Russia's plans for Ukraine may not be finalised
Western governments are using warnings and dialogue to dissuade Moscow from actions they are still guessing at
The US State Department yesterday instructed family members of US diplomats to leave Ukraine. This is another signal that Washington views a Russian attack on Ukraine as imminent. A day earlier, the UK Foreign Office accused five Ukrainian former officials of conspiring with Moscow to stage a coup in Kyiv. US Secretary of State Antony Blinken harbours similar suspicions but has agreed with Russian Foreign Minister Sergey Lavrov to continue diplomacy.
What next
The perceived success of ongoing US-Russian talks will affect Moscow's decision-making on whether to escalate in Ukraine, and if so how. It has multiple options -- ranging from large-scale invasion, through a 'minimalist' occupation of rebel-held territories, to doing nothing at all. The US and UK approach is to expose and possibly neutralise Russian planning, but President Vladimir Putin's advantage is that his true intentions remain unknown and unpredictable.
Subsidiary Impacts
- UK claims and military aid will help consolidate London's relationship with Ukraine and more hawkish NATO powers such as Poland.
- Divisions in Europe will increase as some nations grow concerned at US-UK attempts to push them into more direct confrontation with Moscow.
- Lack of unity on the right approach to Russia will impede further diplomatic progress.
Analysis
The Foreign Office statement provided no evidence but named Yevhen Murayev as intended head of a puppet government in Kyiv. Murayev, a fairly obscure Ukrainian politician, has denied links with Russia. Of the other four named, one -- Vladimir Sivkovich, a former deputy head of Ukraine's National Security and Defence Council -- also appears on a new US Treasury Department sanctions list issued last week.
Although the latest UK and US suspect lists differ, the shared view that Moscow plans not only imminent military escalation but also the creation of a puppet regime in Kyiv exemplifies the tough language coming out of Washington and London.
US officials earlier expressed fears that Russian forces might mount a 'false flag' attack on allies in eastern Ukraine to justify an intervention (see RUSSIA/UKRAINE: Moscow's rhetoric keeps tensions high - January 18, 2022).
Such warnings are out of step with the Ukrainian government's apparently more relaxed posture, and will exacerbate divisions within NATO members on how to respond to Russia (see UKRAINE: Politics self-obsessed as Russian army waits - January 11, 2022).
It would hardly be surprising if Ukrainian politicians and others were approached by the Russian intelligence services or semi-official actors. Such approaches need not be more than exploratory, and cannot in themselves be taken as evidence of specific plans.
Firepower equated with intent
A prime argument in support of the view that Moscow is committed to a large-scale military incursion into Ukraine is the sheer size and nature of the military build-up. The premise is that the Kremlin would not go to the trouble and expense of putting in place such a major force -- one genuinely capable of a sustained offensive -- without intending to use it.
From this perspective, the assumption is that negotiations are meant to fail, as a pretext for escalation.
Russia has assembled forces on an unprecedented scale
This is certainly a force unlike any other assembled previously, not just in numbers but also in its level of logistical support. It will either eat into next year's procurement plans or (as happened after 2014) require special budget subventions to offset the costs.
If Russia decides on an offensive, it has a wide menu of options, not mutually exclusive but carrying varying risks and costs, and requiring different pretexts:
- A ground offensive from the east, either sustained as far as Kyiv or stopping after the swift capture of areas around Kharkiv (to the northwest of Donetsk and Luhansk), to avoid getting bogged down in the face of Ukrainian resistance. This could be augmented by the southward advance of forces deployed 'on exercise' to Belarus.
- A focus on capturing territory north of Crimea and an eastern coastal strip including Mariupol; this might involve amphibious assaults. Maritime assaults could also target Odessa to the west.
- Air and missile strikes to debilitate Ukrainian military command systems and assets, and possibly critical civilian infrastructure.
- A minimalist military option: formally occupying and recognising the separatist Donetsk and Luhansk 'people's republics'.
Coercive diplomacy
The counter-argument is that this is an exercise in coercive diplomacy, an attempt to force concessions from Kyiv and the West using the threat of military action. To this end, generating a force structure capable of launching an offensive makes the threat more credible.
The main argument used to support this explanation is the massive diplomatic, political and economic costs of any escalation.
Opinion polls show no public support for war in Russia. Support could be stirred up in the short term through propaganda, but the economic impact of further sanctions, and the casualties resulting from conflict, would eat into the Russian leadership's legitimacy at a time when it is already low and when the Kremlin's 'political technologists' are already focused on the 2024 presidential election.
Just one plan?
It would be wrong to assume Moscow has a single plan and is determined to go through with it unless it is sufficiently deterred. Instead, the Kremlin creates unstable situations that generate multiple opportunities.
Washington's current position is reportedly based on intelligence that the Russian armed forces general staff was tasked with drawing up plans for an invasion. This is entirely plausible, but need not mean the Kremlin will activate these plans, as past cases show:
- Contingency plans for seizing Crimea dated back to the 1990s but were only activated during Ukraine's 2013-14 revolution.
- Even when Russia occupied Crimea, it did not initially plan on moving into eastern Ukraine. The initial impulse came from nationalists and opportunists on the ground, and Moscow responded first with scepticism, then arm's-length encouragement and only later direct (albeit covert) intervention.
Even if the troop build-up was conceived as a bluff, the Russian army may still deploy troops in eastern Ukraine, possibly prompted by a 'false flag' attack on separatist forces and a plea for help by local leaders. This might lead to formal recognition of rebel-held territories.
Moscow may be re-thinking its stance on separatist aspirations
The Russian parliament this week starts to review a bill calling for the Donetsk and Luhansk entities to be recognised as sovereign states. The Kremlin has long insisted that these territories will revert to Ukraine if and when Kyiv delivers the right terms. However, Moscow reversed its previous position and recognised Abkhazia and South Ossetia when circumstances changed in the 2008 Russian-Georgian war.
Recognition would be difficult to reverse and would clear the path legally for the deployment of Russian forces to Donetsk and Luhansk.
Next steps continue to be the subject of inner-circle debate in Moscow, where some are pushing a tough line and others counselling compromise. Nikolai Patrushev, the Security Council secretary, appears to be the most prominent hawk. Prime Minister Mikhail Mishustin, who fears the disrupting impact of war, is more dovish.
Differing dialogue aims
These complexities all have implications for the negotiations between Washington and Moscow. For the US administration, the talks are intended to determine Putin's appetite for risk and his minimum acceptable goals, and hence to influence the Kremlin's calculus (see RUSSIA/US: Blinken's trip points to US fears - January 19, 2022 and see RUSSIA/US: Talks offer uncertain path to de-escalation - December 16, 2021).
Moscow is using the opportunity to try to identify which avenues provide the best reward-to-risk calculation, including whether it is worth even continuing with talks. Cyberattacks on Ukraine and public transfers of forces from the far east to western Russia followed what for the Kremlin was a disappointing first week. They were a warning.
