AFRICA: AU struggles to build institutions

Analysis

The African Union (AU) -- the successor body to the widely discredited Organisation of African Unity (OAU) -- was formally inaugurated in July 2002 after a year's transition between the two bodies. Its institutions are modelled largely on those of the EU and include:

• a Heads of State Assembly;
• an Executive Council of Ministers;
• a Commission;
• a Pan-African Parliament; and
• a Court of Justice.

In addition, with conflict and lack of security prevalent in substantial parts of the continent, there is a Peace and Security Council, modelled broadly on the UN Security Council (see AFRICA: Test of Union initiative - July 18, 2001 and see AFRICA: African Union development disappoints - July 22, 2003). The Council on April 13 adopted a communique expressing concern over instability in western Sudan, Ivory Coast and Congo-Kinshasa.

In the longer term, the AU envisages economic and monetary union, with the corresponding associated institutions, including an African Central Bank, Monetary Fund and Investment Bank. The AU Commission is located in the Ethiopian capital, Addis Ababa -- which was the location of the OAU secretariat -- but decisions about permanent homes for some of the other institutions are pending.

NEPAD-AU nexus. There is a complex relationship between the AU and the New Partnership for Africa's Development (NEPAD). The latter, which grew out of earlier OAU-related development programmes, was finalised in 2001, and was formally adopted as a core programme of the AU at its inauguration (see AFRICA: Peer-review confusion undermines NePAD - November 29, 2002 and see AFRICA: G8 summit disappoints on NEPAD - June 5, 2003). Its distinguishing features are that:

• it requires urgent action in order to arrest Africa's seemingly inexorable economic and political decline; and
• it needs interlocutors with the industrialised countries who are Africa's intended 'partners' in the rescue process.

For these reasons, under a political impetus led by South Africa, Nigeria, Senegal and Algeria, a separate set of institutions was created for the governance and promotion of NEPAD. Although these arrangements were formally mandated by the AU, they have created the impression of distinct -- if not divergent -- institutional frameworks. The AU is seeking to address the (re)integration of NEPAD bodies into its own structures, but the way forward is currently unclear.

All-member bodies. All of the 53 member states of the AU are represented in the Heads of State Assembly, the Executive Council (comprising Ministers of Foreign Affairs or other designated ministers) and the Permanent Representatives' Committee. The Assembly, of which South Africa's President Thabo Mbeki was the first chairman, and which is currently presided over by Mozambican President Joaquim Chissano, is the supreme organ.

Key institutions. There are several other important organs:

1. The Commission. The Commission acts as the AU's secretariat and also fulfils a political role of 'agent of change' in initiating and developing policies. It comprises ten appointed commissioners, two from each of the five regions (north, south, east, west and central). In accordance with gender equality principles, women must account for half of the commissioners, who will serve four-year terms. OAU Secretary-General Amara Essy was appointed interim chair of the Commission, but he was replaced in September 2003 by former President Alpha Omar Konare of Mali. Although most of the commissioners were appointed at the July 2003 summit in Maputo, the final two positions were filled only on March 15. Consequently, the Commission is only now beginning to operate at full strength.

2. Peace and Security Council (PSC). Despite repeated urgings for early establishment of the PSC, particularly from Mbeki, it took 18 months before it came into force on December 26, 2003. It was not until March 15 that the Executive Council elected the 15 member states to serve on it. Five countries (one per region - Algeria, Ethiopia, Gabon, Nigeria and South Africa) were elected to serve for three years, and ten others (two per region) to serve for two years. It is conceivable that South Africa and Nigeria will become de facto permanent members, albeit without any additional voting privileges. The election of some countries -- including Sudan -- to two-year memberships raises questions about the application of the good governance criteria.

   The PSC has been accorded unprecedented legal authority, powers and responsibilities, including the right to intervene in internal conflicts hitherto regarded as matters of inviolable national sovereignty (see AFRICA: AU promotes regional peacekeeping force - January 22, 2004). Consensus is not required and, in the absence of a veto, a two-thirds majority will suffice for decisions, including the authorisation of the use of military force or other form of intervention.

3. Court on Human and People's Rights. The protocol for establishment of the African Court on Human and Peoples' Rights entered into force on January 25, albeit with only a minority of ratifications by member states. The Court, will comprise eleven judges, who will be elected by the Assembly for six-year terms -- probably at the July summit in Addis Ababa. It will complement the mandate of the African Commission on Human and Peoples' Rights and will hear cases filed by individuals and organisations in member states, albeit normally only with the agreement of the state concerned. However, no country has yet formally offered to host the Court, and the means to fund it have yet to be found.

Pan-African Parliament. The Pan-African Parliament (PAP) -- originally a concept promoted by Libyan leader Muammar al-Qadhafi (see AFRICA: AU girds itself for intervention - February 14, 2003) -- was inaugurated in Addis Ababa on March 18. Every member state will be entitled to five representatives in the unicameral body, at least one of whom must be a woman, and with each country's delegation meant to 'reflect the diversity of political opinions' in its national parliament or other deliberative body. For the first time, opposition politicians in African countries will acquire a formal voice at a continental level.

For the first five years, the PAP will meet only twice-yearly and have only an advisory and consultative role. During this period, the Assembly will define the legislative and oversight powers of the PAP, and the timetable for their introduction. However, the ultimate objective, at least in principle, is for a body with full legislative powers, including the harmonisation of member states' laws, and a membership elected by universal adult suffrage.

As with all AU institutions, the ability of the financially constrained member states to fund the PAP's operations remains highly questionable. Moreover, doubts are raised relating to the willingness of African governments to permit a diversity of political interests to be represented in the PAP.