EUROPEAN UNION: Borders under scrutiny after UK bombs

Analysis

In the aftermath of the London attacks, it emerged that the bombs used were relatively small (weighing about ten pounds each), and were detonated by timers rather than by suicide attackers or cell phones (which were used in the Madrid attacks). Despite the high casualty toll, they do not seem to have been placed for maximum lethality (see INTERNATIONAL: London bombs to spur counter-terrorism - July 8, 2005 and see UNITED KINGDOM: Al-Qaida seen behind London attack - July 7, 2005).

The usual suspects? Nevertheless, the attacks on the London Underground and a quick and substantively familiar internet claim of credit by a group calling itself "The Secret al-Qaida Jihad Organisation in Europe" implied that a group inspired, if not directed, by the al-Qaida leadership had modeled the attacks on those in Madrid last year (see SPAIN/WESTERN EUROPE: Madrid bombs raise major issues - March 12, 2004).

The flaws in the operation, however, suggest that the perpetrators may have been comparatively unseasoned activists with little or no training experience in other prominent 'fields of jihad' such as Afghanistan or Iraq. This, in turn, supports a tentative inference that those responsible were a group of British Muslims -- which would follow the post-Afghanistan pattern of decentralisation and local improvisation necessitated by the absence of a central base.

Targeting Europe. The London bombings, following those in Madrid, confirm a trend of targeting European allies of the United States. The message from the "Secret al-Qaida Jihad Organisation in Europe" identified Italy and Denmark as future targets:

• Italy has a record of Islamic extremism (particularly in Milan) is geographically exposed to the Middle East and the Gulf, and has a large Muslim population of about 1.4 million.
• Denmark's relatively small Muslim population (roughly 200,000) presumably makes surveillance easier to manage.

However, targeting European nations is unlikely to produce appreciable shifts in foreign policy. Spain's withdrawal from Iraq after the Madrid attacks was precipitated by unique domestic circumstances (see SPAIN: Zapatero embarks on policy shift - May 17, 2004). The fact that the London attacks coincided with the G8 summit in Scotland guaranteed a captive high-level audience, but it also steeled the population, boosting support for Prime Minister Tony Blair, whose popularity had suffered over his support for the Iraq intervention. More broadly, transatlantic differences over Iraq have now softened somewhat, and there is agreement that the best must be made of a difficult situation. Therefore, it now seems less likely that a European capital would risk appearing to capitulate to terrorists by changing its policy towards Iraq or Afghanistan.

Homeland insecurity. The London attacks highlight the fact that ground transportation in urban locales remains an unmet homeland security challenge. First response capacity has been taken seriously in the United Kingdom since September 11, 2001 -- as demonstrated by a drill premised on a mock chemical attack staged by the government in central London in September 2003. However, even after the Madrid attacks, there are few comprehensive preventive means in the UK's 11,000-mile, 2,500-station rail network. Metal detectors and baggage scanners are used only on the Eurostar service running between London, Brussels and Paris.

Nonetheless, the United Kingdom has a closed-circuit television surveillance system for public areas -- originally prompted by the IRA's 25-year terrorism campaign -- that is probably the most extensive in the world. Furthermore, UK law enforcement and intelligence agencies have been more inclined than they were when the IRA was the main terrorist adversary to arrest suspects preventively.

After the recent attacks, these safeguards are unlikely to be considered sufficient. Possible additional measures include:

• increased police presence at ground transportation sites;
• arming police;
• more frequent stop-and-search interventions; and
• the use of explosive-sniffing dogs.

While none of these measures could realistically be used around the clock at every transportation node, even their irregular application would introduce an element of uncertainty into terrorist planning and thereby function as a deterrent.

EU response. If investigations conclude that UK Muslims were responsible for the London attacks, the focus will remain on the UK's internal security apparatus. However, if external players were involved, there will be pressure on the UK's partners -- especially in Europe -- to collect and share intelligence more robustly, better insulate Europe against terrorist penetration, and inhibit terrorist movement within Europe.

For the first two years following the September 11, 2001 attacks, substantive changes to Europe's territorial security efforts remained marginal. After the Madrid bombings, Dutch Deputy Interior Minister Gijs de Vries was appointed to fill the new post of Counter-terrorism Coordinator to operate within the Secretariat of the European Council of Ministers (see EUROPEAN UNION: Anti-terror strategy poses problems - March 30, 2004). At the June 2004 summit, the Council called for more active work to :

• combat terrorist financing;
• facilitate information exchange between intelligence agencies; and
• enhance civil protection.

However, De Vries himself noted soon after his appointment that for both political and operational reasons, the EU has only a limited capacity significantly to improve European security against terrorism, and that the larger share of the burden remains with national governments.

Schengen sharing. Nevertheless, border security was perhaps the most conspicuous problem illuminated by the Madrid attacks. As a transnational problem this can benefit from action at EU level. Under the Schengen Information System -- in which most EU members plus Norway and Iceland participate -- each participant is required to issue alerts on illegal aliens seeking visas, including authorised documentary, photographic and biometric means of identification. The European Automated Fingerprints Identification System -- known as 'Eurodac' -- is an element of this. Designed to monitor and curtail "asylum shopping", the system can run up to 500,000 fingerprint comparisons per second with better than 99.9% precision. In a central and commonly accessible database in Brussels, Eurodac registers the fingerprints of asylum applicants over the age of 14 and certain other illegal immigrants.

At the system's inception, the European Commission required that no information acquired or developed by Eurodac under the supervision of immigration authorities be provided to police or intelligence services. However, the London bombings could prompt reconsideration of these restrictions, and stimulate thicker intelligence linkages among European border authorities.