Trump risks serious rift with China over Taiwan

Analysis

Broadly put, the 'one-China principle' is the idea that Taiwan is in some sense 'part of China', rather than a separate, sovereign nation-state.

What constitutes 'China' is variously and often ambiguously defined, allowing ostensible agreement to mask incompatible positions, in order to avoid conflict and enable cooperation.

Beijing makes accepting the one-China principle a non-negotiable prerequisite for diplomatic relations. The United States has maintained such a 'one-China policy' since 1979. Trump has suggested that his government could consider changing this. This would be the most significant change to US China policy in decades.

The Taiwan issue

The 'Taiwan issue' dates to the Communist Party's conquest of mainland China and establishment of the People's Republic of China (PRC) in 1949. The regime that previously ruled China, the Republic of China (ROC), retreated to Taiwan, a former Japanese colony over which it had assumed sovereignty four years earlier. A peace treaty was never signed.

The ROC gradually relinquished aspirations of recapturing mainland China, but never formally relinquished claims to be China's legitimate government.

Both the PRC and ROC reject diplomatic relations with foreign governments that recognise the opposing side. Gradually, all but a handful of states switched recognition from the ROC to the PRC.

Taiwan's lack of 'legal personality' prevents it from joining international organisations. Taipei lost its seat on the UN Security Council to Beijing in 1971.

As a matter of protocol, Taiwanese leaders cannot meet leaders of states that do not recognise Taiwan. However, foreign diplomats (including Washington's) serve in Taipei, maintaining de facto government-to-government dialogue.

Independence movement

Taiwan has two major parties:

Democratic Progressive Party (DPP)

The DPP, currently in government, grew out of Taiwan's democracy movement in the 1980s. It advocates cultivating a distinct Taiwanese national identity, greater international autonomy for Taiwan and revision of the ROC Constitution to formally separate Taiwan from mainland China.

Kuomintang (KMT)

The Kuomintang party originally governed the ROC as a one-party authoritarian state before Taiwan's peaceful democratisation in the 1980s-90s. It favours cultivating a Chinese national identity and closer cooperation with China. Its current leader, Hung Hsiu-chu, supports unification.

Pendulum

The PRC and ROC (under KMT rule) reached an agreement in 1992 that both Taiwan and the mainland belonged to 'one China', but that each side could define 'China' differently. Premised on this '1992 Consensus', relations stabilised and interaction and cooperation increased.

However, Taiwan's first DPP president, Chen Shui-bian (2000-08), supported independence. Relations became extremely tense, worrying many in Taiwan.

The KMT under Ma Ying-jeou recaptured the presidency in 2008, pledging to improve relations. A 2010 economic agreement boosted bilateral trade, barriers to travel were lifted and 2015 saw the first ever summit between ROC and PRC leaders (see TAIWAN/CHINA: Ma-Xi meeting aims at broader audience - November 9, 2015).

Ma was initially popular, but public misgivings grew due to:

• fears that economic ties made Taiwan susceptible to economic sanctions from Beijing;
• perceptions that Taiwan's business elite benefitted from economic cooperation at the expense of the general public; and
• Beijing's hardening policies towards Hong Kong, which some see as a harbinger of Taiwan's fate if it unifies with China (see CHINA: Hong Kong's fate stiffens Taiwan's resistance - September 1, 2014).

This changing mood led in January 2016 to the election as president of the DPP's Tsai Ing-wen, who pledged to decelerate economic cooperation with China (see TAIWAN: New government will upset regional status quo - May 25, 2016). Tsai has not rejected independence as her party's ultimate goal, but neither has she openly advocated it.

This is not enough for Beijing, which severed formal interaction with Taipei when Tsai took office and refuses to resume it unless she explicitly endorses the one-China principle in the form of the '1992 Consensus'.

Cross-Strait relations are now at the chilliest since the last DPP presidency, but Beijing has not imposed heavy economic pressure or military intimidation.

Public opinion surveys suggest that:

• a minority of Taiwanese favour independence;
• a minority favour unification; and
• the majority favour continuing Taiwan's de facto autonomy under its current, unsettled legal status.

However, there is a vigorous and vocal popular independence movement.

China's stance

Beijing maintains that Taiwan is a province of China. Preventing it from becoming a sovereign state with widespread international recognition is Beijing's top foreign policy priority.

Beijing's Taiwan policy aims for, and is premised on, eventual political unification in the form of a 'one country, two systems' arrangement broadly resembling that in Hong Kong.

Beijing scrutinises the deeds and words of ROC officials, other governments and international organisations for signs that they accord Taiwan the status of an independent state. It nit-picks over the treatment that Taiwanese officials and politicians receive from host countries when they travel overseas, and the wording that official documents use vis-a-vis Taiwan. Breaches of protocol elicit objections and threats from Beijing.

In 2005 Beijing passed the Anti-Secession Law, which mandates use of "non-peaceful means" as a last resort to prevent Taiwan's "secession" from China.

Preventing Taiwanese secession is the top priority of China's military, which is highly concentrated on the coast opposite Taiwan.

Taiwan is an emotive issue in China, arousing volatile passions equivalent to religious sensitivities in some other societies.

US commitment

US support for Taiwan is a major source of Chinese distrust of the United States, with many seeing Washington's involvement as the greatest barrier to unification, motivated by a desire to keep China vulnerable.

