Kim-Trump meeting presages US climbdown

Analysis

Crossing the Military Demarcation Line with Kim, Trump became the first serving US president to enter North Korea. They then held hour-long talks on the South Korean side.

South Korea's President Moon Jae-in briefly met Kim but did not join the talks. Absent from the US delegation was National Security Advisor John Bolton, who was in Ulan Bator.

Trump said later he had invited Kim to the White House, and that working-level bilateral discussions on the nuclear issue, in abeyance for four months since the previous summit in Hanoi, will resume within weeks.

Turning point

Belying its supposed last-minute spontaneity, the idea of a third Trump-Kim summit had been widely touted (see NORTH KOREA: Xi visit may revive nuclear diplomacy - June 26, 2019).

Despite its brevity and lack of substance, it may prove a turning point in bilateral relations, at least while Trump holds office. The warmth on display, with denuclearisation unmentioned, shows that Trump now sees his relationship with Kim as an end and gain in itself, rather than a means to achieving swift nuclear disarmament.

Bolton's absence was telling, as was his tweet from Mongolia attacking media reports that the United States would settle for a freeze rather than full denuclearisation. He called this "a reprehensible attempt by someone to box in the President".

Conversely, the US delegation in South Korea included Tucker Carlson, a Fox TV talk-show host increasingly seen as Trump's confidant and credited with recently persuading the president to rescind plans (backed by Bolton) to strike Iranian bases in retaliation for the downing of a US drone.

All this suggests that though Kim's nuclear threat is in no way diminished, the contradictions in Trump's approach are being resolved. With an eye to re-election next year, he sees North Korea as a foreign policy win already, and wants nothing to upset that narrative.

Trump's new stance might be defended as realism. Acknowledging that North Korea is a de facto nuclear power has long been anathema in Washington, lest this encourage other states to defy or quit the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty. Yet Kim's striking advances in both nuclear and ballistic missile technology, shown in a flurry of testing during 2016-17, have created a new balance of power which cannot be wished away.

New talks

The bonhomie at the summit, and Trump's specific promise of fresh talks -- confirmed by Secretary of State Mike Pompeo -- set expectations. Preparations are already underway. US Special Representative for North Korea Stephen Biegun is holding meetings in Brussels and Berlin this week. His South Korean counterpart, Lee Do-hun, yesterday flew to Berlin for consultations with Biegun and other officials.

Precedent cautions that expectations might be disappointed. Neither the Hanoi summit's failure to produce any agreements, nor the earlier 'success' in Singapore, led to substantive progress. Having largely avoided working-level talks till now, it is unclear how far Kim has changed his posture.

Kim will be encouraged by a further US concession. Yesterday, the State Department for the first time confirmed that freezing North Korea's nuclear programme is its initial aim, while insisting that the final goal remains complete denuclearisation.

This has two implications.

First, it renders Bolton's position awkward if not untenable. Rumours as to who might replace him are already rife in Washington, with Biegun's name among them.

Second, it means the US government has finally accepted Pyongyang's consistent insistence on a phased process. Total and immediate surrender of all weapons of mass destruction -- the 'big deal' which was pushed by Bolton and rejected by Kim in Hanoi -- was always a non-starter.

If a freeze is the basis for working talks to commence, this in no way guarantees their success, because the issues on which Pyongyang has hitherto stalled still need to be tackled.

The US side will demand upfront a verified inventory of relevant sites and materiel, to confirm what exactly is to be frozen. On past form, North Korea will use prevarication and subterfuge to yield as little and as slowly as possible.

Easing sanctions

Though Washington has yet to admit this, Kim will not accept a freeze without the quid pro quo of substantial relief from UN and other sanctions. Much hinges on what will be traded for what, and how quickly.

Quite how much sanctions are hurting North Korea's economy is unclear (see NORTH KOREA: Sanctions hurt, but Kim’s grip is strong - May 1, 2019). However, Xi's recent visit, and other trends such as a new cross-border rail bridge nearing completion, suggest that as ever Beijing will prop up the Kim regime, especially if it looks serious about negotiating.

Relief in Seoul

Trump's approach chimes with that of Moon, who was unnerved by Trump's initial 'fire and fury' posture in 2017 and has his own reasons to avoid confrontation, both pragmatic and ideological.

The border itself is less tense since 2018's inter-Korean military accord, though troop deployments near the DMZ have not altered, and this year Pyongyang has frozen all dialogue (see NORTH KOREA: Kim puts inter-Korean stability in doubt - April 17, 2019).

Plans for cross-border transport links and other economic cooperation have fallen foul of sanctions. Moon will therefore redouble his urging that Washington move swiftly to ease these, in hopes of reviving inter-Korean relations and thereby his own political fortunes.

Window of opportunity

This new turn, if such it proves, is potentially time-bound. Both Trump and Moon have opponents at home who, if they come to power, threaten to take a harder line.

However, there is a reasonable window of opportunity. Trump will stand for re-election in November 2020, so he has at least 18 months to serve. Moon's five-year term ends in May 2022, giving him more latitude.