Abortive Venezuela uprising weakens Maduro and Guaido

Analysis

In an early morning broadcast on April 30, Guaido announced the backing of military elements for a final push against Maduro. This was the third attempt this year to force Maduro from office, following the opposition-controlled National Assembly's declaration of Guaido as 'interim president' in January, and Guaido's efforts to force humanitarian assistance into Venezuela in March (see VENEZUELA: Potential outcomes are not optimistic - February 22, 2019; and see VENEZUELA: Parallel powers will not resolve crisis - January 14, 2019).

In the broadcast, Guaido appeared with Lopez, released from house arrest following his conviction for inciting violent protests in 2014. His release was secured on April 29 by the head of the SEBIN intelligence police, General Manuel Figuera, whose wife departed for the United States the same day.

Figuera, sanctioned by Washington in February for "systematic human rights abuses", wrote to Maduro to explain his decision, a move rumoured to have tipped Maduro off to alleged transition negotiations between senior figures in his government and the opposition. Guaido's team lauded Figuera's defection and in the broadcast claimed it was the start of a shift within the armed forces, but no further high-level defections or lower-level rebellions followed.

Equally problematic for Guaido, the broadcast did not prompt the mass spontaneous popular protests to support the military rebellion that he called for. While it had clearly been hoped Lopez's reappearance would galvanise supporters, mobilisations across the country were muted.

Window of opportunity?

Any window of opportunity was missed:

• The anti-Maduro opposition has relied heavily on charismatic leadership, first Lopez and more recently Guaido. April 30 showed the limitations of this strategy and Lopez's waning popular appeal.
• The military retook the La Carlota base in Caracas, the scene of a small rebellion, and pushed back protesters. Defence Minister General Vladimir Padrino Lopez, head of the Bolivarian Armed Forces, tweeted his support for the constitutional order, soon clarified as backing for Maduro, with whom he appeared in a live TV broadcast the following day.

Senior US officials including National Security Advisor John Bolton, Secretary of State Mike Pompeo, Venezuela transition team head Elliot Abrams and Senator Marco Rubio made tweets and statements throughout the day supporting Guaido and calling on the military to defect. Bolton claimed Padrino, Supreme Court President Maikel Moreno and Ivan Hernandez Dala, head of the presidential guard, had backtracked on agreements to support Guaido.

The immediate threat of uprising quickly dissipated. Lopez sought asylum in the Chilean embassy and 24 military officials in the Brazilian embassy, Lopez moving to the Spanish embassy later in the day. Maduro's calls for supporters to take to the streets did galvanise significant numbers. Protests and clashes continued into yesterday but have been contained.

Accounting for failure

US officials and senior figures in Guaido's circle denounced Russia and Cuba as culpable for Maduro's persistence.

According to interviews given by Bolton and Pompeo, Russian President Vladimir Putin convinced Maduro to hold out, even though Maduro was allegedly ready to board a plane waiting to take him to Havana. A figure of over 25,000 Cuban agents in Venezuela was cited to account for Maduro's capacity to deflect the uprising, with further US sanctions planned for Cuba in response for the alleged support (see CUBA: Return to emergency economics may be necessary - May 2, 2019).

No intelligence or other evidence has been produced to support these accounts.

While Guaido's circle have echoed the US allegations, they have explained the military's failure to defect on the basis of:

• the military's criminal nature, specifically in relation to drug trafficking, giving them a vested financial interest in maintaining Maduro in power; and
• Padrino backing away from a rumoured negotiated agreement.

Either way, any offer of amnesties has not reduced the perceived costs of defection.

Bolton maintains the uprising has opened major divisions in the military hierarchy. This is a probable overstatement and intended as traditional 'psych ops' to divide Maduro's inner group. Abrams explained Maduro's people who planned to join the uprising had not been contactable when Guaido announced it.

Leaks and speculation

More reasoned explanations suggest that details of a planned uprising were leaked to Maduro, forcing Guaido to bring it forward from May 1. There is also speculation Guaido's camp was concerned waning popular interest might produce a low turnout for a May 1 mass demonstration, which Guaido had claimed as the final phase in his 'Operation Freedom' (see VENEZUELA: Humanitarian crisis mounts amid stalemate - April 5, 2019).

The arrest in April of former intelligence chief Hugo Carvajal in Spain was said to have led to a trove of security information. Any information obtained was either wrong or misleading.

A breakdown in communications is evident, with some sources pointing to Guaido's move taking Washington by surprise. It is more likely that only some US officials were aware of the plans; this is reflected in reports of deepening divisions in the White House over military deployment in Venezuela.

President Donald Trump, like his counterparts in Brazil and Colombia, is constrained by requirements of congressional authorisation. There is reported unease in the senior military ranks of all three countries around any intervention in Venezuela, and opposition from within sizeable elements of domestic constituencies.

Changes ahead

There is still the possibility over coming days that Padrino may move against Maduro, potentially to put Maduro's arch-nemesis and former military official Diosdado Cabello in power. In a context of governance paralysis, leaders of any post-Maduro Chavista government might be convinced of the benefits of a negotiated political solution, but any calculation will be based on Guaido's perceived strength or weakness.

Guaido's authority has been eroded by this third abortive push and by allowing Lopez back into the political spotlight. There have been gaffes, including Guaido's Armani shoot for GQ magazine's May edition at the height of a serious humanitarian situation, and mounting schisms within the anti-Maduro camp that Guaido's diminished authority looks unlikely to hold together (see VENEZUELA: Guaido risks losing steam amid stalemate - March 18, 2019).

Opposition unity was always fragile and rifts are rapidly deepening between those elements emphatically favouring US intervention (and aligning with the Lima Group) and others wanting to see some form of negotiated outcome (supporting the EU/Latin America International Contact Group). This cleavage is particularly pronounced between the Venezuelan diaspora overseas, and domestic opposition groups within Venezuela.

Splits and leadership changes may be on the horizon, opening up the possibility of dialogue, or driving the country deeper into crisis.