RUSSIA: Putin set to institute statist model

Analysis

Opinion about acting-President Vladimir Putin and what he represents divides into two basic camps. In Russia, the great majority welcome his seemingly decisive and businesslike approach as the only way to rebuild the ramshackle state and correct the social chaos and economic crisis bequeathed by first president Boris Yeltsin. Only a small minority, the most vocal of which are former dissidents such as Sergei Kovalev and Yelena Bonner, see Putin's approach as posing a real threat to fragile civil and human rights and liberties. Bonner has gone as far as to identify Putin with the introduction of a 'modernised Stalinism'.

In the West, some journalists and commentators echo the anxieties of the Russian minority. When Putin first came to prominence, similar concerns were voiced by some officials and politicians. Now that he has inherited Yeltsin's mantle and looks certain to become president, western leaders have strained to take a positive and optimistic view. UK Prime Minister Tony Blair's meetings with Putin in St Petersburg on March 10-11 have confirmed and arguably extended this. Both the UK and US governments have denied having endorsed Putin as a candidate for the presidential contest on March 26, but they clearly welcome the prospect of a Russian president who appears capable of effectively running the country. Protest over the violation of human rights in Chechnya has been minimised, in an effort not to alienate the man who they consider represents the best hope for stability and predictability in Russia -- features conducive to international order and business.

Public support . The presidential election looks set to be a plebiscite rather than anything resembling a real contest. Recent polls give Putin 55-60% of the vote, with Communist Party (KPRF) leader Gennadii Zuganov trailing at 15-18% and Yabloko's Grigorii Yavlinskii considerably below 10%. The image of success is strong still, with recent surveys suggesting that three-quarters of the electorate remains convinced that Putin will become president. Even a majority of KPRF supporters apparently think the same. Only two questions about the election remain open: whether Putin will muster the necessary majority in the first round on March 26, which seems likely; and whether, in the absence of a real contest, turnout will exceed the 50% necessary to validate the result. The prospects for this are also high -- polls suggest that three-in-four intend to vote.

The widespread support for Putin is rooted in his image as a decisive man of action. He continues to benefit from the Chechen war, despite considerable Russian casualties. At the start of this month, the official casualty figures were 1,420 killed and 3,869 wounded; and yet two-thirds of the population favours continuation of the military campaign until control is established. Other poll data suggest that support for firm military action has actually increased in the last month, despite higher casualty figures as a result of fierce fighting in Grozny and the mountains. Putin is personally identified with the ruthless and effective use of military force in the North Caucasus and is expected, as president, to strengthen Russia's much-depleted military capabilities. He has played to this popular expectation by announcing plans for large increases in defence expenditure and steps to ensure a better trained and larger conscript force, including the reintroduction of military education in schools.

Favourable perception . Putin's energetic conduct of the Chechen war has helped to establish his image as a vigorous young leader (he is 47-years-old) who gets things done. The prevalent perception of Putin as a 'doer' rather than a 'talker' is the key to his electoral appeal. This view contrasts sharply with the image of far more experienced politicians such as Yavlinskii, who are more knowledgeable about the economy but appear to most as being better at talking than acting decisively. Even members of the Moscow intelligentsia, who have usually voted for Yavlinskii as the only serious democratic contender for high political office, now consider Putin a more suitable candidate for the presidency.

Support for Putin reflects the widespread antipathy to 'democratic' politics, which are equated in the eyes of many with chaos, ineffective government and the enrichment of the dishonest. Few seem worried by the way in which Putin has moved almost beyond party politics, adopting a catch-all constituency. Initially associated with the reformers of the Union of Right Forces (SPS) and a member of the establishment Unity bloc, Putin has also forged a tactical, and some claim a strategic, alliance with the KPRF (see RUSSIA: Communist-Unity deal may hamper Putin's programme - OADB, January 21, 2000, I. ). Rather than regarding this as a major betrayal, most of his supporters seem to admire the move as a show of political skill and a laudable effort to build consensus in the Duma and good relations between the executive and legislature. Most of the public and even many parliamentary politicians seem highly impressed by Putin's use of the power of the Kremlin machine. The power of might has a long tradition in Russia and has been amply demonstrated by the crumbling of any real political opposition to Yeltsin's anointed successor. There was no strong criticism voiced when Putin recently supported the idea of extending the presidential term from four to seven years after the March election, giving himself the prospect of eleven years in office.

Policy promise . Putin has promised a full programme setting out his policies, including a new 'social contract', after the election. In the meantime, he has issued an election manifesto in the form of an open letter, long on general intent and short on policy specifics. The manifesto highlights the need for a 'strong and effective state' to fight crime, corruption and poverty. It echoes popular sentiment about the need to restore personal and national dignity in Russia.

So far, the main results of Putin's months as acting president have been a climate of increasing mobilisation and conformity with the official line. This has been most evident in the media, particularly television. With the exception of NTV, owned by Vladimir Gusinskii, the major networks have become more uniformly statist and pro-Kremlin in coverage and comment. The arrest and subsequent treatment of Radio Liberty correspondent Andrei Babitskii, who was covering the conflict in Chechnya, highlighted the extent of concern, expressed mainly by print journalists, about growing state constraints on freedom of speech. These issues were raised most vociferously at a large protest rally in Moscow in mid-February. The case, which involved the bizarre exchange of the Babitskii for Russian prisoners of war, revealed the arrogance of the military and security forces. With the success of the Chechen war and the campaign of national vigilance which has accompanied it, the military and security machines, long in decline, feel their time has finally come (see RUSSIA: Nuclear emphasis marks more nationalist stance - OADB, January 17, 2000, II. ). Putin's KGB background does not predetermine his policies, but it does dispose him to deal with political and economic problems by administrative means. Rather than create a system of incentives and competition, Putin is likely to concentrate on building and using a powerful administrative and security machine to increase state reach and control.