Analysis

The Zapad exercises have been held at regular intervals since 1999, and serve as the culmination of the Russian military's annual training cycle. Similar large strategic operational exercises were held at the same time of year in the Soviet period.

The series rotates through the four main operational strategic commands: Eastern, Caucasus, Central and in this case Western (Zapad means 'west').

Zapad-2017 has been anticipated for at least four years (the last Zapad event was in 2013), but it takes place in a radically altered geopolitical environment, with Russian forces officially deployed in Crimea and unofficially in eastern Ukraine, and NATO bolstering its forces in eastern member states.

That creates heightened uncertainty about the scope and exact parameters of the 2017 event.

Troop numbers

One of the main points of contention is the total number of troops involved. Official figures and Western estimates diverge widely:

• Western reports suggest that 75,000-100,000 Russians soldiers may participate.
• Official figures from Russia and Belarus indicate that 12,700 will be involved: 7,200 from the Belarusian military, 3,000 Russians temporarily deployed to Belarus and 2,500 in Russia.

Belarus gave the 12,700 figure in its formal notice to the Organisation for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE) under the terms of the 2011 Vienna Document requiring exchanges of military information.

There are reasons that these figures are so different.

The Russian military is conducting related exercises on its territory that are not technically part of Zapad-2017. Russia has not given the OSCE notice of these exercises since it regards them as domestic and not subject to Vienna Document reporting.

The highest Western numbers usually include not just armed forces personnel but also security agency staff and civilian officials who may be involved in parts of the exercise.

Russia is conducting concurrent civil defence exercises that will include the National Guard and territorial defence reserves. These paramilitary forces may amount to an additional 20,000 personnel, accounting for higher-end Western estimates.

Both Russian officials and Western analysts tend to count the entire personnel of military units involved in an exercise even if only part of the unit is deployed in the field. This inflates totals.

Hence, the overall number of Russian troops involved in the exercise is likely to be much lower than Western estimates, but higher than the total formally reported to the OSCE.

War games scenario

Belarusian officials have tried to dispel fears about Zapad-2017 in the West as well as at home (see BELARUS: Russian wargames cause alarm - February 24, 2017).

They have been far more open about its content and objectives than Moscow, and have stressed that it is entirely defensive in concept.

They say that six firing ranges in Belarus have been selected as locations for Zapad-2017 precisely because they are some distance from the Polish border. Three ranges in Russia's Pskov, Leningrad and Kaliningrad regions will also be used. (see RUSSIA: Fortress Kaliningrad provides assertive shield - July 21, 2017).

The scenario for Zapad-2017 is a military counter-offensive to repulse an invasion of Belarus by three fictional states. This indicates the objective is similar to previous Zapad iterations: defending Belarus from a NATO invasion.

The scenario is likely to result in a limited operation to restore the status quo ante while seeking to avoid engagement by other NATO states and the escalation of the conflict beyond the immediate vicinity of Belarus.

Officials say the exercises will involve 680 armoured vehicles and 70 aircraft, of which 370 and 40 will be deployed in Belarus, plus ten vessels from the Baltic Fleet (see RUSSIA: Navy purge will slow Baltic assertive capacity - July 29, 2016).

Pointers to Russian strategy

Russia has military and political objectives, with messages for its adversaries:

Military

Russia wants to demonstrate its ability to conduct large-scale joint operations involving multiple arms of service and activating logistics networks that include transfers of forces from one zone to another.

Like other exercises in this series, Zapad-2017 seeks to strengthen defence cooperation with Belarus, Russia's most capable military ally and a critical buffer zone.

Moscow views a NATO intervention in Belarus as one of the most likely causes of a major military confrontation.

Political

Despite Western perceptions of an increasingly aggressive Russia, Moscow feels relatively weak compared with the United States and its allies, and perturbed by even modest additional force deployments in Eastern Europe (see RUSSIA: Defence spending will fall at a gradual pace - April 7, 2017 and see NATO: Rotating battalions may not bolster credibility - September 22, 2016).

Zapad-2017 aims to deter the West by highlighting Russia's readiness to counter offensive military action as well as anything it views as Western-sponsored attempts at regime change in Belarus.

Covert motives?

Western media reporting on Zapad-2017 has helped Moscow shape a message of overwhelming strength while simultaneously dismissing as 'hysteria' any suggestion of malign intentions.

Occupying Belarus

Some Western media have speculated that Russia will not remove all its troops from Belarus once Zapad-2017 is over.

This seems unlikely because it would provoke a crisis with Russia's closest ally but also because it would undermine ties with other former Soviet states that host Russian exercises.

Belarusian President Alexander Lukashenka has rebuffed Russian proposals for a permanent military presence, for instance, airbases (see BELARUS/RUSSIA: Minsk's weakness will limit disputes - March 10, 2017). However, Moscow does not have an urgent need for a troop presence since maintaining enough forces to be of strategic value would be expensive, and forces can be moved quickly from Russia in the event of a crisis.

Meanwhile, Russia has enough economic leverage to ensure Lukashenka remains fundamentally compliant, despite his occasional outbursts of anger at Moscow (see BELARUS/RUSSIA: More disputes are likely despite deal - May 18, 2017).

Baltic takeover

Another fear raised in the West is that Zapad-2017 is a dry run for the invasion of one or more of the Baltic states.

Proponents of this view note that Russia conducted a major exercise in the Caucasus not long before intervening in Georgia in 2008, while a 2013 Black Sea exercise foreshadowed the transfer of troops to Crimea in early 2014. However, these deductions are selective: Russia conducts large exercises on its borders many times a year, usually attracting little attention.

Russia has not indicated an imminent wish to move against the Baltic states, not least because it must take seriously NATO's commitment to back up its Article 5 guarantees to these member states (see BALTICS: Ukraine-style Russian meddling looks unlikely - February 8, 2017).