PROSPECTS 2005: Iraq constitution slippage likely

Analysis

National elections can be expected to dominate the calculations of all of Iraq's principal political players between now and the end of January, from the interim government through the United States to the various Sunni Arab insurgency groupings. At stake is the creation of a representative parliament, which potentially will be the first institution created in the country that enjoys democratic legitimacy. Its existence will imbue other political activities in Iraq with similar legitimacy, notably the process for the drafting of a permanent constitution.

Election outlook. It now seems probable that national elections will take place, as announced. The spiritual leader of Iraq's 60% or so Shia population, Ayatollah Ali Sistani, has insisted that there should be no postponement. Iraq's 20% northern Kurdish population has indicated that they too will take part. To postpone the elections at this time, with no realistic prospect that the sporadic violence in Iraq will ease, would simply be to create the impression that the men of violence enjoy a veto over the political process in Iraq (see IRAQ: Election momentum gains ground - November 29, 2004).

The size and geographical distribution of those constituencies that are generally in favour of elections should ensure that there is a reasonable turnout in the elections, at least in excess of 50%. Iraq's electoral commission has talked of a target of a two-thirds turnout. Whatever else occurs, it is unlikely that the present political process in Iraq will trip up because the elections are an abject failure.

On the other hand, it is unlikely that the elections will be an unreserved success. The alienation felt by many in the Sunni Arab 15% of the population at the nature of the transition has increasingly become focused on the electoral process. Leading Sunni Arab organisations have already called for an electoral boycott.

Intimidation. On the violent fringes of the community, there has been a call to precipitate civil war in Iraq if the election goes ahead. While such florid rhetoric is unlikely to turn into a reality, at least in such a short period, the ability of such dedicated groups to inflict acts of violence on areas outside their traditional control should not be under-estimated. With large cities such as Baghdad, Kirkuk and Mosul liable to violent disruption, Arab Sunni rejectionists could deter many from voting. Most importantly, though, violent intimidation seems likely to restrict voter preferences being cast by members of the Arab Sunni population.

Outcome implications. The election is therefore likely to be broadly successful, though flawed. Given the nature of the electoral system being used -- the 'perfect democracy' of a single constituency system -- the outcome of the poll can be expected closely to reflect the demographic make-up of the voter turnout. That means that the new assembly is almost certain to contain a sizeable Shia majority, especially if the Arab Sunni boycott is extensive.

Such an outcome will be the fulfilment of the assumption and expectation of the Shia religious and political hierarchy since regime change in Iraq. This, in turn, makes it probable that the prime minister of the post-election transitional administration in Iraq will also be a Shia, as he is now, though whether that person is still Iyad Allawi remains unclear. Other likely electoral outcomes include:

• Confirmation of Muqtada al-Sadr, the rejectionist young Shia cleric, as a secondary player in Iraqi Shia politics, in comparison with the Sistani-led traditional hierarchy.
• No formal impact on the sensitive future of the disputed city of Kirkuk in the north, especially as local elections will not be held there at the same time. It will not be until after 2005 that the permanent resolution of disputed territories, notably Kirkuk, will be attempted.
• Weak Sunni Arab representation in the new assembly, thereby hindering the effective functioning of the institution. This will also heighten concern on the part of Iraq's predominantly Sunni Arab neighbours, notably Jordan, Saudi Arabia and Syria.
• An eventual initiative to create a more inclusive approach to national politics, as part of a strategy to lure Sunni Arabs away from the camp of violent rejection. The assembly can be expected to resort to ad hoc arrangements for the co-option of Arab Sunni political figures (see IRAQ: Political process to progress fitfully at best - September 16, 2004). An early test of the flexibility of the new parliament in this respect will be over the drafting of a permanent constitution.

Constitution timetable. The formal position is that the newly elected National Assembly will write the draft of the new constitution. The task must be completed by mid-August and put to a national referendum by mid-October. The hope is that new assembly elections will be possible by December 15, resulting in the completion of a full transfer of power to a legitimate government by the end of the year.

Deadline slippage. In reality, it is unlikely that this timeframe will be met. Iraq's violent insurgency can be expected to continue through the constitution-drafting process, reflecting the rejection of the process by a sizeable chunk of the Sunni Arab constituency. Moreover, the general agreement on the interim process that has characterised Kurdish-Shia relations will come under intense pressure during this constitution-drafting phase. While the Iraqi Shia establishment favours a unitary, democratic state, the Kurdish minority wants to check central power with a wide-ranging form of federalism (see IRAQ: US failure could lead to partition - May 17, 2004). The Kurds will look to the incorporation of the Sunni Arabs into the political process as another constituency whose demographic profile make them potential federalists.

Negotiating brinkmanship makes it unlikely that either of the constitution deadlines will be met. Provision exists for a single extension of the process by six months. Negotiations are consequently likely to intensify up to a new effective deadline of mid-January 2006, with a consequent referendum deadline of mid-March. Failure to achieve a satisfactory outcome by then would result in new elections for a National Assembly having to take place, thereby delaying the whole process by a further year. In short, it is extremely doubtful whether Iraq will have a permanent constitution adopted by the end of 2005.