Parallel powers will not resolve crisis in Venezuela
The so-called 'supreme court in exile' has named new National Assembly President Juan Guaido as interim president
On January 11, Juan Guaido, new president of the opposition-controlled National Assembly, agreed to serve as Venezuela’s interim president after being designated by the ‘supreme court in exile’. This creates a situation of parallel powers following President Nicolas Maduro’s inauguration for a second six-year term on January 10. The court in exile considered that Maduro is illegitimate and has usurped power, with authority thereby defaulting to the head of the Assembly. This interpretation is supported by the Lima Group, Washington and European countries including Germany and Italy.
What next
The political situation will be tense and fluid as Maduro seeks to stabilise his party, government and presidency, and as opposition factions position themselves in response to the actions of the court in exile and Voluntad Popular (VP), the minority opposition party to which Guaido belongs.
Subsidiary Impacts
- The manoeuvre has outflanked Maduro and will deepen fissures over his leadership in the ruling party.
- The court’s ruling and Guaido’s move have taken the broader opposition movement by surprise and risk deepening fissures.
- Other opposition leaders may wait for Guaido to fail with an eye to stepping in.
- The armed forces will move centre stage as the arbiter of legitimate authority.
Analysis
Venezuela's constitutional impasse is the culmination of the conflict between the Maduro government and VP, which has refused to engage in elections or dialogue. VP holds 14 of 167 National Assembly seats, but has the support of the White House and close links with Organization of American States (OAS) Secretary-General Luis Almagro.
International pressure has built on Maduro since his decision to sidestep the opposition-dominated National Assembly elected in 2015 and convene a National Constituent Assembly (NCA) in July 2017 (see VENEZUELA: Assembly may bring crisis to a head - August 2, 2017):
- The NCA followed a March 2017 ruling by the government-appointed Supreme Tribunal of Justice (TSJ) that found the National Assembly in contempt for swearing in three opposition deputies under investigation for electoral corruption. Those three deputies gave the opposition a supermajority, allowing the Assembly to reverse government legislation and appoint officials.
- In July 2017, the National Assembly nominated justices in parallel to the existing TSJ judges, appointed by the outgoing Assembly controlled by the ruling United Socialist Party of Venezuela (PSUV).
- Almagro recognised the National Assembly's TSJ as the only legitimate judicial authority, in turn accelerating the conflict between the OAS and Maduro.
- After a swearing-in ceremony at the OAS in Washington in October 2017, the National Assembly TSJ assumed the title 'TSJ in exile' and has since issued various 'rulings', including non-recognition of the 2013 presidential election result on the grounds Maduro is an (unproven) citizen of Colombia, and an August 2018 prison sentence of over 18 years for Maduro's corruption and rights abuses.
The TSJ in exile is not recognised as legitimate by all factions of Venezuela's perennially divided opposition, but it has worked closely with VP, whose leader Leopoldo Lopez is serving a 14-year prison sentence for his role in mobilising anti-government protests in 2014 and 2016.
The TSJ in exile has served as a bridge between the OAS, the White House and VP and most notably in Almagro's efforts to leverage Maduro from power -- efforts that have failed to gain consensual support in the 34-member OAS.
In August 2017, the Lima Group of countries supportive of Almagro's stance was established. This ran parallel with US financial sanctions on Venezuela. The NCA subsequently brought the December 2018 presidential election forward to May, which Maduro won with 67.8% of the vote in conditions that did not qualify as free of fair (see VENEZUELA: Election outcome will debilitate Maduro - May 22, 2018; and see VENEZUELA: Early election call raises a range of risks - January 30, 2018).
Almagro, the Lima Group, the TSJ in exile and opposition groups have maintained the NCA acted outside of the 1999 Bolivarian Constitution and therefore the May election result is invalid. Confusingly, the TSJ in exile and VP had hitherto claimed the 1999 Constitution was illegitimate.
Democratic restoration
Maduro's inauguration has increased regime change pressures, with a recent shift away from the opposition narrative of humanitarian crisis to emphasising the need for external support for democratic restoration. This is in the context of the recent election of right-of-centre Presidents Ivan Duque and Jair Bolsonaro in neighbouring Colombia and Brazil, and a narrative of external intervention to force Maduro from power.
This more muscular discourse reflects sanctions' limited success:
- Sanctions on individual officials have been poorly coordinated between countries.
- They have failed to induce high-level defections.
- Financial sanctions have positioned Maduro to deflect responsibility for the social crisis to the United States.
Following a visit by US Secretary of State Mike Pompeo to Peru and Brazil, on January 4, the Lima Group issued a statement upholding the TSJ in exile's position that Maduro's election was illegitimate and recognising the opposition-dominated National Assembly as the only constitutionally legitimate authority.
The statement outlined the adoption by signatory countries of US financial sanctions on Venezuelan government officials, suspended military and defence cooperation with Venezuela, and criticised the Venezuelan navy for preventing two ExxonMobil ships exploring for oil in territorial waters disputed between Venezuela and neighbouring Guyana.
Washington also issued a new list of sanctions on Venezuelan companies, resulting in the freezing of US-based bank accounts and transactions, including television company Globovision.
Maduro's sparsely populated inauguration highlighted his international isolation
Maduro has previously ridden out threats and sanctions by the United States and Lima Group, but his inauguration was an embarrassing affair attended by a handful of countries, revealing his isolation. The TSJ in exile declared the 35-year-old Guaido interim president of Venezuela the same day.
The move appears to have caught Guaido and the VP in Venezuela off guard, but it was quickly endorsed by Almagro and Pompeo; Brazil and Chile have recognised Guaido as president. The UN says it continues to work with the Maduro government.
Challenges ahead
Almagro, the United States and Lima Group may believe they have begun a smooth and bloodless displacement of Maduro, but there are challenges ahead.
Other opposition groups, including the largest party, Accion Democratica, were not brought into the TSJ in exile's planning and consultations, requiring bridge-building from VP at the risk of Guaido's support evaporating.
Preparation has gone into a social media campaign supporting Guaido -- with Wikipedia quickly edited to cite Guaido as interim president -- but this has substituted for a campaign to win popular support, giving Maduro space to counter-mobilise.
Guaido has stressed that members of the armed forces who oppose Maduro will not be prosecuted. The military leadership, which occupies senior government positions, has reportedly been contacted by regional counterparts calling on them to support Guaido or risk intervention. This risks dividing the armed forces, which currently remain largely behind Maduro.
Confusion around the detention and subsequent release of Guaido yesterday has led Caracas to claim rogue elements are operating within the security sector.
The move undercuts dialogue efforts supported by the new Mexican and Spanish governments; further wrangling will extend rather than alleviate Venezuela's immediate economic and social crisis (see VENEZUELA: Dialogue deadlock raises political stakes - February 14, 2018). Opposition disunity allows Maduro to claim these events are a product of US intervention and imperialism.
Backing the minority VP is a risky strategy
Maduro is on the backfoot. These developments may embolden his critics within the ruling PSUV to push for his replacement or compromise with the opposition. However, VP is an avowedly right-of-centre and neoliberal party, which minimises opportunities for dialogue and highlights the risk that the United States, OAS and Lima Group have taken in siding with a minority opposition faction.
