Syria's political opposition will reject peace talks

Analysis

Since the Syrian revolution began in 2011, the question of who can claim to speak on behalf of the opposition has been a contentious issue. Even as members of the political opposition have come together in progressively more inclusive bodies, rivals have contested those bodies' claims to representativeness and legitimacy.

Throughout, the relevance of the entire political opposition has remained in question, given its persistent failure to command or represent armed opposition forces inside the country. However, this has changed recently.

Russia's intervention in Syria has prompted a new push for talks between the Assad regime and the Syrian opposition. This, in turn, has seen the opposition consolidate into several key blocs incorporating some of Syria's more important armed factions (see SYRIA: Russia risks mission creep as rebels dig in - December 16, 2015).

The Riyadh opposition

The bloc most representative of the anti-Assad rebellion is the 'Riyadh opposition' led by the High Negotiating Committee (HNC). The HNC was formed at a December conference in Riyadh organised in response to the 'International Syria Support Group's' call for negotiations (later enshrined in UN Security Council resolution 2254).

The conference aimed to convene a maximally representative cross-section of Syria's opposition with the goal of agreeing a single opposition delegation and common negotiating platform. To that end, conference invitees included a wide range of forces:

• National Coalition of Syrian Revolution and Opposition Forces.This body has traditionally been treated by the West as the Syrian opposition's political representative.
• Regime-linked opposition.Smaller opposition bodies such as the National Coordinating Body (NCB) and the Building the Syrian State (BSS) party attended. They have maintained a presence inside regime-held Syria and are viewed with distrust by many in the opposition.
• Rebel brigades. In a significant breakthrough, the conference saw major rebel brigades attend alongside the traditional political opposition. These included groups that Russia views as terrorists, such as the Damascus-area brigade the Army of Islam and Salafi brigade Ahrar al-Sham.

The 34-member HNC is led by Riyad Hijab, a regime defector and former prime minister. It has suffered some defections: Ahrar al-Sham formally withdrew before the Riyadh meeting concluded, but has remained in an observer capacity. BSS head Louay Hussein withdrew in January.

Otherwise, the HNC has mostly held together, and now seems to have supplanted the National Coalition as the political leadership of the mainstream Syrian opposition. Critically, non-jihadist rebel brigades whose buy-in is necessary for any possible ceasefire, support the HNC.

While Saudi Arabia is the HNC's principal external backer, it also has the support of the opposition's regional and Western allies.

Syrian Democratic Council (SDC)

The SDC is the political wing of the Syrian Democratic Forces (SDF), a military alliance led by the Kurdish People's Protection Units (YPG). The SDC was formed at a December conference organised in the north-eastern province of Hasakeh as a counterweight to the Riyadh conference.

The SDC is jointly headed by Haytham Manna and Ilhem Ehmed:

• Manna had been a leading member of the NCB before resigning in early 2015.
• Ehmed belongs to TEV-DEM, an umbrella organisation dominated by the Democratic Union Party (PYD). The YPG is the PYD's military wing.

The PYD had been a central component of the NCB, but suspended its membership in January 2016, citing internal differences.

The PYD and SDC can claim relevance because of the YPG's dramatic gains (with US backing) against Islamic State group (ISG). Manna, who has no obvious constituency of his own, has used this to argue for SDC representation in any negotiations: in a letter to the UN, he reportedly claimed that the SDF controls 16% of Syrian territory, while Riyadh conference attendees control less than 5%.

The PYD and SDC exist apart from the Syrian regime, but are not in real opposition to it. Their priority is not the overthrow of the regime, but the establishment of an autonomous Kurdish zone in northern Syria.

The regime still maintains government offices and security installations in PYD-controlled areas. The YPG-SDF has established a close military relationship with the US-led coalition, but the PYD and its Turkish affiliate, the Kurdistan Workers' Party (PKK), have also been friendly with Russia historically (see SYRIA: Kurds will bolster autonomy via US alliance - November 5, 2015).

Independents

There are also various independent figures who have no clear constituencies, but are relevant because of their respective international patrons. One example is Qadri Jamil, a member of Syria's 'patriotic opposition' reputed to enjoy close relations with Russia.

These individuals are deeply distrusted by many in the opposition, who view them as agents of the regime or allied foreign powers.

Geneva attendance list

It is technically de Mistura's prerogative to select the invitees to Geneva talks, including the opposition delegation. Russia has been pressuring de Mistura to expand the opposition delegation beyond the HNC to include figures seen as more palatable by Russia and the Syrian regime.

Saudi Arabia's invitation of figures such as Louay Hussein in Riyadh was already seen as a sop to Russia and was controversial within opposition circles. The further inclusion of the SDC and various independents at Geneva -- even in an 'advisory' capacity -- would be unacceptable to many key members of the Riyadh opposition, including the armed opposition.

Still, this may be only one factor militating against opposition participation in Geneva. Others include the failure to implement confidence-building measures named in UNSC 2254 -- cited by the HNC in its initial refusal to attend -- and opposition backer Turkey's threatened boycott if the PYD is invited (see SYRIA: Diplomacy will make little headway - December 9, 2015).