United Russia aims to win despite lacklustre appeal
The governing party is about to win a majority based on borrowed achievements and the elimination of alternatives
The governing United Russia party goes into the September 17-19 parliamentary election with expectations of a landslide victory but no dynamic plan of action. Its campaign advertising claims the party is responsible for welfare improvements generated by the government. Functionally, the party looks increasingly like a vehicle for the Kremlin to extend its control of regional executives.
What next
United Russia is set to win a large majority despite its limited popular appeal. The few available alternatives in the shape of the unofficial and even official opposition forces have been marginalised. Election monitoring groups and independent media capable of identifying and highlighting electoral fraud face new practical and legal obstructions.
Subsidiary Impacts
- To boost United Russia, President Vladimir Putin has offered additional payments to pensioners and the security services.
- The poor management of the COVID-19 crisis will have little impact on United Russia's performance.
- The Kremlin will allow the Communist Alexey Russkikh in Ulyanovsk and Liberal Democrat Mikhail Degtyarev in Khabarovsk to become governors.
Analysis
Elections to the State Duma (lower chamber) will run from September 17 to 19, concurrently with ballots for 39 regional assemblies and twelve governors, three of them selected in indirect votes.
The aim is to repeat United Russia's success in the last Duma elections, in 2016, when it secured a large constitutional majority -- 343 out of 450 seats -- on the basis of just 54.2% of the vote. This was possible because of the then new system where 225 seats are elected by the old system of proportional representation and the rest in first-past-the-post constituencies. United Russia won in 90% of the latter in 2016.
Directionless party
The election preparations point to substantial changes which both United Russia and the political system more generally have undergone since Sergey Kiriyenko became the presidential administration's 'chief political manager' in 2016.
United Russia as a separate entity has become marginalised in the hierarchy of power. Its traditional politicians have been largely supplanted by Kiriyenko's handpicked technocrats, many groomed through the Leaders of Russia contest for fast promotion.
It now seems unwilling and unable to offer an ambitious reform plan or find compelling new figures to run in elections. Its election advertising makes much of improved benefit payments and other COVID-19-related measures, though these were formulated and implemented by the government with no real policy input from United Russia.
United Russia is trying to borrow Putin's popularity
A slogan unveiled in August, "We are Team Putin", again conflates the executive with the party, in the hope voters will focus mostly on the president. In a poll conducted by the Public Opinion Foundation in early August, only 27% of respondent said they would vote United Russia, while 57% approved of Putin.
New figureheads
Last year, United Russia leaders had ambitious plans to bring in new people and engage more with the public. In a highly publicised primaries process in recent months, it said it changed a high proportion of candidates.
However, any real drive to reform and rejuvenate the party has dissipated.
Putin, who is not a party member, in June announced five names for United Russia's federal list used for proportional representation: Defence Minister Sergey Shoigu; Foreign Minister Sergey Lavrov; Denis Protsenko, head doctor at the Kommunarka Hospital fighting COVID-19 in Moscow; Yelena Shmeleva, head of the Talent and Success Foundation; and children's rights ombudsman Anna Kuznetsova (see RUSSIA: Ruling party's lack of flair not a problem - August 13, 2021 and see PROSPECTS H2 2021: Russian politics - June 29, 2021).
Lavrov and Shoigu were ostensibly nominated as popular figures, even though recent polls show they are not (each has ratings in the 9-11% range). Neither is obliged to resign their ministerial posts when elected; they can just stand down from the party list. The outside possibility that one or both might leave ministerial office was strengthened on September 3 when Putin said it would be a pity to see them go, but the decision was theirs.
Kuznetsova, Shmeleva and Protsenko were chosen as Kremlin-friendly public figures with no political background, again presumably to make the party seem popular and relevant.
Change is also evident in the exclusion of Dmitry Medvedev, the former prime minister who leads United Russia, from the federal list. He had top billing in the 2011 and 2016 elections but was dropped from the current list shortly before Putin announced the five frontrunners. His omission confirms his diminishing role in Russian politics.
Stiffening regional resolve
Governors will head 90% of United Russia's regional party lists, compared with only around 50% in the 2016 elections.
Regional governors are being pinioned to United Russia
Over the last five years, governors have increasingly been selected as technocrats and parachuted in from Moscow. What looks like their increasing involvement in party politics is actually an expression of growing Kremlin control over regional government, and a steady de-politicisation of United Russia (see RUSSIA: Kremlin picks governors to suit regional needs - May 6, 2021).
Electoral engineering
United Russia is counting on a landslide victory achieved by default through a mix of electoral engineering and government repression targeting anyone thought liable to 'disrupt' the election outcome:
- Chief opposition leader Alexey Navalny is in prison, and the election- and corruption-focused networks he developed are being dismantled through arrests and restrictive legislation (see RUSSIA: Courts deployed to dismantle Navalny groups - April 28, 2021).
- Independent media and NGOs are being branded 'foreign agents' and 'undesirable' (see RUSSIA: Opposition will be dismembered case by case - June 8, 2021 and see RUSSIA: Legislators to find new forms of repression - May 5, 2021).
- This is the first time Duma elections are taking place over three days. The system was introduced for the September 2020 regional elections and provided an efficient way for the authorities to track, control and manipulate voting outcomes.
- Another tool which can be used to manipulate outcomes is online voting in six regions, including Moscow and Sevastopol.
- Surveillance camera feeds from polling stations will no longer be available.
- Local election monitoring group Golos has been designated a 'foreign agent', and the Organisation for Security and Cooperation in Europe will not be sending observers.
- The 250,000 residents of the unrecognised rebel entities in eastern Ukraine who have been granted Russian passports in recent years can vote. Almost by definition, they are United Russia voters.
Sidelining any competition
The Kremlin now seems wary of 'systemic' parties, the parliamentary insiders traditionally loyal to the Kremlin. That is particularly true of the Communist Party, which currently has around 15% of public support and theoretically has the potential to grow into a real opposition leftist force, but shows no sign of doing so while Gennady Zyuganov remains leader.
Nevertheless, the Communists have become a target. Pavel Grudinin, a high-profile and colourful figure who ran in the 2018 presidential election and got 12%, was barred from standing in July. Zyuganov responded with an unusual outburst, warning the authorities that Russia risked "fascist-isation".
In a few constituencies, credible candidates have been allowed to register. In areas where United Russia is expected to perform poorly, particularly via proportional representation, the Kremlin will want 'alternative parties' -- in reality its own creations -- such as New People and the Green Alternative to draw votes away from established parties such as the Communists, Liberal Democrats and Yabloko.
In first-past-the-post constituencies, United Russia is challenged by Navalny's 'smart voting' strategy, where voters are urged to pick whichever candidate can defeat the ruling party one. The strategy proved successful in some regional elections last year.
However, new legislation barring any member of a designated 'extremist' group from participating in Duma elections undermines the chances of the strategy working, as Navalny's coordinating networks fall under this designation.
