North Korea’s missiles are a double defeat for allies
Pyongyang is launching missiles at an unprecedented pace
Last month was North Korea’s busiest yet for missile tests, with launches on January 5, 11, 14, 17, 25, 27 and 30. They included new models which can penetrate missile defence systems. Despite this, three UN Security Council (UNSC) meetings failed to agree on the usual condemnatory resolution, and so did not pass one.
What next
The Beijing Winter Olympics have brought a diplomatic pause, but the launches will almost certainly resume later this year. They may could include intercontinental ballistic missiles (ICBMs) for the first time since 2017, and perhaps a fresh nuclear test. A satellite launch is also possible.
Subsidiary Impacts
- Given the state of China-US relations, Beijing may not mind these tests and may even find them useful; nuclear tests are another matter.
- The UNSC’s visible disarray is a major political win for Pyongyang.
- The new missiles display speed and manoeuvrability that challenge conventional missile defences -- a wider global problem.
- Pyongyang's missile tests are a negative for the pro-engagement progressive candidate in South Korea's presidential election in March.
Analysis
Pyongyang's flurry of missile tests in January was unprecedented in its intensity and in the quality and variety of weapons. Eleven projectiles of six different kinds were fired in seven separate launch events.
Pyongyang's missile arsenal is fast becoming more diverse and capable
North Korean officials said the January 5 and 11 launches were missiles fitted with hypersonic manoeuvrable re-entry vehicles. The first had a conical 'glide vehicle', as fitted in an earlier launch in September of the new Hwasong-8 missile. It flew a claimed 700 kilometres. The second, which North Korean leader Kim Jong-un personally witnessed, went 1,000 kilometres.
On January 14, the Railway Mobile Missile Regiment fired two missile in its second train-launched test (the first was in September). South Korea's military said they travelled 430 kilometres (their potential range is 690 kilometres), reaching an altitude of 36 kilometres and a speed of Mach 6.
These projectiles, unnamed by Pyongyang, appear to be what external analysts have dubbed the KN-23: a solid-fuel short-range ballistic missile closely resembling Russia's Iskander-M and South Korea's Hyunmoo-2b, first tested in 2019.
On January 17 and 27, two pairs of short-range ballistic missiles were fired from launchers on road transporters, either tracked or wheeled. State media called them "tactical guided missiles" but gave no names or performance data. Seoul's military said the first pair flew 380 kilometres; these are thought to be KN-24 missiles, similar to the KN-23 but perhaps based more on indigenous research. The second pair were KN-23s. Frequently tested, no KN-23 is ever known to have failed. They could reach Seoul in one minute.
Pyongyang's KN-23 missiles could reach Seoul in one minute
On January 25, two "updated" long-range cruise missiles hit an island target 1,800 kilometres away after a 152-minute flight. There was an earlier cruise missile test in September (see NORTH KOREA: New missiles have multiple targets - October 25, 2021).
The last test, on January 30, was the largest: a Hwasong-12 intermediate-range ballistic missile with a 4,500-kilometre range. First tested three times in 2017 overflying Japan, this time it was launched in a near-vertical trajectory "in consideration of neighbouring countries" and sent images from space. In 2017, Pyongyang threatened to target Guam; this time it was spun as a routine evaluation test.
Multiple motives
North Korea had several cogent reasons for this flurry of launches now.
Development
Any weapons programme requires testing. Though each successful launch augments Pyongyang's menace, official media this time refrained from bluster, instead stressing routine aspects. The subtext aim is to gain acceptance as a normal, responsible missile power. (North Korea's ballistic missile activity is banned by UNSC resolutions, but these do not cover other missiles.)
Operational readiness
The railway-mounted launches were at short notice: the order came the same day. Besides "checking the alert posture" of the regiment, this may have been an instant riposte to Washington's sanctioning on January 12 of five named North Koreans, accused of procuring goods for Pyongyang's ballistic missile and nuclear weapons programmes.
Fulfilment
In these and earlier tests, Pyongyang is steadily fulfilling specific commitments made by Kim at the Eighth Party Congress in January 2020, including the development of hypersonic glide vehicles as missile warheads (see NORTH KOREA: Pyongyang will be poorer but better armed - January 22, 2021).
This is a five-year plan, so there will be more to come.
Window of impunity
The depth of winter adds logistical challenges, evidently surmounted.
That aside, this moment was well chosen. US preoccupation with the crisis over Ukraine gave Kim a window of impunity, knowing Washington has scant bandwidth to spare.
Home pride
An unprecedented defence exhibition in October showcased this new weaponry for a domestic audience. Amid an acknowledged food crisis, and with little else to offer, Kim may feel (or hope) that displays of missile strength will give people something to be proud of.
More coming
A Politburo meeting on January 19, chaired by Kim, warned that owing to US "hostile moves" North Korea will "reconsider" its "trust-building measures" and "promptly examine the issue of restarting all temporally suspended [sic] activities". This threatens an end to Pyongyang's moratorium since late 2017 on ICBM and nuclear tests.
North Korea's largest ICBM, the Hwasong-16 or 17, has been displayed (at a parade in October 2020) but not yet tested.
Kim's grandfather Kim Il-sung was born 110 years ago on April 15, 1912. The event may well be marked with 'fireworks'.
Space too?
On February 7, local media lauded the sixth anniversary of Pyongyang's last space launch, the Kwangmyongsong-4 earth-observation satellite, and promised to "surprise the world" on this front. This suggests space launches may be planned. These are forbidden by the UNSC, since space rockets use ballistic missile technology.
Demonstration effect: Two targets
Kim's main targets, in every sense, are a familiar duo of foes.
South Korea
Whoever succeeds Moon Jae-in as South Korea's president in May has been put on notice that the North's missile threat is formidable and ever-improving. Neither main candidate has any clear or consistent North Korea policy; unlike Moon, this is not their priority. That stance may soon require reconsideration.
United States
Whether or not Kim entertains any hopes of nuclear diplomacy with President Joe Biden, January's volley scored a direct political hit on Washington, which can no longer secure UNSC condemnation of Pyongyang's missile tests, nor even marshal its own allies. Its move instead to issue 'statements of the willing' merely underlined this impotence and disunity.
The first statement, on January 10, after North Korea's first missile test and before a UNSC meeting on it, mustered just six other signatories: Albania, France, Ireland, Japan and the United Kingdom.
A second statement on January 20 condemning three subsequent tests added two further UNSC members, Brazil and the United Arab Emirates.
A third statement, on February 4, berating the UNSC -- "the cost of the Council's ongoing silence is too high. It will embolden North Korea" -- added Norway. However, five more UNSC members -- Gabon, Ghana, India, Kenya and Mexico -- were absent.
Norway, which held the UNSC's rotating presidency during January, could have issued a presidential statement admonishing North Korea, but did not.
Beijing acquiesces?
Beijing's stance is key. A new nuclear test would also test it, as public opinion is hostile -- tremors can be felt in China's north-east.
Missiles are another matter. In the current state of China-US relations, Beijing may not mind Kim causing headaches for Biden.
