PROSPECTS 2006: War on terror lacks direction

Analysis

As 2005 came to a close, the war on terror was being executed effectively at the tactical level, but was unbalanced in its overall strategy:

• Hard power -- military counter-insurgency in Iraq, Afghanistan and elsewhere; law enforcement and intelligence cooperation; and homeland security -- still constituted the lion's share of the overall effort.
• Some governments acknowledge the need for more focused and inventive applications of soft power, particularly in the form of public diplomacy in the Muslim world and more integrative state outreach to Muslim communities in Europe. However, the intensifying jihadi-assisted insurgency in Iraq and July 2005 London bombings indicated that actual efforts in these areas were insufficient to stem jihadi recruitment and activity (see INTERNATIONAL: London bombs to spur counter-terrorism - July 8, 2005).

Trends. The global jihad is evolving as a horizontal, atomised network in which the core al-Qaida leadership has diminished command and control but can inspire and influence regional insurgencies and local upstart groups. This pattern, driven by internet-spread propaganda, is likely to continue:

• While a flat structure makes the network less capable of pulling off a large-scale coordinated attack of the order of September 11, 2001, it also makes the network less vulnerable to military power and harder to neutralise completely.
• After settling for targets of opportunity immediately after the Afghanistan intervention, an ever more dispersed jihadi network now appears capable of striking a wider range of targets in addition to Iraq.

US effect. Perhaps the greatest impediment to prospective gains in the war on terror is the Bush administration's reluctance to recognise the galvanising effect that the US-led occupation of Iraq is having on terrorist recruitment, morale and capability (see IRAQ: Regional states to suffer jihadist 'overspill' - September 27, 2005):

• It has reinforced Osama bin Laden's narrative depicting the United States and its allies as seeking to establish Western hegemony in the Arab and wider Muslim world.
• Furthermore, the US, Canadian and European intelligence communities broadly agree that Iraq has replaced Afghanistan as a training ground for jihadi terrorists (see IRAQ: Jihadist training ground recalls Afghanistan - August 26, 2005).
• The Iraq engagement also has allowed a new charismatic jihadi leader -- Abu Musab al-Zarqawi -- to emerge.
• Finally, it has arguably led Washington to neglect other areas ripe for growth in terrorism recruitment or activity, such as sub-Saharan Africa.

While Iraq presents a more difficult operating environment for jihadis than Afghanistan did, some foreign fighters will survive US-led counter-insurgency efforts and relocate in Saudi Arabia, Jordan, Europe and possibly the United States better trained and motivated to perpetrate and direct terrorist operations:

• Although few, if any, have surfaced in Europe and none have turned up in the United States, a number have returned to Saudi Arabia and Jordan and staged attacks -- notably the suicide bombings in Amman last month (see JORDAN: Amman bombings are work of al-Qaida in Iraq - November 10, 2005).
• More generally, their Iraq experience is also prompting jihadis to refine and propagate urban warfare techniques. They may choose to apply them robustly to cities elsewhere.

Europe danger. Europe appears to be approaching a tipping point at which localised Muslim insurgencies -- potentially coordinated by knowledgeable veterans of the Iraq jihad -- could become a fact of life (see EUROPEAN UNION: Borders under scrutiny after UK bombs - July 11, 2005):

• UK authorities, unlike their Spanish counterparts when Islamist terrorists struck Madrid in March 2004, were aware of the threat and trying to minimise it.
• Operation Contest, premised on a UK government study indicating increasing UK Muslim radicalisation, aimed to reach out overtly to the Muslim community while covertly infiltrating radical Muslim circles and forestalling recruitment. The programme was too little or too late to stop the July bombings.

Mass rioting by Muslims and non-Muslim African immigrants in French cities last month was the immediate product of social, economic and political discrimination, but illuminated grievances that make France's Muslim population vulnerable to Islamist radicalisation.

Civil liberties. One of the most vexing quandaries facing counter-terrorism officials is that of gauging the costs and benefits of curtailing civil liberties (see UK/INTERNATIONAL: Counter-terror threatens liberalism - August 24, 2005):

• Outright torture such as that perpetrated by US personnel at Abu Ghraib prison alienates Muslims to such a degree that it presents no perceptible net advantages.
• Less flagrant restrictions -- such as indefinite detentions without full due process of law -- are harder to assess, as are more selective (if harsh) measures, such as US 'rendition' arrangements.

However, publicity surrounding even these practices has damaged US credibility in the wider Muslim world (see UNITED STATES: Treatment of detainees stokes debate - December 7, 2005). As a result, the US Congress, with the acquiescence of the Bush administration, is poised to pass new legislation expressly barring US personnel from using 'cruel, inhuman and degrading' treatment on detainees.

Diplomacy and domestic policy. Beyond the legal arena, US and European governments face urgent challenges in the areas of diplomacy and domestic policy (see UNITED STATES: Releases an attempt to re-brand 'war' - August 23, 2005). Diplomatic opportunities appear to be materialising with respect to the two conflicts that constitute the most radicalising influences in the Muslim world, the Israeli-Palestinian conflict and Iraq:

• Israel's withdrawal from Gaza has offered some hope of progress. However, the Bush administration will have to immerse itself in direct political brokering to a significantly greater extent than hitherto for the initiative to fulfil its potential.
• In Iraq, the United States will accelerate security training programmes and increase efforts to bridge differences on constitutional matters among the Shia, Sunnis and Kurds in the wake of this month's elections.
• For their part, most European governments appreciate the need to prevent Europe from becoming a field of jihad. Doing so requires the reversal of the radicalising trend in Europe through greater Muslim integration and assimilation. However, there is no clear agreement on a coordinated course of action.

Outlook. The growing consensus among Western powers is that:

• the acceptable period of reaction and adjustment to September 11 is coming to a close; and
• Iraq has weakened the counter-terrorism effort assembled after September 11, which must now find strategic direction.

Thus far, this has not existed:

• The United States has apprehended the counter-terrorism enterprise essentially as a war-like campaign including promotion of democracy, while Europe has tended to view it as a public policy and law enforcement challenge. For example, recent elections in Iraq and Egypt have demonstrated that, contrary to what some US officials might wish, democratisation is an unreliable counter-terrorism instrument.
• The rising terrorist threat in Europe and jihadi network's adaptability and propagation have shown that the network demands a response including both robust domestic integration and interdiction policies and a concerted international response.