IRAQ: US failure could lead to partition

Analysis

Many historians of modern Iraq regard it as a state which has only been held together through a mixture of coercion, oil-based patronage and Arab nationalist identity, which by definition excludes the Kurds. Iraq was formed from the remnants of the Ottoman Empire. The vilayets (provinces) of Baghdad and Basra (which are predominantly Arab) were joined with the predominantly Kurdish province of Mosul. In keeping with Ottoman traditions, the British promoted the minority Sunni Arabs to be the ruling elite in Iraq -- a tradition which continued until the demise of Saddam Hussein.

Sectarian identities. The Iraqi state has failed to construct a national identity of which all constituent groups consider themselves to be part. Iraqi identity has been driven by the Sunni Arab determination for Iraq to be a secular state, Sunni in orientation, and Arab nationalist. As such, there was little room in the narrative of Iraq for a Shia religious position, or a Kurdish nationalist one. Saddam was a symptom rather than cause of this structural instability involved in maintaining a minority government and of the violent political culture it spawned.

Since his overthrow, communal identities have been resurrected, particularly as US plans have hinged on regional quotas, and the only national political party which survived Saddam's purges, the Ba'ath party, is discredited (see IRAQ: Political fragility spawns multiple scenarios - October 29, 2003):

• The Shia religious establishment sees an opportunity for the first time since 1920 to dominate the Iraqi state as a reflection of Shia majority status.
• Kurds, after a decade of de facto independence, increasingly see themselves as separate and will no longer succumb to living under the shadow of an Arab nationalist government, or one dominated by religious figures.
• The Sunni view themselves as the traditional leaders of Iraq and, on the whole, secular. For them, it is not acceptable to be dominated by a Shia religious trend, or to see the Kurds autonomous.

At present, the US occupation is bearing the brunt of antipathy within Iraq. However, when sovereignty is transferred to Iraqis and/or US forces withdraw, the competition will focus on who controls the state -- thereby pitting the different groups against each other. Indeed, many Iraqis maintain that there would be civil war now if US troops were not there.

Since Kurds view themselves as distinct, they can now only be brought back under Baghdad's sway on a voluntary basis. This is only plausible if current US transition plans deliver a democratic federal state. With so many non-negotiable positions existing within Iraq, it is reasonable to ask what might happen if US plans to democratise the country -- and thus keep it together -- fail (see IRAQ: Transition blueprint faces multiple challenges - May 7, 2004).

Historical lessons. In view of Iraq's history, planting democracy and federalism was never going to be easy, as events of the past year have confirmed. There is a strong argument that rushing into national elections is not going to deliver this. Recent experience in the former Yugoslavia suggests that early elections create losers as well as winners before an atmosphere of trust and compromise has been built up, risking the outcome that losers will not accept the result. Furthermore in Iraq the likely winners at this stage are religious, in some cases theocratic and/or undemocratic, and anti-US.

Managed partition. An alternative approach would be to build democracy up from the grass roots rather than from the top down (see IRAQ: Saddam's 'shadow state' defies democracy - May 15, 2003). This would involve local and regional elections as the first stage. The likely result of a series of such elections would be the evolution of credible political parties, some of which might span the ethnic/sectarian divides. The current discussion in Iraq would indicate that five or so regional administrations may emerge - Kurdistan, the south (Basra), the holy cities (Najaf and Karbala), metropolitan Baghdad, and the Sunni triangle. Following the pattern of how federal states evolve (as entities which 'come together' rather than being imposed upon), these regions would then have the option of joining to form the federal state of Iraq, or going their own independent way. It is possible that, with a period of self-governance and the building of civil society within the regions, they would recognise the economic, political and security benefits of coming together under the Iraqi umbrella.

Kurdish conditions. At present, the Kurds are more united than the Arab Sunni or Shia (or indeed they themselves have been in the past). Their peshmerga forces are the strongest among the militias and private armies which now exist in Iraq. They can therefore at present impose conditions for their remaining part of a federal Iraq. Their conditions in general mirror US plans -- Iraq must be democratic, federal, and peaceful. However, they have two specific conditions which put them on a collision course with the other groupings under the current US transition timetable:

1. Federal model. They insist that the Kurdistan Regional Government (KRG) should continue to run the north under a federalism model that, although described as 'administrative' is inherently ethnic. This would give them enough leverage to be able to keep the Iraqi army out of Kurdistan and to wield a veto over the federal constitution. This contrasts with the governorate-based federalism espoused by Iraq's other parties which would only leave them certain of a majority in two of the 18 governorates --- hence their insistence on the interim constitution's controversial veto provision (OADB, October 14, 2003, III).
2. Kurdish territory. They also insist that current Kurdish territory (three governorates) should be expanded to take in two more including the city of Kirkuk (see IRAQ: Kurdish political demands are set too high - February 9, 2004). Kirkuk is tense and could become a new flashpoint very soon. In the absence of a recent census Kurds, Arabs and Turkmen each claim to be in a majority. Many of the 200,000 Arabs shipped in by Saddam in his efforts to Arabise the city are Shia. The Kurds are insisting that they leave and that displaced Kurds are allowed to return before a new census, which must be taken before the assembly elections planned for January. It therefore seems likely that population movements will happen in the near future, and will in many cases be contested. The risks of violence and of political forces from the rest of country being drawn in are also great.

If these conditions are not met, the Kurds would probably seek to consolidate their already powerful position in the north and break away. They would also do so if US attempts to establish a federal democratic state through next year's twin elections either fail at an early stage or fall apart later.

Sunni-Shia conflict. One plausible trigger would be the outbreak of sectarian fighting in the centre and south of the country. The potential for such conflict between Shia and Sunni extremists is real. Many argue that this could never happen, as Iraq is an inherently secular state, and the Sunni and Shia are mixed. However, it does not take many extremists to create tensions, or many political activists to secure control of the state (the Ba'ath did it with very few). In a context of competition for control of the state, these communities could be polarised by extreme figures such as Muqtada al-Sadr. Furthermore, there is deep-rooted antipathy between the traditional Sunni and Shia religious leaderships, reflecting centuries of historical competition.