US-Russian treaty end will destabilise Europe
The US president has announced the abandonment of a missile treaty that has been a cornerstone of European security
US President Donald Trump said on October 20 that the United States would withdraw from a key arms control treaty in place since 1987. Washington has previously accused Russia of violating the Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces (INF) treaty. Russia has responded angrily to Trump's announcement. As both countries consider intermediate-range missile programmes, Russia's arms development methods place it ahead; it reportedly has an operational missile.
What next
The return of a destabilising missile type will worry European states, and many will be reluctant to offer bases. Tearing up this treaty will heighten risks to the strategic balance by destroying a long-standing level of basic trust. In particular, it raises questions about the New Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty (New START), covering long-range nuclear weapons, which expires in 2021.
Subsidiary Impacts
- Complex and frosty US-Russia relations make concessions less feasible.
- German-US divisions will be exacerbated by a US withdrawal from INF.
- The prospect of US missile deployments will add a new dimension to populist opposition across Europe.
Analysis
Trump's comment to journalists that "we're going to terminate the agreement and we're going to pull out" did not come out of the blue. His National Security Advisor, John Bolton, has reportedly been pressing for withdrawal.
Bolton is in Moscow for talks with Foreign Minister Sergey Lavrov today; he may also meet President Vladimir Putin. The INF treaty will feature high on the agenda.
Three decades
The INF treaty was signed by Soviet leader Mikhail Gorbachev and US President Ronald Reagan in 1987, and embodied the new understanding between the two adversaries. It removed growing tensions over US and Soviet missile build-ups by doing away with this class altogether.
The treaty entirely bans ground-based missiles (and their launchers) with a range of 500-5,500 kilometres, in other words weapons that posed the greatest risk to NATO forces in Europe and Russian forces in the western, European part of the country. The treaty prohibits such missiles whether armed with conventional or nuclear warheads, since it would be impossible to tell the difference in a conflict.
Ballistic and cruise missiles with a range of under 500 kilometres are not banned, nor are intermediate-range missiles carried by surface vessels, submarines and aircraft.
The end of verification created a gap in confidence that is now apparent
Reagan's citation of the Russian phrase "trust but verify" was followed up by on-site verifications. Russia destroyed 1,846 missiles covered by the treaty and the United States its arsenal of 846. This process was completed by 1991, when the Soviet Union broke up.
Retrospectively speaking, the flaw in treaty implementation was that verification ended in 2001, a decade after the missiles were gone.
Cracks in confidence
From 2011, Washington repeatedly accused Russia of testing an intermediate-range ground-launched missile in breach of INF. Testing of the weapon, designated 9M279 (NATO designation: SSC-8), began in 2008, according to US officials.
The deputy head of the US Joint Chiefs of Staff, General John Selva, told the House of Representatives Armed Services Committee in March 2017 that the new Russian cruise missile was being deployed, undermining the "spirit and intent" of the INF treaty.
The United States raised this alleged violation at a meeting of the Special Verification Commission in November 2016, the first time this INF implementation body had met since 2003. It put the issue to NATO's annual meeting in July 2018. NATO leaders concluded that "the most plausible assessment" was that Russia was in breach of the INF treaty.
Counter-claims
Russia has tended to ignore rather than address concerns about the 9M279 weapon (although the designation exists in official documents). It focuses instead on the US anti-ballistic missile (ABM) system already deployed in Romania and planned for Poland.
Aside from opposing the ABM system's primary use -- for destroying adversaries' intercontinental ballistic missiles (ICBMs) -- Moscow argues that the launcher can also be used to fire intermediate-range missiles. Since compatible launchers as well as missiles are banned under the INF treaty, the United States is in breach, it argues.
Technical change blurs lines
Missile technology has evolved since the distinct weapon types deployed in the 1980s, making it hard to separate 'illegal' from 'legal' systems.
The 9M279 is a member of the Iskander family, which consists mainly of land-based short-range missiles and launchers. Some (Iskander-K; 9M728) have wings fitted, making them cruise missiles. The Iskander-M (9K720; NATO designation SS-26) is a 'legal' short-range ballistic missile. Its deployment in Russia's Kaliningrad places Poland and much of Germany within range, despite its treaty compliance (see RUSSIA: New missiles increase Baltic region risks - July 6, 2018).
