IRAN: Khatami Presidency

Analysis

Mohammed Khatami's overwhelming victory in the May 23 presidential election was unexpected. He received nearly 70% of the vote, far outpacing his nearest rival and pre- election favourite, majles speaker Ali Akbar Nategh Nuri. Despite support from powerful clerical groups, a majority of majles deputies and, less directly, from Iran's Spiritual Leader Ayatollah Ali Khamenei, the speaker gained only 25%. Turnout was officially estimated at over 90%, amongst the highest reported for an election since the early years of the Islamic revolution. This turnout, and the size of Khatami's majority, are a measure of the enthusiasm his candidacy generated amongst women, younger voters, the intelligentsia and the westernised urban middle class, whose participation in recent elections has been limited. Moreover, it suggests Khatami received unexpected support from traditional and rural areas, previously regarded as the stronghold of the conservative clergy -- for whom the result is a major blow.

New policies. The president-elect -- he is due to assume office in August -- provided no details about his proposed programme during the election campaign (see IRAN: Presidential Election - OADB, May 22, 1997, I. ). Nevertheless, he is perceived as an advocate of change. His stress on the need to strengthen civil society, respect individual rights and 'institutionalise' the constitution was interpreted as support for:

• easing the often harsh enforcement of the Islamic dress code and 'Islamic' codes of public and social behaviour, including intermixing between the sexes;
• reverting to the more liberal policies towards literature and the arts which he pursued between 1989 and 1992 during his tenure as minister of culture and Islamic guidance;
• limiting the repression of writers and the intelligentsia by state security agencies;
• easing political controls and diversifying the range of personnel in leadership roles by breaking the clerical monopoly over power; and
• economic policies that create jobs and encourage economic growth, thereby improving conditions for younger working and lower-middle-class Iranians.

Presidential strengths. Khatami enjoys the tacit support of the outgoing president, Ali Akbar Hashemi Rafsanjani, who remains powerful. Rafsanjani's influence will be enhanced through his role as chairman of the Expediency Council, which Khamenei intends to use as a policy advisory and government watch-dog organisation. Moreover, the outgoing president's position is further strengthened by the fact that Khatami's victory is an implicit endorsement of the more pragmatic policies which Rafsanjani pursued, with limited success, in the early years of his presidency.

The president-elect's candidacy was also endorsed by a bloc of around 80-90 majles members. This group may grow given Khatami's victory. Indeed, 200 deputies have pledged to cooperate fully with him. Khatami is also backed by a large group of young people and women who worked energetically for his campaign and who could serve to bolster his position if he can organise them successfully.

Obstacles ahead. In spite of his mandate and his support base, Khatami will face a number of problems in the future:

• Nategh Nuri remains speaker and his conservative coalition controls a majority of seats in the majles. The parliament, whose term continues for another three years, could easily frustrate Khatami's attempts to introduce social and cultural reforms, and to pursue a new economic policy, in the same way it frustrated Rafsanjani's reformist programme.
• Khatami's coalition of pragmatists and radical Islamists is unwieldy, supporting contradictory policy agendas. Moreover, he has no political organisation of his own. Much will depend on whether Khatami can shape his coalition into an effective political group. It has been suggested that the president-elect will move to authorise the establishment of political parties, although Khamenei has yet to endorsed the idea.
• The election campaign and the outcome have aroused heightened expectation of change, despite the fact that Khatami is a cleric and former cabinet minister who repeatedly emphasised the centrality of Islam to Iran's governmental and social structure, and his own loyalty to the existing system. Any failure by Khatami to introduce quick reform initiatives would disappoint the electorate.

The election also highlighted the deep divide in Iranian society. The ruling clergy, including Khamenei, believed that their main support base lay amongst the conservative clerics and the 'hardline' Islamist organisations and committees. In part to mollify this constituency, the clerical leadership has engaged in a rhetoric of Islamic morals, hostility to the western 'cultural onslaught' and a militant foreign policy, including support for Islamic movements abroad. However, the election has indicated the existence of a large constituency in favour of social, cultural and political reform (including improved contacts with the West) and economic improvement (including an end to official corruption, cronyism and inefficiency). The ruling clergy face a difficult dilemma in attempting to meet the conflicting aspirations of both these groups. The Rafsanjani presidency illustrated the difficulties of attempting to pursue shifts in policy in the face of the vested interests of the ruling clergy and the large para-statal foundations, the lack of movement in US policy and domestic fears that any fundamental changes will be perceived as an abandonment of the Islamic republic's revolutionary principles.

Policy questions. The future direction of policy and the degree to which Khatami will control it remain uncertain. Much will depend on Khamenei's approach to the new president and his policies. He appears to have three options:

• The spiritual leader may perceive the election result as a threat to his own position and policies. Under these circumstances, he is likely to attempt to neutralise Khatami by encouraging the president-elect's opponents.
• Khamenei may decide to respond to the desire for change by helping Khatami to control the hardliners. This would be a risky venture, requiring Khamenei to abandon his traditional support base in favour of Khatami's constituency. The spiritual leader would also need to reverse the rhetoric he has favoured over the past few years regarding the dangers of supposedly western-inspired ideals such as human and female rights.
• Khamenei could attempt to chart a middle course, making some concessions to Khatami's constituency without abandoning his own.

An important indicator will be the complexion of Khatami's cabinet. This will illustrate the composition of political forces in Iran, the concessions that Khatami feels obliged to make to various groups and the extent of Khamenei's control over cabinet-making. The education and Islamic guidance portfolios will be particularly significant in terms of likely cultural policy, while appointments to the economic ministries will indicate whether Khatami intends to make concessions to the economic radicals. Khatami, who is likely to appoint a woman to the cabinet, will have to follow Khamenei's directive in the appointment of the foreign minister and the minister of intelligence -- the removal of Ali Fallahian from the latter post would suggest that Khamenei is willing to rein in the security agencies.

The passage of legislation in the majles will also be an important indicator of Khatami's likely strength. He can ease book, press and cultural controls without referring to the assembly. However, parliamentary assistance would be required to remove existing legislation, such as the ban on satellite dishes, as well as any attempts to restrict the role of organisations such as the morals police and the large para- statal institutions. In these areas, parliamentary conservatives are most unlikely to yield; and Khatami, for his part, is in any case unlikely even to test their resolve.