UNITED KINGDOM: Al-Qaida seen behind London attack

A series of explosions brought central London to a standstill this morning and caused many casualties. Initial evidence suggests an al-Qaida terrorist attack in the manner of the Madrid bombings of March 2004.

Analysis

A number of explosions occurred this morning throughout the London transport network. It appears that there may have been six blasts on the city's underground network and one on a double-decker bus. Although both the character of the incidents and the numbers of casualties are extremely sketchy at this stage, the co-coordinated character of the explosions, the exploitation of the inevitable vulnerability of a mass transit system, and the presence of the G8 leaders in the United Kingdom strongly imply an al-Qaida style attack in the manner of the Madrid bombings of March 2004 (see SPAIN/WESTERN EUROPE: Madrid bombs raise major issues - March 12, 2004).

Vulnerable London. London had long been considered a primary potential target for terrorism, because of its close association with the United States and the administration of President George Bush. Senior police chiefs had previously conceded that an attempt at an attack in the city was "inevitable". The huge transport network has long been regarded as the most exposed aspect of the city.

Although discreet measures had been introduced to deal with a poison gas attack or any attempt at a 'dirty bomb' atrocity, there was little that could be done to prevent a more conventional bombing plan. If the initial reports are confirmed of a comparatively modest number of fatalities, it may indicate that a large number of relatively small packages were placed on underground trains and buses (in the fashion of the Madrid attacks), although suicide-bombings may also have been employed.

Political reaction. The statements made by both UK Prime Minister Tony Blair and Charles Clarke, the Home Secretary, suggest that the number of injured is likely to be considerable. The initial public response will be to rally around the government in horror and condemnation of the atrocities. It is unlikely that any mainstream politician will directly blame the Blair government either for inviting an assault through its intimate links with the Bush administration or by the failure to detect any apparent plot by intelligence means.

Although London has been plunged into chaos today, the emergency evacuation plans prepared in anticipation of such an event appear to have been executed with competence and professionalism. The entire underground network was cleared at considerable speed. This will limit the extent of any criticism that might eventually be directed at the prime minister and the government.

Further responses. Several responses to today's attacks are likely:

  • International unity. Blair will attempt to revive the political unity surrounding the 'war on terror' that existed after September 11, 2001 but which has been diluted in the past four years, largely because of the divisions exposed by the Iraq War. This was the underlying message of the short statement that he made before leaving the G8 summit in Gleneagles and returning to London himself, with the intention of returning to the G8 meeting this evening.
  • G8 impact. Terrorism will now inevitably be placed squarely at the centre of the G8 agenda, partially displacing the original themes of Africa and climate change. Blair is likely to receive strong domestic support for such an initiative, and his instincts will be to use his global political authority and the present UK presidency of the EU to promote this political position (see EUROPEAN UNION: UK presidency will be tactical - July 1, 2005).
  • Legislative response. The UK government will seek to revive what have been perceived as quite draconian measures to deal with those suspected of terrorist links, and ministers will seek to argue that the government's controversial desire to introduce a national identity card scheme has become a matter of greater unity. Although opposition parties will dispute the linkage between combating terrorism and an ID card scheme, public opinion is likely to swing behind more authoritarian measures. This may pave the way for a further series of clashes between ministers determined to minimise the risk from terrorism and a judiciary which has been concerned to protect civil liberties.
  • Ethnic tensions. If, as seems probable, the attacks are the work of an al-Qaida affiliate, then tensions between the majority of the population and the large minority Muslim community in Britain will inevitably increase. Ministers will be deeply concerned about the possibility of the form of backlash that has been witnessed in the Netherlands over the past 12 months (see NETHERLANDS: Tolerant state gets tough on immigration - April 20, 2005). There may be relatively little that can be done to prevent this tension.
  • Intelligence resources. There will also be concern that the various intelligence agencies involved were unable to acquire information of a detailed plot which appears to have required several people to carry out and perhaps a sizeable quantity of explosives. There is likely to be a major increase in the resources devoted to this area given that it is completely impractical to make the whole of the London transport system secure from the threat of terrorism.
  • Olympics security. The attacks come a day after London secured the 2012 Olympics (see INTERNATIONAL: G8 leaders at odds on climate change - July 6, 2005). This is likely to be a coincidence as the city was not the favourite to secure the Games. The presence of G8 leaders in the United Kingdom is much more likely to be the symbolic event that determined the timing of these atrocities. However, the importance of security to the preparation of the 2012 Olympiad will be heightened; and further measures will need to be built into the blueprint that was accepted by the International Olympics Committee. Measures that were imposed on the movement of people and vehicles in the financial district of London at the height of the IRA bombing campaigns of the 1980s and early 1990s are likely to be restored.

Conclusion

The UK government's response is likely to centre on an attempt to revive the global political unity against terrorism that emerged after September 11, 2001, but which has been eroded since then. It will also focus on further legislative measures to allow the police and intelligence agencies additional authority to detain those suspected of terrorist sympathies. This is likely to bring the government into conflict with the judiciary in the medium term and to further heighten tension between the Muslim community and the remainder of the population.