COVID-19 will threaten African political stability

Analysis

The most obvious threat to political stability comes from unpopular leaders who manipulate the COVID-19 crisis as a cover to try and strengthen their position.

In Malawi, President Peter Mutharika declared a national State of Disaster on March 24, even though the country did not have a single confirmed case. Mutharika faces an election re-run on July 2 after his victory in 2019 was nullified by the Constitutional Court in February (see MALAWI : President will struggle to tame opposition - March 19, 2020). He now faces a significant challenge to retain power, after the two main opposition parties -- which secured 55% of the vote last year -- formally launched a coalition.

Civil society leaders and opposition parties have questioned whether the new rules introduced by Mutharika -- which include a ban on all meetings over 100 people -- represent illegitimate infringements on Malawians' human rights. However, international donors have been reluctant to criticise the government, as they have implemented similar measures and are keen not to do anything that could be interpreted as downplaying the severity of COVID-19.

Food and poverty

There is a significant risk that government responses to COVID-19 will undermine the ability of citizens to access affordable food, especially for those who live in slum areas in major cities, who typically lack the capacity to grow their own food, and also pay some of the highest prices for food and water.

COVID-19-related restrictions on movement, such as lockdowns, are particularly problematic for this demographic as they both prevent them from utilising established coping strategies to manage financial strain, and risk locking them off from supply streams.

Rising food prices will be particularly challenging in countries where the cost of food is already high, such as Zimbabwe where uncontrolled inflation has already seen the price of the staple 'mealie meal' more than double in 2019.

If urban residents in high-density areas feel that governments are deliberately condemning them to hunger, there is a significant risk of protests and riots, which could both undermine efforts to prevent COVID-19 from spreading and trigger broader urban unrest.

Recognising these challenges, the Nigerian, Rwandan and Ugandan governments have put in place policies (of varying natures) designed to feed poor families, especially in urban areas.

Human rights abuses

The risk of popular opinion turning against the government will be exacerbated by the use of heavy-handed strategies to enforce COVID-19 restrictions.

In Rwanda, two men were reportedly shot and killed by police officers when they refused to comply with the lockdown. In Kenya, at least five people have been killed amid police enforcement of a curfew; one of these, a 13-year-old boy, was shot while standing on his balcony as police enforcement operations took place nearby.

In South Africa, the Independent Police Investigative Directorate is investigating at least eight deaths related to police actions during the lockdown -- almost as many as the total numbers of deaths from the virus itself.

Continued abuses such as these may backfire by triggering more widespread popular resistance, especially in countries where governments are unpopular in urban areas (such as parts of Kenya, Malawi, Uganda, Zambia or Zimbabwe).

Economic crisis

The collapse of tourism and the need for greater expenditure on healthcare are set to increase budget deficits across the continent. This will be compounded by the extensive measures introduced to curb the spread of COVID-19 in two of the continent's most important economic players, Nigeria and South Africa.

In Nigeria, the lockdown of Abuja, the political capital, and Lagos, the commercial capital, will undermine government revenue (see NIGERIA: Lower naira will not offset recession risks - March 25, 2020). In South Africa, President Cyril Ramaphosa has enforced one of the most restrictive lockdowns in Africa (see SOUTH AFRICA: Lockdown faces compliance hurdles - March 25, 2020). In both cases, economic slowdown -- including deep recession for South Africa -- will undermine economic growth regionally (see SOUTH AFRICA: Economy faces severe recession in 2020 - March 31, 2020).

The impact of slowing growth and falling government revenue will depend on the health of a country's economy prior to the crisis. In the set of heavily indebted countries, further economic decline may trigger a debt crisis.

Africa hosts some of the most indebted countries in the world, including Eritrea (debt-to-GDP ratio of 127%), Mozambique (124%), Zambia (91%), Mauritania (81%) and The Gambia (79%) -- but a raft of other countries will likely suffer debt difficulties, including Kenya and Ghana.

The IMF and World Bank have pledged to made additional credit available to governments struggling with the economic consequences of COVID-19 and have also advocated for debt deferral. However, in the absence of either debt cancellation or long-term debt rescheduling this will simply set the scene for a series of defaults once the crisis is over (see AFRICA: Leaders may seek COVID-19 debt reprieve - March 24, 2020).

However international financial institutions approach this challenge, many African states will be asked to reduce expenditure. Consequently, this will undermine governments' ability to sustain policies that are critical to their popular legitimacy, including efforts to provide free primary education or cheaper food and fuel.

Leadership struggles

There is also a serious risk that COVID-19 may also trigger political instability in a much more direct way, by incapacitating senior political leaders and generating a dangerous power vacuum.

In Burkina Faso, six ministers have tested positive for COVID-19: those in charge of education, foreign affairs, mines, education, interior, and trade, industry and handicrafts. There is serious concern that others may also be affected and that the advanced age of many leaders, along with the country's limited health facilities, will lead to multiple fatalities. Rose Marie Compaore, the influential second vice-president of the National Assembly, died of COVID-19 on March 17-18 (see BURKINA FASO: Case may mirror Sahelian vulnerabilities - March 30, 2020).

In Nigeria, the health of senior leaders is a constant source of speculation, which the onset of COVID-19 has exacerbated. Most notably, the news that Abba Kyari, President Muhammadu Buhari's chief of staff, had tested positive has prompted speculation that Buhari also has COVID-19. The presidency insists that Buhari has tested negative, but this has done little to curb the rumours.

Several other members of the political elite have tested positive, including the son of opposition leader and former Vice-President Atiku Abubakar, Bauchi State Governor Bala Mohammed and Kaduna State Governor Nasir el-Rufai -- a potential future presidential candidate.

If a growing number of senior political leaders are taken sick in African countries -- and especially if they do not recover -- the prospects for instability will increase dramatically. Because political parties have weak institutions of internal democracy, they often struggle to remain united during succession battles to replace presidents and prime ministers, leading to political uncertainty and, in the worst cases, violent struggle.