IRAQ: Sunni Arab alienation threatens stability

Analysis

The Sunni Arabs are not a monolithic bloc, and many -- intellectuals, officers and tribal leaders -- ceased to support Saddam Hussein many years ago. However, until Saddam's regime fell, Iraq was defined by its 70-year old Sunni Arab imprint. This is no longer the case, but the Sunni minority remains key to whether the current situation ultimately improves or deteriorates further.

Sunni alienation.The United States was never going to work with senior members of the old regime, most of whom were Sunni Arabs tainted by their association with Saddam and in some cases by their roles in the intelligence, paramilitary and security services. However, the Sunni Arab community as a whole was well placed to contribute to the post-Saddam era under US guidance. Although they had been hard hit by Saddam's policies and sanctions, the large Sunni Arab middle class/technocratic elite could have been co-opted to play a role. However, not only have they been excluded, but also the coalition's failure to restore law and order and infrastructure in major cities such as Baghdad has hit the middle-class Sunni suburbs especially hard. These Sunnis now live a fearful existence behind the walls of their homes. Those who can afford it -- mainly businessmen who profited from sanctions -- hire private security guards or pay protection money to criminal gangs to ward off attacks. Emigration is on the minds of many.

Coalition Provisional Authority (CPA) policies have further alienated Sunnis, who constituted a majority of public sector employees. The edicts to dissolve the Ba'ath Party and the armed forces threw a huge number of Iraqis out of work, while de-Ba'athification has alienated a huge number of professionals who had merely joined the party in order to advance their careers or to protect themselves. Die-hard party functionaries -- along with members of the security services and paramilitary organisations such as Saddam Fedayeen -- have organised the insurgency and have also formed a clandestine party called al-'Awdah (The Return) (see IRAQ: Terrorism threat increases risks for foreigners - September 11, 2003). The dissolution of the armed forces threw 500,000 men with deadly skills onto the street without jobs or money. Many Sunni Arab servicemen went back to their tribes in the Sunni regions north and west of Baghdad for succour or have joined the insurgency; their influx has increased its professionalism.

The coalition's poor relations with the major Sunni Arab tribes in the regions north and west of Baghdad have deepened the alienation of an important segment of the community. After years of denigrating them, Saddam returned to them in the early 1990s and began to rely on them for the maintenance of security and law and order in the rural areas (see IRAQ: Saddam's 'shadow state' defies democracy - May 15, 2003). Specifically, he asked certain tribes to protect oil pipelines and installations in return for material rewards. With the collapse of the regime, this system also collapsed and the CPA refused requests to renew it. To show their displeasure, some of the tribes began to attack or sabotage the oil installations. In addition, these tribes have borne the brunt of US counter-insurgency operations, and US tactics have infuriated many who might otherwise have stayed on the sidelines.

Anxieties.Sunni Arab alienation is compounded by anxiety over the future. Even those who may sympathise with or tacitly support the insurgency are increasingly uneasy over the radical Islamist trend that it is taking. While many Sunni Arabs have begun to turn to Islam, they fear that the influx of extremist Sunni Islamist movements into the country will increase sectarian tensions between Sunnis and Shia. They are also uneasy about the strengthening of Shia radical Islamists such as the Sadrist movement of Muqtada al-Sadr at the expense of mainstream Shia movements, especially after the assassination of Ayatollah Mohammed Bakr al-Hakim, which removed a major moderate religious figure who acted as a bridge between the two communities (see IRAQ: Hakim assassination dims stability prospects - September 2, 2003). Moreover, the culprits are suspected of being Sunni Arabs. If this is established, there could be a serious backlash. Sectarian strife has been minimal to date, although suspected Sadrists have seized a number of Sunni mosques in the south.

Political participation.Sunni fears have been exacerbated by their weak political hand in the post-Saddam era. Although there are five Sunni politicians in the Iraqi Governing Council (IGC), most regard the body as promoting a sectarian approach to the country's politics. However, unlike the Kurds who were able to develop relatively strong institutions, parties and systems of patronage free of Saddam's control, or the Shia who had strong mass movements in exile, the Sunni Arabs have only weak or nascent political movements:

1. Iraqi Unified National Movement (IUNM).This group was formed by the controversial and maverick Ahmed al-Kubaisi following his return to Iraq from exile. He calls for the unity of all Iraqis in a state informed by Islamic principles, but not a theocracy (which would not work given the fact that the country is divided between Sunnis and Shia). He has reached out to the Shia and claims he would not be averse to a Shia becoming leader of the country so long as he represented all Iraqis. His alleged relationship with al-Sadr has alarmed the CPA and mainstream Sunni Arabs. He opposes a federal system with special rights for the Kurds, reflecting the profound suspicion with which Sunni Arabs view Kurdish political aspirations. He has denounced the IGC as illegitimate and says Iraqis have the right to oppose the coalition by force if it is still there after one year. His constituency among Sunni Arabs is limited, thanks to his political antics and years of politically inactive exile, while his 'liberal' attitude concerning the role of Islam has angered the more conservative tribal political elements in the region of al-Ramadi from which he hails.
2. Independent Democratic Movement (IDM) /National Democratic Party (NDP).These two parties represent the face of secular liberal and nationalist Sunni Arabs. The IDM was founded in February by Adnan Pachachi, the 82-year old highly respected former foreign minister and now IGC member. Pachachi has called for a secular and democratic Iraq and does not aspire to represent merely Sunni Arabs. However, his movement has no mass following as it was founded only recently and Pachachi himself lived in exile for many years. The NDP is headed by Nasser al-Chadirchi, a prominent 70-old Baghdad lawyer and IGC member who did not go into exile during the Saddam era. The party was founded by his father in the 1940s, but it never attracted a mass following and it is not clear that the reborn party will either.
3. Iraqi Islamic Party (IIP). This is the Iraqi offshoot of the Muslim Brotherhood (MB). It is represented on the IGC by its leader, Dr. Mohsen Abd al-Hamid, a respected Islamic scholar. The relationship between the MB and its Iraqi offshoot is complicated -- the MB itself has an Iraqi representative, Dr. Osama al-Tikriti, as well as a long but clandestine history in Iraq. The IIP was founded in the 1960s but was immediately banned and went underground. It was able to recruit clandestinely among Sunni Arab and Sunni Kurds, particularly in Mosul which became its stronghold. The Ba'ath Party suppressed it and killed scores of members, others of whom fled to Syria or Jordan. Saddam's ostensible return to Islam in the 1990s allowed it to make some headway among Sunni Arabs. With the downfall of the regime, the IIP has opened hundreds of offices across the north and centre of the country and recruited adherents, particularly around Mosul. The IIP calls for reorganisation of society and state in accordance with Islamic teachings, but apparently acknowledges that a Sunni Islamic state is impractical. Its institutional and mass base is still weak after persecution.

If a drift among Sunni Arabs towards Ba'athist/nationalist/Islamist parties is to be averted, largely technocratic parties more powerful than those led by Pachachi and Chadirchi need to emerge. For this to happen, Sunni middle class professionals need to be reintegrated into the emerging post-war order.