IRAQ: UN endorses sovereign Iraq

The UN Security Council yesterday passed Resolution 1546, endorsing Iraq's rebirth as a sovereign state and giving the country greater control over security operations within its borders. The unanimous passage of the resolution marks a key diplomatic success for the United States and the United Kingdom. It provides the post-June 30 Iraqi Interim Government with wide authority to curtail the actions of the US-led multinational force, and/or end the latter's UN mandate even before the government's planned expiration on January 31, 2005.

Analysis

UN Security Council Resolution 1546 was passed unanimously yesterday. The resolution, along with accompanying letters written by Iyad Allawi, the Iraqi prime minister-designate and US Secretary of State Colin Powell, mark a formal end to the occupation and the birth of the fully sovereign post-Saddam nation of Iraq. French and, to a lesser extent, German and Algerian concerns about the clarity of Iraqi control over security operations in the country were resolved at the last minute.

Multinational force status.Allawi's letter requested that the multinational force remain in Iraq "until we are able to provide security for ourselves, including our land, sea, and air spaces". This definition could mean that foreign forces of different kinds could be stationed in Iraq for many years (eg air forces, to defend Iraq's airspace until the time-consuming task of building an air force is completed).

However, the multinational force's initial UN authorisation will expire "no later than" January 31 2005, and can be reviewed at any point before then if the Interim Government wishes. The resolution stresses that the multinational force will operate under international and humanitarian law, a point echoed by Powell in his letter, which explicitly commits it to follow the Geneva Convention. The resolution also states that under Article VIII of the UN Charter, the multinational force may take "all necessary measures to contribute to the maintenance of security and stability" in Iraq, including the prevention and deterrence of terrorism. This broad mandate will be offset by the development of security consultation procedures with the Interim Government.

Security operations and consultation. In the penultimate draft of Resolution 1546, procedures for security consultation were contained within the two annexed letters by Allawi and Powell. However, in the final draft, the points made in these letters were summarised in the actual text of the resolution. It states that the multinational force will consult fully with the Interim Government on "the full range of fundamental security and policy issues, including policy on sensitive offensive operations".

Hoshyar Zebari, the Iraqi foreign affairs minister-designate, indicated that the Interim Government would not micromanage routine multinational force operations. He asserted that consultation would focus on "really major offensive military operations that would have serious political consequences like Fallujah". The resolution does not affect the inherent right of the multinational force to act in self-defence without consulting the Iraqi government, as Powell noted two weeks ago.

Ministerial Committee for National Security.According to Allawi's letter, the mechanism through which consultations will be undertaken will be a special Ministerial Committee for National Security chaired by Allawi (see IRAQ: Interim government faces huge task - June 2, 2004). It will include a core membership of Zebari; Barham Saleh (deputy prime minister-designate for security); Hazem Sha'alan (defence minister-designate); Falah al-Naqib (interior minister-designate); Malik Dohan al-Hassan (justice minister-designate); and Adel Abdel Mahdi (finance minister-designate). Permanent advisory members will be National Security Advisor Mowaffik Rubai, Iraqi National Intelligence Service Director General Mohammed Abdullah Shehwani, and there will be an as yet unnamed senior military advisor. The multinational force commander (or a deputy of designated representative) will attend committee meetings at Allawi's discretion.

This strong and capable committee is 'balanced': there are three Shia, two Kurdish, and two Sunni permanent members. Hard-headed 'securocrats' from the Sunni triangle (al-Naqib) and the Shia tribal areas (Sha'alan) are also balanced by capable internationalist, pro-US leaders and politicians such as Allawi, Saleh, and Zebari. All the officials have regional or tribal clout, indicating that the committee is likely to be a pragmatic body that will probably not easily be swayed by public opinion.

Federalism issues. The resolution limits the Interim Government's authority to take "any actions affecting Iraq's destiny beyond the limited interim period until an elected Transitional Government" comes to power. However, no mention is made of the Transitional Administrative Law (TAL). The TAL encapsulates the creation of a bilingual (Arabic/Kurdish) state in which the Kurdistan Regional Government (KRG) is authorised as a multi-province regional government and vested with a veto over the deployment of central government troops in the north and an opt-out clause over features of the constitution that the Kurdish parties oppose. It has proven impossible to accommodate the needs of the Kurdistan Democratic Party (KDP) and Patriotic Union of Kurdistan (PUK) leaderships (who wanted the TAL referenced in the resolution) and Ayatollah Ali Sistani (who wanted the TAL excluded).

In a letter to the UN and Bush administration protesting at the lack of reference to the TAL, KDP and PUK leaders hinted at the future secession of the KRG if Kurdish rights in the TAL were not respected. One possibility is that special dispensations could be made for the Kurdish militias -- folding them within a KRG civil defence force -- to help offset these concerns.

Other issues. The new resolution includes a range of functional and other long-anticipated statements on the new Iraqi state including:

  • Security Council endorsement of direct democratic elections of a Transitional Government no later than January 31, 2005, and a constitutionally-elected government no later than 31 December, 2005.
  • UN commitment to play "a leading role" in Iraq's political rebirth, including the appointment of a "Special Representative of the Secretary General and the United Nations Assistance Mission for Iraq".
  • Oil funds to be "disbursed solely at the direction of the government of Iraq", monitored by an International Advisory and Monitoring Board that will operate for a year or until the Interim Government decides to revoke its mandate.
  • The Interim Government of Iraq and its successors to assume the rights, responsibilities and obligations relating to the oil-for-food programme that were transferred to the Coalition Provisional Authority.

Conclusion

The Ministerial Committee for National Security is likely to be pragmatic and to cooperate with the multinational force, focusing the latter's attention on major offensive operations. Greater Iraqi input into these contingencies will provide key intelligence-sharing opportunities and act as a confidence-building measure between the multinational force and Iraqi security establishments. The main weakness of the resolution is that it may precipitate increased discord between the Kurds and Sunni/Shia blocs just as the Interim Government is in desperate need of a united front.