US/MIDDLE EAST: After Saddam: hopes and realities

Analysis

President George Bush yesterday said that a US-led military campaign will begin against Iraq "at a time of our choosing" unless Saddam Hussein and his sons leave the country within 48 hours. Bush promised the Iraqi populace that the "day of their liberation" is fast approaching. The first obstacle for Bush's plans to use 'regime change' in Iraq as a catalyst for democratic reform throughout the Middle East will be achieving a sustainable democratic settlement in Iraq. Washington will have a large incentive to rely on existing structures (local governance, the general military) rather than create wholly new ones. However, the administration's rhetoric will probably induce it to pursue more ambitious change quickly -- an elected assembly, for example, and a new constitution.

Regional opposition . The obstacles are daunting, not least because none of Iraq's neighbours shares the US goal of Iraqi democracy inspiring change throughout the region. Indeed, many regimes feel deeply threatened and will work actively to prevent the realisation of the administration's vision that a strong, democratic and free Iraq will serve as a beacon of hope to the Middle East.

Neighbouring states share the US desire that Iraq remains united, but their clear preference is for a weak and factionalised country that can move neither armies nor ideas beyond its borders. Reform in Iraq is perceived as particularly threatening by the regimes in Iran and Saudi Arabia. However, both have experience of supplying money and weapons to opposition and insurgent groups overseas, including those in Afghanistan. Neither would have serious qualms about seeking to weaken a new administration in Baghdad.

US dominance. The immediate post-war environment is unlikely to pose many impediments to US pre-eminence. The massive mismatch of US to Iraqi forces, combined with Washington's determination to press for rapid regime change, suggests that US dominance will be fairly quickly established after the onset of hostilities. While high levels of civilian casualties may colour the reaction of the Arab world to the operation, such suffering is unlikely to prolong the endurance of Saddam's regime.

Once the regime falls, the administration is likely to launch a strong rhetorical onslaught. The most vigorous Bush advocates of the 'positive domino theory' -- the idea that democratic reform in Iraq can inspire or cause positive political change in adjoining states -- have a relatively united worldview. They learned their politics from those former communist sympathisers who emerged as the staunchly anti-communist neo-conservatives in the 1970s, and gained government experience in the Reagan administration. As a group, they strongly believe that rhetoric matters, and were strongly supportive of Reagan's characterisation of the Soviet Union as the "evil empire".

Battle of ideas. This group -- including Deputy Defense Secretary Paul Wolfowitz, Defense Undersecretary Douglas Feith, Special Assistant to the President Elliot Abrams and Richard Perle (the chairman of the Defense Policy Board, a Pentagon advisory committee) -- view the primary achievement of the US government in the past century to be the defeat of the Soviet Union. Further, they see this battle as having been won not in Vietnam or El Salvador, but in the pages of journals such as The Public Interest, in the halls of the Organisation for Security and Cooperation in Europe, and on university campuses and in think tanks. In their view, communism was defeated not by armies, but by ideas. The group's fondness for rhetorical sparring finds a supportive voice in Bush, who especially since the September 11, 2001 terrorist attacks has tended to draw sharp distinctions between friends and foes.

Given the group's experience in 'battling' communism, few of its members believe that the battle against Middle Eastern radicalism will be won swiftly. They see it, rather, as a strategic confrontation that will take decades to resolve. While some moves toward democratic reform in the Middle East may be forthcoming by the end of Bush's current term of office in January 2005, few of them expect much dramatic change in the intervening period.

Iran ambitions. To the degree that there is a short-term target for this group, it is Iran. It is an article of faith among some in the Pentagon that that country is teetering on the brink of a revolution (see PROSPECTS 2003: Political stalemate likely in Iran - OADB, December 31, 2002, III. ). Their feel for Iranian politics, however, has sometimes appeared clumsy, and some Pentagon-inspired gestures (such as Bush's statement supporting the aspirations of the Iranian people in July 2002) appear to have backfired. Senior US officials cannot agree whether policy should try to hasten a change in government (perhaps having the opposite effect), or simply allow time to take its course. However, once Washington has a presence in Iraq, democracy enthusiasts may try even harder to win presidential approval for more aggressive action.

A potential wildcard would be the US reaction if Iran were thought to be complicating a democratic transition in Iraq through proxy attacks on either US troops or pro-US forces there. That could move the Bush team closer to a clear policy of supporting regime change in Iran.

Saudi Arabia and Egypt. A longer-term target for change is Saudi Arabia, which is increasingly pressed for friends in Washington (see SAUDI ARABIA: Reform on the agenda as war looms - OADB, March 17, 2003, II. ). Crown Prince Abdallah's reform initiative has its admirers at the State Department, but elsewhere in Washington, the kingdom is viewed as being a supporter of terrorism, an oppressor of women and a persecutor of Christian missionaries. The second-order problem, however, is that democratic transition in Saudi Arabia at present would almost certainly bring to power a far more radical group than is currently running the country. When the situation is scrutinised more deeply, the democratisers are likely to look for a better target.

In the intermediate term, their sights may settle on Egypt, which is coming under increasing criticism for its authoritarianism, its 'cold peace' with Israel, and its sometime semi-official anti-semitism (see EGYPT: Mubarak regime will survive Iraq fallout - OADB, February 21, 2003, II. ). Egypt has received more than 2 billion dollars per year in aid from Washington for more than 25 years as part of its peace deal with Israel. With President Hosni Mubarak reaching the end of his term in office due to old age, the power transition may provide an occasion to review the entirety of the US-Egyptian relationship, and to see if Washington could play a more active role in promoting democracy in that country.

Reform embrace. A number of factors will influence how well US moves to embrace democratic reformers in the region are received, including the conduct and outcome of a war in Iraq; the post-war environment in Iraq; the behaviour of Israel toward the Palestinians; the US role in Arab-Israeli peacemaking; and the presence or absence of a figure or an idea opposing the US presence in the Middle East. On balance, however active or inactive the administration chooses to be on this question, it is unlikely that the embrace of the United States will be generally sought or welcomed by local reformers (see MIDDLE EAST: Will Saddam’s demise spur Arab democracy? - OADB, March 7, 2003, I. ).