CHAD: Oil revenues fuel growing instability

Analysis

Reports in May of the arrest of army officers in the Guarde Republicaine who were plotting a coup to overthrow President Idriss Deby are almost certainly exaggerated, and may reflect media manipulation by the government. The leading officers involved may have voiced criticisms of Deby's regime -- and there are legitimate grievances over salary arrears -- but it seems unlikely that a coup was contemplated. It appears much more likely that the armed forces were being purged of malcontents and, at the same time, attention was being diverted from other issues.

This is a tactic often seen in the region; at the end of March, similar coup rumours surfaced in neighbouring Sudan, but were probably intended to deflect attention from the conflict in Darfur (see SUDAN: Coup claim probably aims to deflect criticism - April 8, 2004). In this respect, Chad's alleged coup plot was announced to coincide with the ruling Mouvement Patriotique du Salut (MPS) engineering a constitutional amendment to allow Deby a third presidential term from 2006.

Deby's succession and health. On May 26, parliament approved a constitutional amendment to allow Deby to seek a third period in office. This was somewhat of a formality as Deby's MPs commands more than a two-thirds majority in parliament. However, changes need to be ratified in a national referendum. Moreover, the near unanimous parliamentary vote in favour of removing from the statute book the two-term presidential limitation masks the unpopularity of the ruling regime, and mounting domestic opposition to Deby. Opposition parties boycotted the parliamentary vote, and some strikes and demonstrations were reported in Ndjamena.

There has long been concern relating to Deby's health, an issue that could become a source of political instability if his tenure is extended to 2011. Although Deby insists that he is in good health, he has previously sought treatment in Saudi Arabia for an unknown condition, and he was hospitalised briefly in Paris in July last year. Widespread public knowledge of a decline in Deby's health could generate further political instability.

Darfur. Some opposition to the regime -- both within military and civilian circles -- results from Deby's policy on the conflict in Darfur on Chad's eastern border, which has resulted in the inflow of significant numbers of refugees from Sudan (see SUDAN: Darfur has makings of humanitarian disaster - May 19, 2004). Moreover, some victims of the ethnic cleansing alleged to be occurring in Darfur are the Zaghawa tribe, elements of which live in both countries, and whose Chadian representatives supported Deby's push to power in 1990. Deby himself is from one of the sub-clans of the Zaghawa. The government's adoption of a low profile on events in Sudan is therefore causing tensions within Chad, which are not eased by the logistic problems of coping with a large influx of refugees.

Oxfam estimates that Chad has received an inflow of 150,000-200,000 refugees from the conflict in Darfur. For a country as poor as Chad, this places significant pressure on water, food and housing provision. Most refugees are crowded into camps, with poor sanitation facilities and associated risks of disease. Experience elsewhere in Africa indicates that large inflows of refugees arouse animosity among the indigenous people. This has raised the potential of increased domestic unrest.

Military matters. At the end of April, extra Chadian forces were deployed along the eastern border in an attempt to control incursions by Gangawit (Janjaweed) militia -- supported tacitly by Khartoum -- chasing refugees out of Sudan. Moreover, armed forces are involved in fighting at least two rebel groups in the north of the country:

• in the Aozou Strip, the army is fighting the Movement for Democracy and Justice in Chad (MDJT); and
• the military is attempting to control border incursions by an Algerian-based Islamist Salafist Group for Preaching and Combat (GSPC) (see ALGERIA: Insurgents align with al-Qaida - February 4, 2004).

The military is hampered -- and frustrated -- by its poor resources and pay arrears, and by fighting on several fronts. It is not surprising therefore that unrest is mounting within the security forces. Moreover, none of these conflicts is likely to be resolved in the near term.

Terrorism. Chad is significant in the current international campaign against terrorism, and Deby is nurtured by the West as an ally in the fight to suppress radical forces. The Tibesti mountain range in north-west Chad is an acknowledged base for terrorists, with relatively easy entry and exit points into neighbouring Niger and Libya. US forces actively support Chad in the area. Again, no simple solutions are available for resolving this problem, and the outlook is of deterioration in the short to medium term, particularly if a political vacuum results from Deby's removal. The oil sector -- and Chad's economic outlook -- is vulnerable to attacks on oil installations and pipelines, which are a tactic of leading terrorist groups, as recent developments in Saudi Arabia testify (see SAUDI ARABIA: Khobar attack raises oil supply fears - June 1, 2004).

Regional implications. Maintenance of stability of the regime in Ndjamena has regional significance:

• while its leader, Muammar al-Qadhafi, has made significant overtures to the West, Libya still harbours territorial claims to parts of northern Chad, particularly the Aozou Strip, and a change in administration in Ndjamena -- or perceived weakened resolve by the present government --may rejuvenate Tripoli's regional strategic aspirations; and
• the regime of President Francois Bozize of the Central African Republic is supported by Deby, but remains fragile and susceptible to changes in political leadership in Chad.

Oil revenue management. Exports of oil from the Doba field began to be piped through Cameroon to a terminal at Kribi from July last year (see CHAD: Pipeline launched amid domestic tensions - July 31, 2003), and revenues accrued from sales in world markets by the end of 2003. As a condition of World Bank financial support for the project, a Chadian Oversight Committee was instigated, with a brief to report on:

• the effectiveness of safeguards that are devised to prevent misallocation of funds; and
• the expenditure programme, which specifies that oil revenues are to be directed towards economic and social improvement, particularly poverty alleviation.

A Petroleum Revenue Management Law was enacted to provide legislative backing for the whole scheme. However, members of the oversight committee have complained about insufficient funds, staff and information. The government has implicitly acknowledged that funds have been used to purchase arms. That such abuse of oil revenues arises despite safeguards -- the World Bank's agreement to finance 3% of the pipeline was subject to expenditure monitoring -- is not surprising, given the nature of regimes in Chad and Cameroon, which are known for poor governance, lack of transparency, corruption and repression (see CHAD/CAMEROON: Pipeline generates controversy - September 25, 2002).