US strike merely limits Damascus to conventional arms

Analysis

US Secretary of State Rex Tillerson emphasised that the US strike was intended to be targeted, proportional and directly tied to the April 4 use of chemical weapons. US intelligence reportedly tracked the Syrian air force Sukhoi Su-22 jet that carried out the Khan Sheikhoun attack to Al Shayrat.

US strategy

This attack executed an updated but pre-existing Pentagon plan to target Syrian military airfields with an eye to minimal loss of life or risk of provoking a Russian escalation (see US/SYRIA: Obama is unlikely to approve strikes - October 5, 2016).

President Donald Trump chose a limited approach by:

• picking a symbolic target;
• warning Russia via the deconfliction hotline in advance; and
• using destroyer-launched cruise missiles, so as not to test Russian or Syrian air defences' willingness to shoot at US aircraft.

The Trump administration does not want to commit additional US resources to compel Damascus to exercise restraint and hopes Assad's international backers in Moscow and Tehran will exert this pressure instead.

Drawing on the lessons of Obama's failed 'red line' in 2013, the Trump approach seeks to focus narrowly on the chemical weapons issue, rather than making an explicit or implicit threat to mount a large-scale effort to degrade Syria's military at a strategic level or remove Assad from power.

Escalation options

Some US and international actors have called for a broader response by Washington, targeting the Syrian air force.

However, Tillerson has emphasised that the strike was a "one-off" action and that wider US policy is unchanged. On March 30, he had implied that the removal of Assad was no longer a top priority.

The United States remains unwilling to risk or threaten Russian aircraft and personnel.

Russian consternation

Russian President Vladimir Putin said the pretext for the attack was "invented" as the Syrian government's chemical arms stocks had all been destroyed. His initial comments expressed anger but were measured enough to avoid a break in relations. However, Russian policy in Syria has been set back.

Intractable client

The substantial territory Assad has gained thanks to Russian air support has strengthened his position, leaving Russia with limited leverage (see RUSSIA/IRAN: Visions differ on Syria's future - March 6, 2017).

After the latest chemical attack, Kremlin spokesman Dmitry Peskov said support for Assad was "not unconditional". However, the defence ministry's flat insistence that there was no chemical attack by Assad's forces offered little room for manoeuvre.

Moscow is left with an intractable ally whom it can neither control nor abandon.

Airspace embarrassment

The Russian defence ministry in October 2016 warned that its air defence forces would shoot down unidentified aircraft and missiles entering Syrian airspace; the implication was that this included US systems (see RUSSIA/US: Moscow gambles US ties against Syria gains - October 7, 2016).

Washington warned Moscow of the impending attack and -- to avoid unwanted escalation -- Russia did nothing to counter the cruise missiles. Russian claims to airspace control are now constrained by US military actions.

Moscow today suspended an agreement designed to avoid accidental confrontations with US aircraft. However, the agreement has worked well. Russia may have no option but to return to it as multiple operations continue over eastern Syria.

International responses

Iran, too, condemned the strike, saying it would strengthen terrorism and complicate the situation in Syria.

By contrast, Western countries voiced support.

Israel, Saudi Arabia and Turkey expressed vociferous approval. Tel Aviv is keen to disincentivise chemical weapons use by a potentially hostile neighbour, while Ankara and Riyadh are longstanding rebel backers.

Syria's future

In practice, the US strike will make little military difference on the ground. The Syrian air force has many other airbases, and there are suggestions that it managed to move out some planes before the attack after the Russians passed on the US warning.

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Chemical caution

The main impact is tactical. The Assad regime is now significantly less likely to use chemical weapons in future attacks, knowing that it risks an immediate US response. Although the government's command-and-control is sometimes poor, this will also apply to senior commanders.

It is not impossible that Damascus might test Washington's resolve by using other chemical agents such as chlorine -- for which rebels could more plausibly be blamed.

However, this would carry high risks for limited military benefits. Instead, Syrian forces will focus on conventional arms attacks -- which can also have a high humanitarian cost.

Slow offensive

The non-use of chemical weapons may complicate the government's offensive on rebel-held Idlib. In contrast to eastern Aleppo, which fell swiftly to a concerted assault in December 2016, Idlib is mostly rural. Over-stretched pro-government forces lack the personnel and training to take and hold so many dispersed villages.

Opposition fighters and their families have been evacuated to Idlib from across the country as other strongholds fall, and will seek to hold this territory -- with support from neighbouring Turkey -- as their last foothold in Syria (see SYRIA: Squabbling rebels will avoid showdown - March 20, 2017).

The latest developments may make the regime more likely to focus on controlling the urban areas, leaving Idlib for later.

Polarised negotiations

Another impact of the chemical attack will be to change the nature of international negotiations on Syria. There had been a gradual movement towards international acceptance -- not least by the Trump administration -- that Assad was likely to remain in place.

That de facto legitimacy is now damaged. It will be harder for Western countries to talk to the Damascus regime -- while lacking leverage to force a genuine political transition.

Rebels will also become more intransigent. Talks will, therefore, fail.

Fragmentation

In the absence of any genuine negotiations, the current situation on the ground in Syria is likely to persist. No opposition actor will be able effectively to challenge Assad, who -- with Iranian and Russian backing -- will retain control of the cities of Aleppo, Hama, Homs and Damascus, and the coastal provinces.

Yet aside perhaps from in the Damascus suburbs, the government will have little capacity to advance beyond its heartlands.

Syrian fragmentation will become entrenched. Islamist rebel factions will win out against secular rivals to control Idlib and some other rural areas.

Boosted by US support for their operations against IS in Raqqa, the Kurds will consolidate a de facto state in the north, despite Turkish opposition (see SYRIA: Northern competition could be explosive - March 7, 2017).

With reduced options for even tacit cooperation between US-backed forces and the Syrian government, IS has a higher chance of holding onto territory around Deir al-Zour.