The United States and ROC were allies against Japan during the Second World War and remained so afterwards. Washington supplied arms and deployed military assets to deter China from attacking it.

In 1979 Washington ended the defence treaty and switched diplomatic recognition to Beijing, to facilitate cooperation with China against their common Cold War adversary, the Soviet Union.

The same year, US lawmakers passed the Taiwan Relations Act. This obliges Washington to provide the means for Taiwan to defend itself from attack, potentially including US military intervention in a China-Taiwan conflict.

Under this law, Washington continues to sell arms to Taipei, with 8 billion dollars' worth delivered since 2004 (see TAIWAN/US: Arms sale will have limited impact - December 29, 2015).

US resolve was tested in 1996 when Beijing fired missiles into waters near Taiwan's largest ports to deter Taiwanese voters from electing a candidate Beijing believed favoured independence. Washington sent two aircraft carrier battle groups to deter Beijing, the largest deployment of US military force in Asia since the Vietnam War.

Alarmed, Beijing began a military modernisation drive aimed at countering Washington's ability to intervene if Beijing decided to seize Taiwan by force. It has succeeded, having acquired the ballistic missile capability to sink a carrier.

Trump turbulence

On December 2 this year, Tsai managed to set up a ten-minute telephone conversation with Trump through US lobbyists hired to further Taiwan's interests in Washington. This was the first leader-to-leader contact since diplomatic relations ceased.

Trump then suggested, in a December 11 interview, that Washington's one-China policy could be reconsidered unless Beijing made concessions on China-US trade, North Korea and/or the South China Sea.

In Taiwan, the phone call and subsequent statements were seen as a diplomatic coup and were largely well-received.

Beijing's responded by:

• issuing an official complaint through diplomatic channels and denunciations through state media;
• asking Washington to deny Tsai a transit visa for a state visit to Guatemala planned for January; and
• stepping up air force patrols in the Taiwan Strait.

China's apparent restraint may not reflect caution so much as surprise and indecision.

Motives

A number of explanations for Trump's actions are plausible.

Ignorance

Trump has no foreign policy background. He may simply be ignorant of US-Taiwan relations and related US and Chinese protocol and policies.

Negotiation

Trump may hope to use Taiwan for leverage in negotiations on unrelated matters.

Raising a 'core' issue that has been substantively settled for almost four decades signals that nothing in the relationship is settled any more -- everything is up for negotiation.

Alternatively, he may wish simply to cultivate the image of a tough negotiator, to intimidate and disconcert Beijing ahead of negotiation on other matters, without seriously considering changing US policy.

However, Beijing will feel that it now has less room for compromise on anything, for fear that Chinese citizens will see it as capitulating to US threats.

Conviction

Trump may agree with those on the US political right who sincerely want a more pro-Taiwan policy. His inexperience with foreign affairs may make him susceptible to the arguments of China hawks. John Bolton, a potential deputy secretary of state, supports diplomatic recognition of Taiwan.

Trump's actions have tapped a desire among lawmakers and long-time policy advisors for more robust support for Taiwan and a desire to 'punish' China for its activities in the South China Sea.

Many lawmakers have challenged successive US administrations' reluctance to establish relations with a fellow democracy, deeming it appeasement to entertain the 'legal fiction' that Taiwan is not a country. Regarding China, they make a lower assessment of the benefits of cooperation and the costs of confrontation.

Escalation scenarios

Trump has made no commitment and would incur no cost if he let the matter drop. However, he has numerous escalatory options, including:

• hosting Taiwanese leaders in the United States and sending US envoys to Taiwan;
• meetings between US and Taiwanese leaders;
• closer state-to-state cooperation through formal dialogues and bilateral agreements;
• accepting Taiwan's participation in international forums;
• verbally rejecting the one-China principle; and
• awarding full diplomatic recognition to Taiwan.

Washington could also choose to increase the quantity, quality and/or frequency of arms sales to Taiwan, or hold joint military exercises.

Beijing would feel forced to demonstrate what it deems to be a proportionate response.

It would probably first take measures against Taiwan to deter Taipei from reciprocating Washington's overtures. However, it has options for putting pressure on Washington, including:

• terminating bilateral cooperation initiatives;
• military deployment and/or exercises in sensitive locations;
• promoting cyberattacks by non-state actors;
• non-cooperation in international forums;
• competitive currency devaluation;
• harassment or de facto sanctions targeting US firms and individuals;
• dumping US government debt; and
• severing diplomatic relations.

These would all have severe negative consequences, but none of them by themselves bring the countries close to war.

War would require a succession of decisions on all three sides to steer the confrontation in that direction. The least implausible path to conflict is this:

• Washington's apparent support would have to embolden a DPP government to call a referendum on independence.
• Public support for this would have to overwhelm popular opposition.
• The referendum would probably have to be held, and won.
• Taipei would have to feel sufficiently sure of US support to actually declare independence.
• Beijing would then need to determine that it had exhausted peaceful means of applying pressure.
• The US Congress and president would then need to decide that direct intervention by US forces was the only way to ensure Taiwan's defence.

Nothing in what Trump (or Bolton) has said suggests that the United States is likely to go to war over Taiwanese sovereignty. A 'new Cold War' on trade, security and other matters is less unlikely.