Aircraft carriers will extend China’s military reach
China last month commissioned its first domestically built aircraft carrier
The commissioning into service last month of China’s first domestically built aircraft carrier, the Shandong, was a milestone in the development of Beijing’s naval potential. It brings a step closer the ability of China’s People’s Liberation Army Navy (PLAN) to deploy a credible operational carrier capability and in particular to deploy with greater confidence and freedom of action at range in regions remote from China to project Beijing’s power and influence.
What next
The operational capacity of these ships will remain limited for now, but the PLAN is likely to deploy them increasingly regularly and more assertively in its near waters, such as the South and East China Seas and the Taiwan Strait. They will become increasingly potent and significant tools in the competition for global influence, probably starting with the Indian Ocean and then extending beyond to the Mediterranean and even the Atlantic.
Subsidiary Impacts
- Beijing potentially could deploy perhaps six carriers by the 2030s, compared with the US Navy’s current eleven fleet carriers.
- Beijing’s carriers would have only a limited, supporting, distracting role at most in a direct confrontation with the United States.
- Their main purpose will be to impress and intimidate other countries and project China’s power.
- Other major military powers will adjust their own aircraft carrier plans in response to China’s.
Analysis
The Shandong joins the PLAN's first carrier, the Liaoning, originally laid down for the Soviet navy but bought second-hand by Beijing from Ukraine as an incomplete hulk and heavily refitted in China. The Liaoning is similar in size and capabilities to its original sister-ship, Russia's Admiral Kuznetsov.
The Shandong embodies China's incremental approach to developing its carrier force. It is a modified version of the Liaoning.
It weighs in at about 60,000 tonnes full-load displacement, compared with around 100,000 tonnes for a US Navy carrier.
It will be able to carry a few more than the Liaoning's 18-24 jets and 17 helicopters, compared with more than 50 jets plus helicopters for a US Navy carrier.
The Shandong also has more advanced radars than the Liaoning.
Both the Chinese ships have conventional propulsion, whereas the US Navy operates nuclear-powered carriers, giving them almost unlimited range and the ability to sustain themselves at sea for longer.
The Chinese vessels use a 'ski-jump' ramp rather than catapults on a long deck to launch their fighters. This limits the size of aircraft they can host, and the range and payload of these jets due to the restricted take-off weights.
Despite these limitations, China's incremental approach of cautiously developing an existing design before attempting something more ambitious is giving the PLAN more experience, and sooner, of producing and operating such vessels. The next and subsequent ships are likely to be larger and more capable, incorporating catapults, capacity for larger aircraft and eventually nuclear power.
These early Chinese carriers cannot replicate the full firepower of their US counterparts (see CHINA: Military will lag US capabilities for years - March 22, 2019). However, they are more than enough to present a significant challenge to most other navies in South-east Asia and the Indian Ocean, and to fulfil the role of potentially coercive diplomatic tools.
Moreover, when they are fully operational, they and particularly subsequent vessels will provide the PLAN with a credible capability to operate independently at range as a blue-water navy, able to defend itself in limited contingences even in the face of hostile air power, and to have limited offensive capability as well.
This will be a step-change in Beijing's power projection potential
Not just for show
The fanfare that accompanied the Shandong's commissioning, including the presence of President Xi Jinping, underscored the part that national prestige plays in Beijing's calculations of the value of its nascent carrier force.
However, this about more than symbolism. Beijing is investing not just in the ships themselves but in the panoply of supporting capabilities needed to deliver an effective carrier force.
Most recently, less than one month after the Shandong entered the fleet, the PLAN commissioned the first of a powerful new class of cruiser, the Nanchang. An important role for these ships will be to provide a defensive screen for the carriers. The PLAN has also been building a class of large and fast supply ships specifically to support the carriers.
The PLAN is still on a steep learning curve with its carriers
It is a testament to the complexities of carrier operations that, despite the huge investment that Beijing has clearly been pouring in, it is inevitably taking time for the PLAN to master the art.
The most serious uncertainty is how far China has got in producing the aircraft modifications and trained aircrew needed to operate from the ships. That is among the most difficult parts of the equation that makes up operating an aircraft carrier.
Perhaps even more difficult is bringing together all the different parts that make up a fully fledged carrier group with all its supporting elements and getting them to act effectively as a whole. That too is still a work in progress -- although even high-profile training deployments can send a message.
No paradox
China has done more to challenge the operational assumptions of the US Navy's pre-eminent carrier force than has any other country, by investing in long-range, precision, high-speed anti-ship missiles and a spread of other anti-access/area denial capabilities.
Yet its investment in developing its own carrier capability is second only to that of the United States.
This is because carriers continue to have huge utility and flexibility in multiple different scenarios, including power projection, humanitarian relief, diplomatic leverage and parading national prestige.
Joining the club
China now joins the very select group that has more than one full-sized carrier at sea --the others being the United Kingdom and United States. India will probably soon field a second, and is the only other navy with a plan for more than two, but its ability to deliver on its ambitions to field three is less assured than China's. Russia's aircraft carrier is undergoing repairs and may possibly never re-enter service.
How far and how fast Beijing actually goes in developing its carrier force will inevitably depend on what lessons it draws from its increasing operational experiences with its ships, and also on the broader trajectory of China and its economy.
Just how the PLAN force develops will influence those states with programmes and possible aspirations for carriers or other large aviation-capable ships. These include the United States, United Kingdom, France and a number of other European nations, Russia, India, Japan, South Korea and, at the fringes, perhaps Australia and Brazil (see JAPAN: F-35s will confer air superiority - June 14, 2019).
