconstruction and guarantee the safety of investors and workers. Despite such assurances, the risks of militant violence will remain a deterrent for Chinese investors (see PAKISTAN/CHINA: China may do more on Pakistan security - July 16, 2021).
A copper mining project at Aynak, south of Kabul, has suffered multiple attacks. So has CNPC-run oil extraction in northern Afghanistan. Both projects have stalled, although oil extraction is made viable through linkages with nearby Turkmenistan, where China has significant hydrocarbon interests. The copper mine's prospects are based on the less likely assumption that a rail freight route can be built to Mazar-e Sharif and then Uzbekistan.
