IRAQ: Neighbours may intervene if US plans fail

Analysis

April and May have been very difficult months for the US-led coalition. The killing of contract workers in Fallujah, followed by a widespread uprising by the Shia populist leader Muqtada al-Sadr, have prompted increasingly ad hoc military responses from US forces. A Sunni Arab general has been tasked with calming Fallujah, and a similar strategy has been discussed in order to isolate and neutralise al-Sadr.

This period has witnessed a significant weakening of the US position in Iraq. Insurgents, emboldened by what they see as a victory in Fallujah and Najaf, are likely to continue to mount operations in the run-up to the June 30 handover. Ordinary Iraqi Sunnis' sense of humiliation and despair at the occupation has been heightened by the evidence of abuse of prisoners at Abu Ghraib prison, tempting more to join in -- or at least remain neutral towards -- anti-coalition violence. Kurds are increasingly tainted by association with the coalition, while viewing with heightened trepidation their position in a future Iraq dominated by Arabs.

Constitutional tussles. The Transitional Administrative Law (interim constitution) agreed after much discussion on March 1 represents a temporary political compromise, and as such will be difficult to use as a constitutional document. The next round of constitutional discussions, in 2005, is therefore likely to be fraught with difficulty, with the different political groups reluctant to make concessions to each other, as the result will determine the future shape of Iraq (see IRAQ: Transition blueprint faces multiple challenges - May 7, 2004). There are several circumstances in which the US timetable could break down, with centrifugal forces then pulling Iraq towards de facto partition (see IRAQ: US failure could lead to partition - May 17, 2004).

Neighbours' concerns . With the future of Iraq seen as being at stake, neighbouring countries would in these circumstances become increasingly involved in attempts to influence developments (see IRAQ: Political fragility spawns multiple scenarios - October 29, 2003):

1. Iran . For the first time in the 'Arab' Middle East, the Shia have the opportunity to control a state, and potentially a very powerful one. Tehran is currently for the most part keeping out of events in Iraq, since the US timetable should, if all goes according to plan, deliver this. Furthermore, while the United States is increasingly mired in Iraq and the Bush administration divided over how to handle Iran in this context, US threats to Iran are seen as largely rhetorical. However, if the constitutional route starts to look less promising or relations with Washington deteriorate, Tehran has a number of levers at its disposal.

   With the holy cities of Najaf and Karbala now open to pilgrims, Qom and Mashad in Iran will both lose many of their theologians who will return to the theologically superior cities in Iraq. Iran will also seek to influence the south of the country via the range of Islamic charities operating in the area, and also through the networks of the existing religious establishment. Iraqi Shia politicians feel obliged to maintain links to Tehran. Al-Sadr follows the teachings of Ayatollah Kazim al-Ha'iri in Qom (see IRAN/US: Iraq Shia rivalries stoke friction - May 9, 2003). The Supreme Council for Islamic Revolution in Iraq (SCIRI) was established in Tehran, and its military wing, the Badr Brigades, is reportedly commanded by Iranian military personnel. Furthermore, despite their political differences, it is almost impossible for any prominent Shia politician not to deal with Tehran, as is evident from Ahmed Chalabi's recent visits to Iran.

2. Sunni Arab neighbours . Other neighbouring states, dominated by Sunni and/or secular regimes, view with alarm the possibility of the emergence of a Shia-dominated, possibly even theocratic, state in all or part of Iraq. As such, there is ample reason to assume that neighbouring powers will support Sunni Iraqis opposed to this domination. While there is currently some evidence of Sunni-Shia cooperation against the US occupation, such unity is temporary and tactical. When the prize is control of the state and its resources, the Sunni and Shia will probably struggle to find a negotiated settlement.

   Sunni Arab neighbours have a range of links to exploit in the interests of shaping political developments. Again, Islamic charities operating through mosques are already strong and are beginning to operate in as effective a manner as their Shia counterparts. Tribal ties across borders will also allow the spread and promotion of particular political lines. Various Iraqi Sunni politicians are associated with particular Sunni Arab states, and, if the situation continues to deteriorate, will rely even more on their foreign backers. Finally, the Sunni extremist foreign 'jihadists' present in Iraq mainly come from Sunni Arab states in the region. Even if governments try to prevent them reaching Iraq, they are likely to see confrontation with the Shia for control of Iraq as an important jihad target, as they currently view the coalition military.

3. Turkey. In the event of US failure, the Kurdish leadership will view the prospect of a Shia theocracy or a Sunni dictatorship as leaving them with little choice but to withdraw from the state of Iraq. If the Kurds decide to do so, they are strong enough politically and militarily within Iraq to be able to seal their border and operate independently. If, as is likely, this decision is made amid the collapse of US plans, Kurdistan will be the only part of Iraq in which Washington will be able to maintain military bases, and which unreservedly welcomes a US presence within its borders. The Kurds would thus have the benefit of some degree of superpower protection, assuming that Washington still wanted bases in the region.

An independent Kurdistan is viewed with alarm in Ankara, Tehran and Damascus (and, indeed, Baghdad). However, Syria remains too weak to intervene militarily against Kurdistan (particularly if it has US backing), although it has the ability to support covert groups. Iran is unlikely to risk becoming involved in Kurdistan overtly, while it has a long history of working with the Kurdistan Democratic Party (KDP) and Patriotic Union of Kurdistan (PUK), and indeed recognises a 'Kurdistan' province within its own borders.

Turkey is therefore the most likely obstacle to Kurdish independence. Much would depend on how the Kurds played it, influenced by the fact that the enclave would be economically dependent on Turkey. If they avoided an official declaration of independence and similar 'provocative' gestures, the chances of Turkish military intervention would diminish. One such provocation would be laying claim to Kirkuk and its oilfield, although here again options are constrained since they might well have to rely on Turkish pipelines for exports. However, Ankara's record in resisting Kurdish aspirations, both in Turkey itself and in northern Iraq, is well established.

EU-focused pragmatism .On the other hand, Ankara is also pragmatic. It has a decade-long experience of dealing with the KDP and PUK in military, political, and economic arenas, and Turkish businesses are probably the biggest investors in Iraqi Kurdistan at this time. The complexity of the relationship can be seen in the fact that Ankara is increasingly ignoring the calls of Turkmen parties in Iraq to support them and to oppose the KDP and PUK (see TURKEY/US: Divide over Iraq deepens - July 23, 2003).

One factor behind this apparent shift in Turkish policy is its attempt to gain a start date for EU accession negotiations in December. Any foreign policy excursion which appeared to deny Kurdish self-determination or attack the rights of minorities could damage its chances. Thus the outcome of December's European Council meeting could well prove important in this context. As long as the door is not firmly shut, it is possible that Ankara would rely on political and economic threats and inducements, and other diplomatic levers, to secure its interests.