Summit highlights Tokyo's dependence on Washington

Analysis

The joint statement after the summit has made Trump's administration approach to Japan clearer.

Security

The first impulse of Japan's government as it considers how to influence the Trump's administration's evolving agenda is to demonstrate Japan's indispensability as an ally. The Abe government's 2015 legislation relaxing some of Japan's self-imposed restrictions on military activities makes it more valuable to Washington on this count.

When Trump signed a controversial order on January 27 that temporarily blocked nationals from seven Muslim-majority countries from entering the United States, Abe was entirely silent as leaders from Germany and the United Kingdom spoke out against it.

US statements on security cooperation at the summit appear to maintain the basic positions of the Obama administration:

• Trump stated that the Diaoyu/Senkaku islands, administered by Japan but claimed by China, fall within the scope of the Japan-US bilateral defence treaty.
• Trump thanked Japan for hosting US forces; he did not mention his claim during his presidential campaign that Japan should "pay more". Trump's defence secretary also described Japan's contribution as a "model" for other US allies.
• The joint statement says that the United States will "strengthen its presence" and Japan will "assume a larger role and responsibilities".
• Implementation of the 2015 US-Japan Defence Guidelines will continue.
• The '2+2' security talks between the two sides' foreign and defence ministers will resume.

US Secretary of Defense James Mattis's decision to visit Japan earlier this month on his first overseas trip since taking office also reassures Tokyo that Washington values the alliance highly.

Economic relations

The most serious risk to Japan -- the Trump administration linking security guarantees with deals on economic concessions -- has not emerged.

However, economic relations remain unsettled. Just one-third of the joint statement dealt with economic matters, compared with two-thirds addressing security.

Trump has formally cancelled US participation in the Trans-Pacific Partnership (TPP) agreement -- the centrepiece of Abe's trade policy -- and declared that the United States has abandoned it for good. Trump prefers bilateral free trade agreements (FTA) -- less attractive for Japan, since the larger economy would have greater leverage.

Abe told parliament before the summit that he hoped to persuade Trump to re-join the TPP; the joint statement appears to acknowledge that this will not happen. Instead it commits to discussions on a "bilateral framework" (though not yet bilateral FTA talks) between Japan's deputy prime minister and US Vice President Mike Pence.

Since taking office Trump has criticised Japanese firms for investing in Mexico to export to the United States, accused Japan of manipulating its currency and threatened a 38% tariff on Japanese cars.

However, he appears not to have raised these issues at the summit, whereas Abe came well-prepared. Abe has sought to ward off Trump's accusations by highlighting Japanese investment in the United States and proposing a US-Japan Growth and Employment Initiative to create 700,000 US jobs.

Other partners?

Japan may explore other options to bolster its international position, provide leverage to moderate US behaviour and even seek alternatives to reliance on the United States. However, its options are limited.

China

Tokyo might attempt to improve relations with Beijing to try to persuade Washington not to take Japanese support for granted. Yet the Abe government has failed for five years to engineer any substantial improvement in relations with China, and the Abe administration's ideological aversion to China gives this policy limited feasibility within Abe's grand vision of Japan's place in the world.

Taiwan

Alternatively, Japanese leaders might seek to exert new pressure on China given the Trump's administration's assertive approach to that country on economic and security issues and also signs of new willingness in Washington to deal with Taiwan (see TAIWAN: Trump risks serious rift with China - December 16, 2016).

In sharp contrast to China and South Korea, Taiwan is not hostile to Japan over the latter's colonial rule, and conservative Japanese leaders are sympathetic to Taiwan as a well-established democracy. However, any move that appeared to undermine the status quo in cross-Strait relations would carry serious security risks.

Russia

Tokyo has more freedom to improve ties with Moscow, since Washington itself seeks apparent rapprochement. Japan might hope to use Russia to counterbalance China.

Yet scope to improve Japan-Russia ties appears limited because, despite active diplomacy, a bilateral territorial dispute between repeatedly disappoints hopes of resolution (see RUSSIA/JAPAN: Two leaders set on improving ties - December 20, 2016). Moreover, Russia is unlikely to sacrifice its relations with China.

South Korea

Japan's relations with South Korea showed signs of improvement in 2016, but have now deteriorated again over the 'comfort women' issue (see SOUTH KOREA: Populism spells danger in foreign policy - November 8, 2016). Moreover, Seoul is temporarily paralysed by domestic political turmoil (see SOUTH KOREA: Impeachment leaves leadership vacuum - December 12, 2016).

The Philippines

Japan has more options in South-east Asia and has worked hard to court the Philippines.

The arrival of a US administration less fixed on human rights issues than its predecessor could make for closer US cooperation with the administration of President Rodrigo Duterte, but Abe's government has already forged ahead with improving ties.

However, Manila under Duterte is a fickle partner. It has moved closer to Beijing and indicated that it has no intention of binding itself to either Washington or Tokyo.

Region-wide

The Abe administration has concentrated on the TPP as its main vehicle for regional economic cooperation.

It put minimal energy into other arrangements such as the Regional Comprehensive Economic Partnership (see ASIA: RCEP to fill gap as Trump pulls out of TPP - January 23, 2017), and actively rejected joining the Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank (AIIB). Tokyo might try to revitalise its participation in such mechanisms, but will be wary given China's major influence in both.

Australia

Tokyo's explicit rejection of Canberra's suggestion of a 'TPP minus the United States', perhaps inviting China instead, again demonstrates reticence to pursue Asia-centred regionalism.

Australia is likely to be Japan's closest partner besides the United States in both economy and security. However, Tokyo sees this as complementary to its strategic relationship with Washington rather than independent of it.