LEBANON: Israeli raid risks wider conflagration

Analysis

On April 16, Israel launched an air raid against a Syrian radar station in Lebanon in response to an attack two days earlier by Hizbollah against an Israeli position. The air raid, which killed three Syrian soldiers and wounded six others, is the most serious attack on Syrian troops in two decades. It also marks Syria's first direct involvement in the low-key military confrontation between Hizbollah and Israeli forces since Israel's withdrawal from south Lebanon last May (see LEBANON: Sharon’s victory raises fears of instability - OADB, February 12, 2001, IV. ).

New rules . Israel's air raid constitutes a change in the rules of the game that have governed the sporadic and limited exchanges between Hizbollah and Israeli forces. Until now, both sides have taken great care to keep the confrontation within acceptable limits. Hizbollah only launched its campaign in October, following the outbreak of the Palestinian intifada, calculating that Israel would hesitate to open a second front while trying to contain the Palestinians. The group, which maintains an armed presence all along the border, has also strictly limited its operations to the disputed Shebaa farms area -- a small stretch of land at the foot of Mount Hermon, which Beirut claims is Lebanese territory, while Israel and the UN consider it Syrian.

For its part, Israel has refrained from enacting its post-withdrawal threats to respond to any cross-border assault with heavy attacks against Lebanese and Syrian targets inside Lebanese territory (see ISRAEL: Lebanon pullout provides important boost - OADB, June 14, 2000, II. ). Instead, it has confined its response to shelling areas close to the border with artillery and helicopter gunships. At the same time, Tel Aviv has repeatedly called on Lebanon and Syria to rein in Hizbollah or face the consequences. However, Syria and Lebanon have continued to sanction Hizbollah's attacks in a bid to remind Israel that there will be no peace along its northern border as long as the Golan Heights remain under occupation.

The recent air raid was an attempt by Israel to restore its power of deterrence. It was designed to send a strong message that it will no longer tolerate Hizbollah's attacks, which have so far resulted in the abduction of three Israeli soldiers and the death of three others. The government chose to deliver its message directly to Damascus, which it holds responsible for assisting Hizbollah, not least by allowing supplies to be brought through territory under its control. The message is that the rules of the game have changed, with the intimation that Syrian military targets will no longer be immune from Israeli raids in retaliation for Hizbollah operations.

Lebanese disunity . Israel's air raid has also accentuated the domestic debate in Lebanon over the continued operations. Since Israel's withdrawal, several Lebanese parties have strongly criticised the government -- and indirectly its Syrian patrons -- for failing to deploy the army in the liberated area in compliance with UN Resolution 425, which calls for Lebanon to take effective control of the region and to maintain peace and order along its border (see LEBANON: Syria Fosters instability - OADB, July 21, 2000, III. ). They argue that since the UN has confirmed Israel's withdrawal, Lebanon should seek to resolve the Shebaa farms dispute by diplomatic means, or risk losing international legitimacy. Furthermore, they add, it is time for Lebanon to focus on political and economic recovery.

Fearing that a military escalation could endanger his attempts to achieve economic recovery (see LEBANON: Debt and deficit impede rapid recovery - OADB, February 2, 2001, IV. ), Prime Minister Rafik al-Hariri has sought to check Hizbollah's attacks. In February, Hariri met Hizbollah Secretary-General Sheikh Hassan Nasrallah. Although no details of the meeting were officially released, it is believed that a 'common understanding' was reached whereby future operations would not take place too often' and would be coordinated with the Lebanese government.

However, the recent operation in the Shebaa farms appears to have taken Hariri by surprise. A few hours after the attack, an editorial in a newspaper owned by the prime minister sharply criticised the attack, questioning whether Lebanon could bear the political, economic and social costs of such an operation. Hinting at the lack of support in Lebanon for Hizbollah's cross-border attacks, the editorial concluded that no single group should be allowed to "detract from the victory of Israel's expulsion".

Although the subsequent Israeli air raid led Hariri and most parties in Lebanon to close ranks around Hizbollah and its operations as well as around the Syrian leadership, the incident has exposed the lack of consensus in Lebanon regarding Hizbollah and the growing rift between the organisation and Hariri. It has also revealed increasing differences between Hariri and President Emile Lahoud, who has come down strongly in favour of the continuation of Hizbollah's attacks.

Measured response . Undeterred by the mounting debate, Hizbollah has vowed to continue its attacks regardless of whether Hariri or the Lebanese population in general approve. This stance has received support from Syria, which has pledged to respond to the Israeli attack. One Syrian commentator stated that Israel was deluding itself if it believed it could set new rules. Nevertheless, he ruled out a "hasty and reckless" Syrian response.

Few in Damascus will want to risk a direct confrontation with Israel. However, Syria cannot afford to be seen to yield to Israel's threats. Syria could encourage Hizbollah to launch another attack in the Shebaa farms. However, since Lebanese civilians were not targeted in the air raid and no Lebanese infrastructure was damaged, such a move would further undermine Hizbollah's credentials as a national resistance movement and accentuate its image as a Syrian surrogate. Furthermore, such a move would invite further Israeli raids against Syrian positions. Damascus could also bring anti-aircraft missiles into the Bekaa Valley, as it did in 1981, or cross some other 'red line', thereby provoking an international political crisis and prompting US mediation, which might provide a face-saving way out of the crisis. However, such a course of action would involve some risk, as the Bush administration and Israel would use the opportunity to push for the neutralisation of the Shebaa farms area -- an eventuality which Damascus is sure to reject. Nevertheless, Damascus does have some bargaining chips vis-a-vis Washington, since it needs Syria's backing for its proposed 'smart sanctions' against Iraq.

However, Damascus is likely to wait before making any move. After that, much will depend on developments in the Palestinian territories. Syria has tried to exploit the situation there in order to assert its position within the Arab world vis-a-vis Egypt and Jordan. In the event of further deterioration and the development of a major regional crisis, Damascus may attempt to take advantage of this to push for a more radical Arab agenda. Syria may take some limited initiative in the hope that the Israeli response will also be restrained. However, while a regional war is unlikely, a major regional crisis could develop, as well as some sort of heightened confrontation between Israel and Syria.