IRAQ: Interim government faces huge task

Analysis

Despite concerns that intense politicking might delay the naming of the Interim Iraqi Government, the full details were announced yesterday:

1. President.The current head of the Iraqi Governing Council Ghazi Yawar will become the ceremonial president. Yawar is the Sunni leader of the large and influential Shammar tribe, which is settled in Iraq, Saudi Arabia, and Syria, and includes both Sunni and Shia members. His appointment comes after the Coalition Provisional Authority's (CPA) preferred candidate, former Iraqi foreign minister Adnan Pachachi, refused the job, stating that he lacked sufficient backing from the IGC. Yawar emerged instead as the preferred candidate of the IGC and commands broad backing in the interim government. The 45-year old Yawar is likely to be more politically active than the 81-year old Pachachi would have been, and also more critical of the United States and the Transitional Administrative Law.
2. Vice-presidents. Daawa Party leader Ibrahim Jafari (a Shia) and Kurdish Democratic Party (KDP) parliamentary speaker Rowsch Shaways will become the two largely ceremonial vice-presidents. Their appointment creates sectarian balance in the presidential triumvirate: both are seen as voices of moderation who can mobilise support for the IIG within their communities.

3. Prime minister. Iyad Allawi, the Shia leader of the Sunni-Shia Iraqi National Accord, was appointed last week to the politically substantive role of prime-minister. He was not the first choice of any of the major participants in the negotiations, but represented a compromise following the decision of Brahimi's favoured candidate, nuclear physicist Hussain Shahristani, to reject the position.

   Although Shia by origin, Allawi is secular and has strong links within Iraq's Sunni communities, giving him broad acceptability. He has maintained a low profile since arriving in Iraq in April 2003 (most Iraqis do not know him, or will only have heard of his connections to the CIA while a member of the exiled opposition). In a speech yesterday designed to introduce himself to the Iraqi people, Allawi promised increased pay for the security forces, greater subsidies for families, and said that he would seek the withdrawal of foreign forces as soon as possible.

   Despite this political gambit, he recognises the need for foreign forces to remain, and is well-positioned to coordinate Iraqi and multinational security operations due to his deep-rooted connections with the CIA, the UK security services, the US State Department, and the security establishments of Jordan, Saudi Arabia and Kuwait. Allawi has chaired the IGC security committee since it was established.

Ministerial appointments. Allawi has announced a major expansion in the number of ministers, from 26 to 31 -- only seven held positions in the previous cabinet. The changes reflect the intense politicking that preceded the formation of the government:

• Patriotic Union of Kurdistan (PUK) Prime Minister Barham Saleh was appointed to the new post of deputy prime minister for security. Saleh is close to Washington and is tipped as a major political figure in the future. He is likely to serve as a key liaison between the IIG and the multinational force. His appointment, as well as the re-appointment as foreign minister of Hoshyar Zebari, of the Kurdish Democratic Party (KDP), has satisfied Kurdish leaders. The appointments provide the Kurdish bloc a strong influence over Iraq's security affairs and its dealings with neighbouring states, including Turkey and Iran.
• The Supreme Council for Islamic Revolution in Iraq (SCIRI) is relatively lightly represented on the IIG, and did not gain a seat on the presidential triumvirate. Instead, SCIRI members Adel Abdel Mahdi and Abd al-Aziz al-Hakim will be finance and communications ministers respectively. The United States increasingly views SCIRI as a potential complicating factor in the security sphere, due to the muscular actions of its Badr Brigades and other militia, and its ties to the Iranian security establishment. Washington's concern about Iranian influence over the new government was evident in the CPA's hesitancy to back Shahristani as prime minister (he spent a number of years in Iran, when US officials feared he may have become involved in the Iranian nuclear programme); and in its treatment of IGC members with proven ties to the Iranian intelligence services, Ahmed Chalabi and Jalal Talabani. The Iranian seizure of an Iraqi border post in the Kut area, which has not yet received much attention, could further exacerbate tensions between Iran and the United States, which is the unofficial guarantor of Iraqi sovereign integrity.
• The recently appointed defence and interior ministers were replaced. The powerful Shia tribal leader, Hazem Sha'alan, will be appointed as the new defence minister, while the new interior minister is Falah al-Naqib, a Sunni provincial leader from the dangerous Tikrit-Samarra area of the Sunni triangle.

Technical capabilities. These political appointments have not necessarily reduced the technical capabilities of the cabinet, and in some cases may have improved them. Although the cabinet is not the purely technocratic group that Brahimi envisaged, notable technocrats and experienced professionals will occupy key portfolios in the ministries of oil, finance, justice, human rights, health, culture, public works, planning, agriculture, and science and technology.

The reshuffle also reflects new approaches to sectarian and religious balancing. In broad terms, the changes have reduced the very pronounced numerical bias in favour of Shia. However, a strong Shia presence has been maintained in the form of the prime minister, the defence, finance, and communications ministers, and by stressing the cross-cutting trans-sectarian tribal leadership of Yawar. The CPA's policy of meticulously balancing the proportions of key officials to reflect the demographic balance is likely to dissolve under the IIG.

Security decision-making. These cross-cutting tribal, sectarian, and religious affiliations will help to cement the pursuit of collective national security. They could also reduce inter-communal tensions as a permanent constitution is negotiated in 2005, bringing to the surface the issues of the role of religion and federalism in the Iraqi state. The IIG's make-up also reflects a strong focus on security decision-making. As well as tough new defence and interior ministers from some of the most threatened and threatening areas of Iraq, the office of the prime minister has been constituted to give the IIG a strong voice on security matters.

In addition to the prime minister and deputy prime minister for security, the leadership group will call on a National Security Advisor and Iraqi National Intelligence Service director general. This apparatus will allow the IIG to confer with the multinational force on equal terms, reflecting the new government's apparent determination to be involved in reviewing security operations. This independent and politically vibrant IIG may well prove to be a challenging partner for the United States and the multinational force to work with, but these features are also likely to improve the government's durability.