Analysis

The two most significant dimensions of the Russian-Chinese defence partnership are their bilateral military exercises and Russian arms sales to China. In recent years, the Russian and Chinese navies have been conducting a series of bilateral 'Joint Sea' naval exercises. The first four occurred in the Pacific. However, in May, Russia conducted its first naval exercise with China in the Mediterranean. They will conduct another exercise in August, in the Pacific.

Military drills

In May, two Chinese frigates and a supply ship joined six Russian vessels for drills in the Mediterranean. They began with an unprecedented rendezvous in Russia's Black Sea port of Novorossiysk and then sailed to the Eastern Mediterranean, where they engaged in live-fire drills, practised air defence and rehearsed safety drills.

Pacific drills

Earlier this month, Russian and Chinese officers met in Russia's far eastern Primorsky territory to plan the second stage of the Joint Sea 2015 drills, which will take place this August in the Sea of Japan. While the first round in May included only nine warships, around two dozen ships will participate in the second phase. The planned activities will include reconnaissance as well as airborne and amphibious landings, which were absent from the May drills.

Du Jingchen, deputy PLA Navy commander and director of the May drills, has said both countries are making a concerted effort to explore new exercise formats and learn valuable experience from each other. Vice Admiral Alexander Fedotenkov, Russia's deputy Navy commander, emphasised that the exercises underscored Moscow's and Beijing's readiness to answer new threats and challenges at sea jointly anywhere in the 'World Ocean'.

Arms sales

Following years of stagnating sales, since 2012, China's purchase of Russian weapons has been on the rebound. Beijing recently became the first country to buy Russia's S-400 surface-to-air missile system, whose delivery is expected next year (see RUSSIA/CHINA: Russian S-400 missile will help China - December 22, 2014). The S-400 is more advanced than China's domestic HQ-9 surface-to-air missile system, itself a derivation of the older S-300 system.

Advanced surface-to-air missiles are key for China's defence against US stealth aircraft such as the B-2 and F-35. The system's 250-mile range will, for the first time, allow the PLA to hit targets anywhere over Taiwan and disputed islands in the East China Sea.

Xi in Moscow

During Chinese President Xi Jinping's visit to Moscow in May, Russian Helicopters and China's state aircraft manufacturer AVIC reached a framework agreement to develop jointly a heavy-lift helicopter, named the Advanced Heavy Lift (AHL). The AHL's preliminary specifications, based on Russia's existing 29-tonne Mil Mi-26, would enable it to convey 10 tonnes internally and another 15 tonnes on an external sling.

Su-35 negotiations

Negotiations towards China acquiring Russia's best air-superiority aircraft, the Sukhoi-35 (Su-35), continue. China wants the Su-35 to provide a bridge between its current fleet of third-generation aircraft such as the Su-27/J-11 and its acquisition of its own fifth-generation stealth planes, which will take a few more years to develop. The Su-35 can overmatch the F-16s flown by Taiwan and many other Asia-Pacific air forces.

Tanks

Looking ahead, Russian media have reported Chinese interest in acquiring long-range strategic bombers from Russia as well as advanced conventional attack submarines. On June 4, the Russian presidential aide for military technical cooperation, Vladimir Kozhin, said China had also enquired about buying new military equipment such as the T-14 Armata tank (see RUSSIA: Armata tank will be formidable but expensive - April 14, 2015). However, as China has its own domestic alternative, the China North Industries Corporation (Norinco) VT-4, Beijing's procurement of the T-14 cannot be guaranteed. Norinco says its VT-4 is technically superior and cheaper.

Imperfect alignment

However, despite relations having never been better, Russia continues to sell weapons to countries that have tense relations with Beijing:

Vietnam

Russia has been selling Vietnam advanced weapons, including 3M-14E Klub supersonic land-attack cruise missiles (NATO designation: SS-N-27A 'Sizzler') for the country's six Russian-provided 4,000-ton Type-636 Kilo-class diesel-electric submarines. These submarines, along with the Russian-provided anti-ship and land-attack missiles, give Vietnam the most powerful submarine force in all South-east Asia.

Hanoi could in theory use these long-range missiles (they can deliver a 450-kilogramme warhead some 300 kilometres) to threaten precision strikes against Shanghai or other Chinese countervalue deterrent targets. They could also be used for counterforce strikes against China's growing network of island bases near the maritime zone in dispute between Hanoi and Beijing. Russia also has transferred technology under licence to Vietnam to enable that country to manufacture six Project-1241 Tarantul-class or Molniya corvettes.

Central Asia

While China's presence in Central Asia will continue to be primarily economic, Kanwa Defense Review reported in January that Uzbekistan and Turkmenistan were buying China's Fangdun (FD)-2000, the export version of China's HQ-9 surface-to-air missile system (see UZBEKISTAN: Tashkent-Beijing alliance will strengthen - September 24, 2014). It said the sale of the HQ-9 was linked with lowering the price of gas sales from Turkmenistan and Uzbekistan to China. If confirmed, this suggests that Beijing may be re-examining its long-standing policy of not selling combat systems to Central Asia out of deference to Moscow's security primacy there.

However, Uzbekistan and Turkmenistan are not members of the Russian-dominated Eurasian Economic Union and are not at present likely to join. Additionally, Russia's ties with Uzbekistan and Turkmenistan are weakening, with Gazprom having significantly reduced gas purchases from Ashgabat recently. This defence sale reinforces the notion that in Central Asia, Tashkent and Ashgabat will move closer to Beijing, while other Central Asian states will be more closely aligned with Moscow.