Defeat of Aleppo rebels will boost Syrian al-Qaida

Recent regime advances promise to shift the character of the insurgency in northern Syria

The UN called for urgent humanitarian access to the rebel-held eastern side of Aleppo on July 21, after the last remaining supply route to it was cut off by regime advances last week. The encirclement of eastern Aleppo is the latest in a series of heavy blows to the rebel movement since Russian military intervention began in September 2015. What is left of the armed opposition to the regime of President Bashar al-Assad in northern Syria is dominated by jihadists, including Syrian al-Qaida affiliate Jabhat al-Nusra (JaN), and by hard-line Islamist factions such as Ahrar al-Sham. The changing character of the northern insurgency complicates the political logic of Western and Gulf support for the armed opposition.

What next

If the rebels inside Aleppo survive the siege, it will be in a severely reduced state. This will accelerate the shift in power within the northern insurgency towards jihadist and hard-line Islamist groups. JaN will become the main anti-regime force in the north, meaning that any other rebels that want to fight there will have to do so on JaN's terms. Stepped-up US and Russian targeting of the group is likely to rally more opposition factions and popular support behind JaN.

Subsidiary Impacts

  • Humanitarian conditions in rebel-held areas will deteriorate and refugee flows will increase.
  • US, Turkish and Gulf support to the rebels will continue, partly to maintain them as leverage in talks on a political transition.
  • A new US administration may attempt to increase support for nationalist rebels to counterbalance JaN, but is unlikely to succeed.
  • US, Russian targeting of JaN will bolster the global jihadist, anti-Western orientation of the group.
  • Containing the northern insurgency would enable the regime to redeploy forces to retake territory in the south.

Analysis

A regime offensive coordinated by Iran and backed by Russian air support to clear the Aleppo countryside and encircle Aleppo's rebel-held areas has been largely successful.

Aleppo is critical to the continuation of the anti-Assad rebellion. It has symbolic importance as Syria's largest city and economic capital, and has been a bastion of the nationalist, non-jihadist opposition since 2012, including US-backed nationalist factions such as the Free Syrian Army (FSA) and moderate Islamists (see SYRIA: Regime poised to defeat rebels in Aleppo - February 16, 2016).

Nationalists and 'moderate' Islamists

Nationwide, the rebel-held areas that were dominated by non-jihadist opposition have been mostly isolated and neutralised:

  • Southern rebels in Dara'a and Quneitra seem to have been obliged to stand down by their Jordanian backer.
  • Rebel pockets around Damascus are besieged by Syrian regime forces and are progressively shrinking as the regime captures ground around their edges.
  • In the north, the main remaining centres of FSA control are Aleppo city and the northern Aleppo countryside around the Bab al-Salamah border crossing.

A key turning point came in February when regime advances in the countryside north of Aleppo cut off rebel access to the border crossing, thereby depriving them of a key supply line from Turkey. Since then, these rebels have been occupied in a mostly fruitless battle with Islamic State group (see SYRIA: Civil war heads for escalation - April 28, 2016).

Aleppo under siege

After a two-month lull in fighting brokered by the United States and Russia, fighting escalated again in April. Since then pro-regime forces have focused on encircling Aleppo. This operation was completed on July 17 when the regime took Castello Road, rebel-held Aleppo's remaining supply line, leaving the city completely encircled.

Nationalist rebel fragmentation reduces their ability to fight the regime and stand up to the hard-line Islamists and jihadists

They city now lacks the accessible hinterlands or tunnels that could allow for goods to be smuggled in and out and alleviate the effects of the siege. It also lacks a single, regimented rebel military power to coordinate a response. The diversity of rebel groups in the city may make effective coordination and rationing a challenge.

The situation for rebels and civilians inside the city seems likely to deteriorate quickly.

Jihadist-controlled 'Greater Idlib'

Alongside Aleppo city, the other main opposition stronghold in northern Syria is rebel-held Idlib province and adjacent areas in Lattakia, Hama and Aleppo provinces, which together can be described as 'Greater Idlib'.

These areas are supplied through Turkish border areas controlled by JaN and hard-line Islamist faction Ahrar al-Sham. Most of this region is now divided into rough zones of influence between the two groups, including some areas such as Idlib city where they collaborate on governance and control.

Nationalist and 'moderate' Islamist factions, and opposition civil society persist in these areas, but mostly as part of an accommodation with either Ahrar al-Sham or JaN. Ahrar al-Sham in particular is seen as shielding FSA factions from a predatory JaN.

JaN has nonetheless attacked some nationalist factions it has argued were criminal or agents of the West. JaN also reportedly continues to 'tax' some FSA factions, obliging them to surrender a portion of their external support.

Jihadists and Islamists ascendant

With the siege of Aleppo set to weaken the non-jihadist opposition critically, Ahrar al-Sham and JaN now seem likely to become even more central within the northern insurgency.

Both are now playing a lead role on the most important and active fronts in the north-west, including Lattakia's mountains, the southern Aleppo countryside, and efforts to break the siege of Aleppo just north of the city in the Mallah and Handarat areas.

Jabhat al-Nusra car bombers will be critical to rebel efforts to lift the siege on Aleppo

JaN's vehicle-borne improvised explosive devices will likely be a decisive part of any opposition attempts to break the siege.

On these battlefronts, the FSA is left to man static defensive lines or play an auxiliary role. Brigades that have previously had hostile or thorny relationships with JaN have been obliged to work alongside the jihadists, as was the case with the rebel 13th Division's participation on the southern Aleppo front and non-jihadist Islamist faction Harakat Nour al-Din al-Zinki's collaboration with JaN north of Aleppo city.

Rebel supporters' dilemma

For opposition backers sensitive to the shape of a post-regime political order and concerned about counterterrorism, the evolving character of the northern opposition seems to undermine the rationale for escalating military support to them:

  • JaN is poised to capitalise on any new opposition gains or any influx of support for the armed opposition in the north, and it has also made clear that it is prepared to root out any foreign attempts to displace it in favour of non-jihadist competitors.
  • Seen by some as a counterbalance to JaN, Ahrar al-Sham continues to cooperate closely with the al-Qaida affiliate, and has its own hard-line Islamist agenda that -- while not overtly menacing to the West and Saudi Arabia like JaN's global jihadist outlook -- is nonetheless incompatible with most opposition backers' visions for a resolution to Syria's war.

However, the nationalist opposition will continue to receive external material support, even as it operates under the effective guardianship of Ahrar al-Sham and JaN, because it will be an important bargaining chip in negotiations on a political transition with the regime and Russia.