Assuming the treaty-violating 9M279 model is an extended-range variant of the Iskander-K cruise missile, the two will be hard to distinguish except when their flight is tracked. Launcher systems will be similar or identical.
US response
Concerns about Russia's alleged violations and its failure to address complaints have prompted moves to begin work on a US intermediate-range missile. A Congressional bill of July 2014 called on the president to initiate a research and development programme for cruise and ballistic missiles in the 500-5,500-kilometre range. National Defense Authorization acts of 2015 and 2016 built on this recommendation, and the 2018 act requires the Department of Defense to begin a cruise missile development programme.
In response to alleged Russian violations of the INF treaty, Washington's 2018 Nuclear Posture Review calls for reintroducing nuclear-armed cruise missiles on naval vessels. These would replace similar weapons phased out in 2013 (see UNITED STATES: Success of new nuclear arms not certain - February 6, 2018).
This programme would be more swiftly actionable than the design of a new ground-based weapon. It has the added attraction of achieving a US strategic aim without breaching any treaty.
China factor
In his announcement, Trump referenced Chinese military capabilities as part of the justification for withdrawing from the INF treaty. If Russia and China were both developing INF-violating weapons, "that's unacceptable", he said.
China was not party to the 1987 treaty but subsequently developed an advanced military arsenal as its economy grew. The then commander of US Pacific Command, Admiral Harry Harris, told Congress last year that some 95% of Chinese missiles would be in breach of the INF treaty if the country was a party to it.
Some commentators argue that Russia's urge to develop an intermediate-range missile stems from perceived threats posed by such systems proliferating in China, in particular, although other Asian states are free to own them, too.
Moscow proposed to the UN in 2007 that the INF treaty be transformed into a multilateral agreement for signature by all states that possess intermediate-range missiles. Washington backed the idea, but other states chose not to and the initiative died.
Outlook
The dismantling of a treaty that has largely worked for three decades will affect Europe above all.
The prospect of intermediate-range weapons returning will heighten NATO-Russia tensions and divide European states: Western European countries are likely to be reluctant to host weapons seen as especially destabilising, while also living in fear of Russia's greater capacity for devastating surprise attacks.
East European states such as Poland may be more willing to host a new US intermediate-range missile; this will intensify Russian concerns and heighten tensions around Kaliningrad.
Russia can take swift advantage of the end of the INF treaty
The end of the INF treaty will give Russia a short- to mid-term strategic advantage in that it need only modify and deploy tried-and-tested Iskander-type weapons while the United States gradually develops a new system. This is well within Russia's limited budget capacity; in most areas of defence it is out-spent by the United States many times over (see RUSSIA: Modest arms plan may dictate defensive posture - February 16, 2018).
Opposition to the INF treaty appears to reflect Bolton's hawkish stance, which complicates the already-conflicting US establishment views of Russia: Congress and the Treasury favour ramping up sanctions, as Trump tries to maintain a positive relationship with Putin. Trump's approval of INF treaty withdrawal may reflect a desire to show he is 'doing something about Russia', but the consequences are far-reaching.
Whatever the reasons behind withdrawal, it is consonant with Trump's unilateralist approach to international affairs. That will raise serious questions about how he will handle related matters, above all the five-year renewal (or not) of New START, the current version of a bilateral understanding that has kept ICBMs -- and fear of nuclear war -- in check since the 1970s (see US/RUSSIA: Nuclear arms treaty may lose relevance - April 24, 2017).
It is possible Trump may shift position on a total withdrawal, although pressure from Bolton suggests not.
If he does shift, and his position is just a negotiating tactic, it could be successful in pressuring Russia to commit to treaty compliance.
The INF treaty is fundamentally sound, and a revised version could build on-site inspections back into the process. Both Moscow and Washington would have an interest in coming to terms bilaterally and then revisiting the multilateral treaty idea, to persuade or coerce Beijing into signing up.
