US rhetoric outstrips North Korea policy options
Foreign capitals are scrutinising the signals and symbolism sent by the Trump White House to infer Washington’s intent
President Donald Trump has summoned all members of the Senate to the White House for a briefing today on North Korea by leading administration national security figures. The Trump administration has been keen to distinguish its nascent policy towards Pyongyang from that of former President Barack Obama. US officials have stated that Pyongyang should not “test” Trump, that he is willing to use force and that Washington will not adhere to a status quo posture on the Korean peninsula.
What next
The United States will accept in the longer term living with a nuclear North Korea and increased risk on the peninsula, as South Korea and Japan do. However, official rhetoric may continue to present unrealistic hopes of transformative change, for fear of domestic criticism and a desire to avoid conferring legitimacy on Pyongyang. Future US policy goals may eventually shift to promoting 'good' nuclear behaviours and restraint rather than outright denuclearisation or cessation of testing.
Subsidiary Impacts
- There is nearly no precedent of states giving up nuclear weapons without dramatic internal and international political shifts.
- A nuclear North Korea proliferating weapons technology and equipment will remain a central concern for both Washington and Beijing.
- North Korea probably has a credible enough deterrent already to ward off an Iraq- or Libya-style external intervention.
Analysis
US National Security Advisor HR McMaster stated on April 16 that North Korea's nuclear weapons and ballistic missile programme "can't continue" and that there was a sense in the region that "this problem is coming to a head".
Foreign policy crises are often defined as:
- a sudden threat to a country's core interests;
- with a high risk of interstate war; and
- a limited time window for policymakers to make decisions.
Chinese President Xi Jinping reportedly spoke with Trump on April 24 and implicitly criticised any North Korean activity in violation of UN resolutions.
He also expressed his hope that "all sides exercise restraint", Beijing's standard and long-standing response to both North Korean provocations and the United States mulling increased coercive activity.
US rhetoric presents a closing window, but Beijing argues there is more time for deliberation
Meanwhile, the initial deployment of the THAAD US missile defence system today drew protests in South Korea, with a spokesman for leading presidential candidate Moon Jae-in arguing that its early deployment before next month's South Korean election brings a new administration "ignored public opinion and due process" (see SOUTH KOREA: Park prosecution will seal left's victory - March 29, 2017).
Signalling, sabre-rattling and cheap talk
High-level messages on the international political scene can be misinterpreted and also are noticed by third parties and domestic audiences.
US military deployments and rhetorical expressions of 'resolve' could reflect several scenarios:
Deterring North Korea
The Trump administration intends to send a genuine signal to North Korea that Washington will use military force if Pyongyang conducts a missile or nuclear demonstration/test.
This aims to deter Pyongyang from taking action Washington considers provocative.
Compelling China
The Trump administration intends to raise -- but perhaps not follow through on -- the threat of a US military strike or intervention against North Korea in a bid to compel China to exert hitherto-unexerted pressure on Pyongyang.
Cheap talk
The Trump administration privately believes that the United States has no tools to compel either an ending to the testing programme or overall denuclearisation, but does not want to give any form of recognition and consequent legitimacy to North Korea's status as a nuclear-armed state outside the established international nuclear framework (see US/INT: Next president will confront nuclear disorder - September 30, 2016).
This could reflect US fears that legal instruments and informal understandings that have propped up nuclear restraint could be severely undermined by public de facto acknowledgement of North Korea as a nuclear weapons state (see INT/US: Nuclear weapons’ utility will grow for states - April 5, 2017).
This has been an issue for other nuclear-armed states, such as India and Israel, with longer-established nuclear programmes and stronger credentials for responsible possession of nuclear weapons in Washington's eyes (see INTERNATIONAL: Politics will undermine NSG function - May 24, 2016).
Poor messaging and/or nascent policy
The Trump administration has struggled in several cases to maintain a unified line on what it sees as central US interests and how far it is willing to go to pursue those interests (see UNITED STATES: Trump will undercut McMaster at NSC - February 22, 2017 and see SYRIA: US strike will only stop chemical weapons use - April 7, 2017).
There are also strong political incentives for a president to appear to be deftly handling international affairs and bolstering national prestige as US commander-in-chief, especially after setbacks over domestic initiatives (see UNITED STATES: AHCA debacle will hinder Trump’s plans - March 27, 2017).
What's driving North Korea policy?
Elements of these scenarios overlap, such as Trump's desire to not be seen as backing down over North Korea for domestic political reasons; it is difficult for an external observer to determine what specific element is driving foreign policy as it unfolds.
This reflects the problem of 'observational equivalence' -- what is observable from the outside is not substantial enough to confirm which explanation of a set of mutually exclusive explanations is correct.
The White House either believes or does not believe each of the following:
- North Korea would change its behaviour or even denuclearise in response to external pressure short of war.
- China could do more to pressure North Korea than Beijing currently claims.
- North Korea's nuclear status and improving capabilities pose an intolerable threat to US interests.
- The window for transformative US action is closing irreversibly.
- The potential international or domestic political dividends of heightening tensions on the Korean peninsula outweigh the risk of an accidental or deliberate military clash involving US or allied forces.
There are also observational difficulties with determining whether Trump's messaging is intentional and whether it is reaching its intended audience.
Signals in international politics can often be misinterpreted and reach an unintended audience
However, observable actions such as live-fire exercises, rhetorical shifts and deploying military assets offer limited insight into these questions, requiring an external observer to rely more on logical inferences on a thinner factual base.
This risks the observer smuggling logical fallacies into their assessments, such as overreliance on historical analogies comparing the Pyongyang regime's ability to retain power to the collapse of the former German Democratic Republic and the Soviet Union.
However, while there are strong constraining factors that would pull both countries back from military conflict, there is a possibility -- however remote -- of unintended escalation in response to a miscalculation or accident.
Structural constraints
Nonetheless, there are factors that will shape any direction of US response away from a direct military clash:
Force protection
If current bellicosity is politics-as-theatre, it would be important to keep this from resulting in injury or death of any US soldiers, which would invite much greater domestic criticism of the White House.
Allied aversion
South Korea and Japan are against any preventative US strike that risks attacks on their population centres and are conveying this through formal and informal channels. Washington may worry that overriding their concerns and antagonising their populations could lead other US partners to reassess their ties.
Understanding China's options
Trump admitted that he overestimated China's ability to intervene in North Korea before Xi taught him about the region during the Mar-a-Lago summit. If assumptions that US bellicosity would lead to beneficial Chinese action drove initial hawkishness, the reversal of those assumptions will diminish US appetite for action.
US rhetoric outpaces Washington's willingness to intervene and scope for transformative action
Outlook
These constraints indicate that the US response to a future North Korean missile test or nuclear demonstration will most likely be a continuation of status quo policies couched in heightened rhetoric, with some effort to boost third-party compliance with sanctions on North Korea (see NORTH KOREA/US: Rhetoric masks absence of fresh policy - April 12, 2017).
