Analysis

Since David Cameron became UK prime minister in 2010, efforts have been made to develop diplomatic and geopolitical relations with South-east Asian states, and with ASEAN itself:

• In 2010, then-Foreign Secretary William Hague signed the Vietnam-UK Strategic Partnership, which was followed by the establishment of the UK-Vietnam Strategic Dialogue in 2011. The Strategic Dialogue includes a defence cooperation Memorandum of Understanding, one in a series pursued by Hanoi with other European and South-east Asian states.
• In 2012, the United Kingdom acceded to the Treaty of Amity and Association with ASEAN, a treaty that is the basis for regional solidarity among ASEAN nations, though external signatories are largely symbolic.
• The United Kingdom became a strategic partner of Indonesia in the same year, and also re-established diplomatic relations with Laos and took the lead in calling for the end of European sanctions against Myanmar.
• In 2013, the ASEAN-UK Knowledge Partnership was formed, facilitating relations in higher education and research links.

Cameron's two visits as prime minister to South-east Asia elevated UK diplomacy in the region. His first trip in 2012 included a visit to Myanmar, where Cameron was the first European or North American leader to visit since Myanmar's government began its transition to fully civilian rule (see MYANMAR: New Year politics will be fractious - April 21, 2016).

A second visit in July 2015 saw Cameron visit Indonesia, Malaysia, Singapore and Vietnam. Cameron's administration also worked to strengthen China-UK ties (see CHINA/UK: Trade will boom, but US ties come first - October 21, 2015). Nonetheless, UK diplomacy is still overshadowed by China, Japan and the United States within South-east Asia.

Brexit impact on ASEAN-UK ties

Direct diplomatic relations between the United Kingdom and South-east Asian states will not be affected immediately by Brexit. Since June 23, UK diplomats in the region have been reassuring regional governments that they should expect no changes in bilateral relations.

South-east Asian leaders have been positive:

• Indonesia's foreign affairs minister has stated that his government sees no change in Indonesia-UK relations.
• Malaysia's prime minister encouraged the United Kingdom on June 24 to see Brexit as an opportunity to improve relations, especially trade, investment, defence, education and tourism -- in 2015, the United Kingdom was Malaysia's 15th-largest total trade partner, at 7.6 billion dollars.

However, South-east Asian-UK diplomatic relations will be affected by the UK leadership transition. A leadership vacuum until Cameron leaves office in September, and afterwards as the new prime minister becomes established, will temporarily divert attention from the United Kingdom's improvement of South-east Asian ties.

Brexit and EU-South-east Asia diplomacy

Although the United Kingdom is not the EU's most important member in terms of trade with South-east Asia, it is vital to the EU's political, diplomatic and humanitarian aims in the region.

Politically, Brexit will have a much greater negative effect on the EU's efforts in the region than it will on the United Kingdom's own strategic position. However, overall, the effect of Brexit on EU operations in South-east Asia will be limited.

Brunei plan

The EU's relations with ASEAN are outlined in the 2010 Brunei Plan of Action. Beyond its economic objectives, the plan committed EU support for ASEAN's efforts related to non-proliferation, maritime security and counterterrorism.

The plan also provides a framework for cooperation on disaster management and environmental security as well as making available EU administrative support for ASEAN's economic integration.

The EU has been successful at establishing mechanisms for bi-regional multilateralism, most importantly regular ASEAN-EU ministerial meetings. The United Kingdom will be unable to participate in these meetings after Brexit actually occurs.

Security matters

For the EU, however, the UK's departure is more significant. The United Kingdom is the only EU member to have a South-east Asian military presence, with 2,000 personnel stationed in Brunei and at the Sembawang Royal Navy Dockyard in Singapore.

The United Kingdom is also the only EU state to have established defence commitments in South-east Asia with the Five Power Defence Arrangements. These were agreed in 1971 with Australia, Malaysia, New Zealand and Singapore, and encourage cooperation in the face of any external security threat.

The only EU member with the potential diplomatic and military capacity to replace the United Kingdom in South-east Asia is France.

Development assistance

Medium-term economic volatility from Brexit could strain the official development assistance budget of the UK Department for International Development (DFID), reducing its ability fully to maintain current programmes in South-east Asia.

Brexit would necessarily involve withdrawal of DFID funds allocated to EU-managed development projects. However, the Brexit financial dividend returning to the UK government's coffers would not necessarily be reinvested into DFID's aid budget.

DFID's budget for South-east Asia for 2016-17 is 110 million pounds (146 million dollars), which funds 25 projects in Cambodia, Indonesia, Laos, Myanmar and the Philippines. This amounts to 3.5% of DFID's overall country project budget -- 85% of the South-east Asian budget funds 18 projects in Myanmar.

Projects in the region include funding for initiatives related to forest governance, land mine removal, healthcare, education, civil society, peace building and disaster relief. In Myanmar, UK funds have supported election commissions and census taking as a means of developing state capacity.

The EU's development and external assistance budget for South-east Asia in 2014 was 245 million euros (272 million dollars), with projects in all ASEAN countries except Singapore and Brunei. Included in this total was 5 million euros to assist good governance and rural development in East Timor, a country that may later join ASEAN.

Although the UK contribution to EU external assistance is about 14% of the EU's total assistance budget, how Brexit will affect EU external assistance overall or how a loss in UK funding would affect projects in South-east Asia will depend on Brussels. Yet any declines in foreign assistance could have a substantial negative impact on poorer South-east Asian states.