Biden will face major US overseas policy challenges

Analysis

Biden enters office with tangible but daunting foreign policy goals, many with short timelines. In his first year, urgent security issues will dominate over trade initiatives in foreign policy, while the administration focuses on managing COVID-19 and US economic recovery.

Since Biden's election, his team has been speaking publicly on foreign policy, partly as tensions with US rivals are spiking (see UNITED STATES: Biden to wield foreign policy expertise - December 10, 2020). On January 3, Biden's incoming national security advisor, Jake Sullivan, outlined plans to renegotiate two arms control agreements, with Russia and Iran.

In December, Sullivan suggested on Twitter that the EU consult Biden's team before finalising an EU-China investment agreement. However, China and the EU proceeded to agree in principle on the EU-China Comprehensive Agreement on Investment.

Arms control agreements

Thus far, the Biden team's most concrete foreign policy plans appear to be in reviving the US role in arms control agreements.

Russia

Washington and Moscow have agreed a one-year extension of the New START agreement, but talks on a longer-term extension have fizzled. Biden's team wants to restart these talks before momentum dissipates entirely (see RUSSIA/US: Arms talks offer hope in relationship - December 4, 2020). This will be a delicate balancing act for Biden, who must persuade Russian President Vladimir Putin to remain in the agreement while the US government simultaneously is investigating (and perhaps punishes) Russia for hacking US government networks.

Iran and Middle East

Stabilising US-Iran relations (including in hope of reviving the 2015 Iran nuclear deal, with renewed US participation) will likely involve lifting sanctions and will be even more difficult (see IRAN/US: Nuclear deal revival will face hurdles - November 25, 2020).

On January 3, possibly to mark the first anniversary of the US killing of Iranian military leader General Qassem Soleimani, Tehran announced its resumption of enriching uranium of 20% purity, far exceeding the 2015 deal's limits.

While 20% is insufficient for a nuclear weapon, Tehran is unlikely to soften and will expect Biden to make the first move. Ultimately, Biden hopes to extend the 2015 deal to negotiate provisions to prohibit missile development, which he can do without Senate approval.

Stabilising relations with Iran to enable such negotiations will be one of many problems to untangle in US-Middle East relations in Biden's first year. These range from US troops in Afghanistan and Iraq (made more difficult by outgoing President Donald Trump's recent drawdowns) to reassessing the US-Saudi Arabia alliance.

In each one, however, a new persepctive will complicate US calculations: the country's declining dependence on foreign oil, and the long-term decline in the salience of oil globally.

China's centrality

The most important item on Biden's early foreign policy agenda will be US-China relations. The prospects of narrowing the gap between the two countries on security and trade soon are slim.

Biden aims to make the relationship calmer and measured. He will reinstate some Obama-era cooperative programmes including regular military-to-military dialogues and joint medical programmes to forecast and address epidemics.

With a more positive tone, Biden's administration may be able to persaude Beijing to moderate its 'wolf warrior' behaviour, which Trump's Secretary of State Mike Pompeo often encouraged with his "new Cold War" rhetoric.

However, on core security and trade issues, Biden will have no choice but to continue along Trump administration policy lines:

Trade talks

Biden will struggle to push trade negotiations toward a 'second phase' agreement in which issues of particular concern to US business (intellectual property protection; rules of the digital economy) are at stake.

A conclusion is unlikely in Biden's first year, and he will be slow in lifting tariffs on China until there is tangible progress. Both countries will also be affected by the need to reorient their own domestic economies following COVID-19.

Security relations

Biden will continue to strengthen US security relations in Asia, and last month publicly endorsed Trump's Free and Open Indo-Pacific framework. However, the Quad (Australia, Japan, India and the United States) that undergirds the framework may wobble in 2021:

• Japan has its general election later this year;
• Australia-China relations are fraught; and
• there are questions about India's willingness to integrate in the region beyond occasional joint exercises.

Wrangling allies

The announcement of the EU-China investment agreement raises the question of whether Biden can easily restore relations with longstanding US allies. The investment deal is viewed as a net gain for China in its effort to separate Washington from its closest partners.

The EU and United States have often differed on Asia trade policy, but the timing of the announcement is viewed as a rebuff to Biden's overture to European allies. It also undermines one of the assumptions in Biden's planned 'Summit of Democracies', that democratic countries are naturally inclined to cooperate.

Yet Europe's growing presence in Asia-Pacific, particularly recent French and UK efforts to raise their security presence there, points to a more difficult issue for Washington. The United States operates with its European allies through NATO and with Asian allies through the hub-and-spokes configuration. These are two different forms of alliance management that could be difficult to reconcile.

Beyond this problem, in its attempt to re-energise its alliance relationships, the Biden administration will need to consider two issues:

Unequal allies

Washington does not view all allies, even treaty allies, with equal importance. In the Asia-Pacific, Japan and South Korea will remain key allies because of the security threats China and North Korea pose. US treaty alliances with Thailand and the Philippines, which originate from the 1950s, are less central to US security interests; the most valuable South-east Asian US security partner arguably could be Singapore.

Democracy and human rights

As with other presidents before him, Biden will need to confront conflicts between alliance relationships and US policy to promote democracy and human rights. The Japanese and South Korean leaders will no doubt receive invitations to the Summit of Democracies. Thailand and the Philippines will likely not.