Seoul’s new assertiveness recasts Korean missile race
An unprecedented week of missile launches by both Koreas has wide-ranging implications
On September 11-12, Pyongyang tested new long-range cruise missiles capable of reaching all of South Korea and most of Japan. On September 15, it launched two ballistic missiles from a train for the first time. Hours later, South Korea carried out its first official test of a submarine-launched ballistic missile (SLBM), becoming the eighth nation to develop this capability, and announced previously undisclosed tests of supersonic cruise missiles.
What next
Seoul seeks to show Pyongyang -- and Beijing -- that its own weapons can counter any threat. Both Koreas will test more missiles in the coming months, possibly including the North’s largest inter-continental ballistic missile yet. New inter-Korean talks are now unlikely before South Korean President Moon Jae-in leaves office in May. Pyongyang will continue to rebuff Washington’s overtures. The peninsula’s arms race will heat up.
Subsidiary Impacts
- Testing the SLBM while China's foreign minister was in Seoul signals defiance of Chinese pressure not to side with the United States.
- The unusually robust riposte to North Korean missiles should boost the ruling Democratic Party by showing it is not soft on Pyongyang.
- The North Korean tests demonstrate the continued advance of Pyongyang's capabilities, despite sanctions and economic crisis.
- Seoul's growing capabilities make it a more useful US ally, but also more able to act independently in ways Washington might not want.
- Further North Korean threats will play into Japan's upcoming prime ministerial election, favouring the more hawkish candidates.
Analysis
Last week's Korean missile launches are unprecedented in both intensity and reciprocity.
North Korea
On September 11-12 -- the date is no coincidence -- North Korea tested a new long-range cruise missile. The country's Academy of National Defence Science described it as a "strategic weapon", code for the ability to carry a nuclear warhead, though this would require the technological capacity to miniaturise the ballistic-missile-sized warheads now in development.
As the missiles flew low, in a figure of eight so that they remained over Northern territory, the launches went undetected -- or unpublicised -- till Pyongyang boasted of them on September 13. Both missiles flew a claimed 1,500 kilometres, meaning they could reach all of South Korea and most of Japan. Unlike ballistic missiles, UN Security Council (UNSC) resolutions do not ban North Korea from testing cruise missiles.
On September 15, South Korea's Joint Chiefs of Staff said that the North fired two ballistic missiles. Flying 800 kilometres, these landed (according to Tokyo) in waters within Japan's exclusive economic zone.
The next day, Pyongyang issued photographs and video showing the missiles were launched from a train. This is a first, as hitherto all its ballistic missiles have been road-mobile. These short-range ballistic missiles are thought to be the KN-23 model, first tested in March.
South Korea
Hours later, Moon observed Seoul's first official test of a submarine-launched ballistic missile (SLBM). On September 7, Yonhap, the quasi-official news agency, reported two earlier tests, which at the time the defence ministry refused to confirm.
This makes South Korea the eighth nation to develop an SLBM, and the only non-nuclear power. North Korea tested SLBMs in 2016 and 2019.
Separately, the same day South Korea also tested long-range air-to-surface missiles.
Additionally, on September 15, the defence ministry released footage of three further recent weapons tests:
- supersonic cruise missiles, tested "some time last year";
- a "high-power" ballistic missile with an increased conventional warhead capacity; no date for the test was given; and
- a combustion test of solid propulsion engines for space-launch vehicles on July 29.
Multiple messages
This unprecedented show of force by South Korea on a single day marks a break with past practice. Previous North Korean missile launches often seemed to catch Seoul on the back foot: either failing to spot them, or sometimes reluctant, for political reasons and despite clear evidence, to identify a Northern projectile launch as a ballistic missile test, forbidden under UN Security Council resolutions.
This time, although Seoul missed (or chose not to publicise) North Korea's cruise missile tests days earlier, it swiftly reported September 15's short-range ballistic missiles and named them as such.
Seoul has rarely if ever responded in kind, preferring bland calls for peace
September 15's multiple salvo by South Korea -- two launches on the day, as well as publicising three recent tests, all of different weapons systems -- marks a distinct change of tack and a bluntly physical response. Evidently carefully planned -- hence not a direct riposte to North Korea's ballistic missile tests, but possibly to the cruise missile launches revealed two days earlier -- this volley sends a number of messages, on at least five different fronts.
North Korea
In media coverage, for once South Korea upstaged the North, which is used to being the sole focus and monopolising the narrative.
Substantively, the South showed it has weapons that are more than a match for the North's. While unsurprising given South Korea's US alliance and far larger economy, Moon does not usually rub this in.
Politically, Seoul no longer cares about Pyongyang's reactions. Nor does Moon expect any further inter-Korean progress in his final few months (his presidential term ends on May 9).
Though Pyongyang derided Seoul's SLBM as a "clumsy" first step, this riposte and a plaintive comment by Kim Jong-un's sister suggest the North is rattled. Kim Yo-jong called Moon's reference to countering North Korean "provocation" an "improper remark" and a "thoughtless utterance".
China
Moon watched the SLBM test while Chinese Foreign Minister Wang Yi was visiting Seoul.
Timing this show of force during Wang's visit is a change of tack. Hitherto Moon had tiptoed around China (in sharp contrast to his robustness towards Japan), partly because he sought a visit by President Xi Jinping. Criticised by opponents as appeasement, and with polls showing South Koreans dislike China even more than North Korea or Japan, this reticence may now be over.
While not picking a fight, Moon wants all comers, not just North Korea, to appreciate that South Korea is a match for any aggressor or bully.
South Koreans now dislike China even more than North Korea and Japan
United States
September 15's display showcased the 'missile sovereignty' that South Korea has regained after its agreement with the Biden administration that Seoul can abandon long-standing limits on range and payload (see SOUTH KOREA: Ending missile cap has regional impacts - June 17, 2021).
US-China tensions are pushing Seoul closer to Washington (see SOUTH KOREA: Biden-Moon summit indicates a new realism - May 28, 2021).
However, growing indigenous technological capacity is a double-edged sword: creating a stronger and more equal ally, but also one potentially more able to act independently.
Domestic politics
With campaigning for the presidential election in March next year in full swing, September 15's salvo also aims to boost the ruling Democratic Party's chances of retaining the Blue House after Moon, who cannot run again.
One aim is to rebut conservatives' claims that the liberal Democratic Party is soft on enemies and neglects defence. In fact, on Moon's watch defence spending has risen much faster than under his right-wing predecessor, Park Geun-hye (see SOUTH KOREA: Defence ambitions may exceed capabilities - May 14, 2021).
Another is to reassure the Democrats' left-nationalist base that South Korea is no mere US client. Moon has failed to achieve the transfer of operational control of joint forces in wartime from Washington to Seoul during his term, as he hoped to do. Demonstrating powerful indigenously produced weapons not dependant on the United States gives some consolation.
Marketing
Testing and displaying advanced weapons systems also has commercial motives. Rapidly growing sales made South Korea the world's ninth-largest arms exporter in 2016-20. Here as in other industrial sectors, Seoul's abiding goals and modus operandi are to acquire foreign technologies, indigenise them and then export them.
