UNITED KINGDOM: Ulster Opportunity

Analysis

After the persistent failure to secure cross-party agreement on the establishment of the power-sharing executive for the new Northern Ireland Assembly, former US senator George Mitchell was asked to carry out a review of the peace process. Previous disagreement centred on the issue of the timing of the decommissioning of paramilitary weapons, with the unionists insisting that this take place prior to Sinn Fein being allowed to take up its seats on the executive (see UNITED KINGDOM: Ulster Crisis - OADB, July 19, 1999, IV. ; and UNITED KINGDOM: Ulster Crisis - OADB, March 9, 1999, II. ). The review has lasted several months and, in a series of scheduled statements, a way out of the current difficulty has now been established:

On November 15, Chairman of the Independent International Commission on Decommissioning General John de Chastelain stated that the implementation of the Good Friday agreement in all its aspects would create "a new context in which the situation will be transformed". He called on the paramilitaries to respond urgently by appointing authorised representatives to hold discussions about modalities with the International Commission, and then proposes to issue a report within days of such meetings.

On November 16, an Ulster Unionist Party (UUP) statement noted that nationalists had a legitimate right to seek a united Ireland and that if there were a "genuine and meaningful" response from the IRA to General de Chastelain's statement, then the political institutions set out in the 1998 agreement could be established -- that is, the power-sharing executive, the North-South Ministerial Council and the British-Irish Council (see UNITED KINGDOM: Ulster Agreement - OADB, April 15, 1998, I. ).

On the same day, Sinn Fein leader Gerry Adams stated that Sinn Fein was "confident" that the IRA remained committed to the objective of a permanent peace. In its statement, the party also accepted decommissioning as an "essential" part of the peace process and declared its belief that the issue of arms would be finally and satisfactorily settled under the aegis of the de Chastelain Commission. Sinn Fein also expressed its total and absolute commitment to pursue its objectives by exclusively peaceful and democratic means in accordance with the Good Friday agreement, its total opposition to any use of force or threat of force by others for any political purpose and its total opposition to punishment attacks.

Yesterday, the IRA announced that it would nominate a representative to meet the de Chastelain Commission once the political institutions have been established, and expressed its support for the Sinn Fein leadership.

Next steps . Following these initiatives, the key parties to the Good Friday agreement will need to consult their supporters:

The UUP's 850-strong council will gather, probably on November 27, to discuss and vote on the proposals to go into government with Sinn Fein effectively in advance of any actual decommissioning. UUP leader David Trimble must secure a majority to proceed.

Sinn Fein and IRA leaders will meet their members and supporters to ensure that their statements do not lead to a split within the republican movement.

If the UUP approves the plan, an executive could be established in early December and power could be devolved to the Northern Ireland Assembly before Christmas. There is a general expectation, though not confirmed, that the IRA may seek to support these developments by decommissioning some weapons, under the observation of General de Chastelain in January.

Unionist difficulties . The UUP is seriously divided on the way forward. A majority of the party's MPs were opposed to Trimble's position even before these latest concessions. Opinion polls in 1998 suggested that 25% of UUP voters voted against the agreement and that figure may have increased since. Anti-agreement members of the party will seek to have the proposals rejected on the grounds that they are a significant departure from the previous commitment not to enter government before arms were actually decommissioned.

Trimble is gambling that he can win widespread support at the larger Ulster Unionist Council (UUC). In the aftermath of the Good Friday agreement, he secured over 70% from that body despite the opposition of key elements of the leadership. With the backing of the party's largest institution he would have the necessary support to proceed, despite objections. While a defeat at the UUC is possible, it is unlikely and Trimble, based on previous votes, should secure a majority. However, if support is significantly reduced from 70%, that might encourage his opponents to walk out and seek to undermine him by splitting the party.

The balance between pro- and anti-agreement unionists in the UUP assembly party is also an area of concern. Even if Trimble wins the backing of the broader party, he needs to maintain the support of sufficient assembly members to form an executive and govern:

In the 1998 elections, anti-agreement unionists secured 28 seats, while the UUP won 28 and the pro-agreement Progressive Unionist Party won two.

Since then, one UUP member has defected leaving the position very evenly balanced. While Trimble has clear support from the majority of his assembly party, a majority of all unionists (and a majority of nationalists) must back an executive to proceed.

However, there are some technical possibilities in the event of a small number of transfers to the anti-agreement bloc:

The Women's Coalition (two seats) and the Alliance Party (five seats) could change designation. At the first meeting of the assembly in July 1998, parties were required to register a designation of identity in accordance with procedures formulated to ensure that key decisions were taken on a cross-community basis. The Women's Coalition and the Alliance Party both refused to be counted as either unionist or nationalist. They could decide to designate themselves as 'unionist' to increase the proportion of pro-agreement 'unionists'.

Decisions can also be made with as little as 40% of unionist support if both nationalist parties -- Sinn Fein and the SDLP -- are voting in favour.

However, in practice it may prove difficult, even if not legally impossible, for Trimble to continue if he represented only a minority of all mainstream unionists in the assembly.

Republican problems . There is little public evidence of a serious split within Sinn Fein or the IRA, but the nature of the organisations makes it more difficult to form a judgement. Dissident groups to date have been small and relatively insignificant (see UNITED KINGDOM: Ulster Ceasefire - OADB, September 2, 1999, I. ). There is little doubt that the Sinn Fein leadership places an absolute priority on avoiding a split in its own ranks and would be unlikely to have gone so far without some indication that it can sell the package. However, the actual destruction of IRA arms, if it occurs in January, will bring home the logic of the peace process to the IRA support base and may provide the focus for dissent and splits.

Future challenges . Even if the peace process survives the tensions of the next few weeks and the institutions are established, there are many other difficulties ahead:

The deal seems, on the unionist side, to be based on the likelihood of IRA decommissioning in the new year. However, there has been no such public commitment.

A decision needs to be taken early in the year on the future of policing in Northern Ireland. The very different perspectives on the RUC held by nationalists and the UUP will be bound to create tensions in any government.

There will also pressure to proceed with the 'equality issues', which include stronger fair employment legislation, support for Irish language schools, legal recognition for the Irish language and criminal law reform -- all of which have the capacity to be controversial.

Orange marches will return to the political agenda at Easter if no agreement is reached on the issue of parades through nationalist areas.