Russia has options other than full invasion of Ukraine
The world is awaiting Moscow's choice between invasion and diplomacy; it might yet opt for a lesser form of intervention
President Vladimir Putin on February 1 indicated a willingness to continue negotiations despite arguing that US and NATO responses "ignore" Russia's demands. This adds little clarity to his intentions on Ukraine. The amassing of Russian forces still leaves ambiguity about the feasibility and desirability of full-scale invasion. US troop deployments to eastern Europe represent NATO's maximum response: there will be no deployment to Ukraine in the event of conflict.
What next
More modest Russian objectives might involve de facto occupation of rebel-controlled territories in eastern Ukraine. This would probably provoke less harsh Western sanctions than a full invasion. A second round of peace talks regarding eastern Ukraine is planned; Russian engagement would indicate an inclination more towards negotiations than war. Much will depend on what Putin views as success -- or too high a risk.
Subsidiary Impacts
- Kyiv's more restrained rhetoric on the Russian threat is out of step with Western claims.
- Moscow will try to widen perceived divisions within NATO and Western discord with Kyiv.
- The Ukrainian president's promise to expand the armed forces by 100,000 will have no near-term impact.
Analysis
Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky, Defence Minister Olexiy Reznikov and National Security and Defence Council (NSDC) secretary Olexiy Danilov have repeatedly downplayed the danger of imminent invasion, in sharp contrast to the sense of alarm in Washington (see UKRAINE: Policy dissonance adds complexity - February 1, 2022).
Foreign Minister Dmytro Kuleba said on January 26 that Russian troop numbers were "insufficient for a full-scale offensive along the entire Ukrainian border", a view shared by the NSDC.
How many is enough?
A Ukrainian defence ministry assessment reported by CNN on January 18 said Russia had 127,000 troops located around Ukraine, 106,000 of them ground forces and the rest air force and naval personnel.
Between 60,000 and 80,000 troops are believed to have been stationed in regions adjacent to Ukraine since 2014. During the March-April 2021 Russian build-up, Ukraine's defence minister put the total at 110,000 (see RUSSIA/UKRAINE: US intercession may help de-escalation - April 15, 2021). That number probably fell thereafter and started increasing again after the Zapad-2021 war games in September (see RUSSIA/BELARUS: Wargames reinforce key message - October 4, 2021).
Russian reports say some troops and heavy weapons have been returning to their bases. This is misleading: it refers principally to units mobilised for exercises in the Southern Military District in January (forces north of Rostov region belong to the Western Military District).
One caveat is that most soldiers are likely to be conscripts, rather than the professionals whom Moscow has used in campaigns ever since the first Chechen war (1994-96) exposed failings in the conscript army.
That said, Russia's armed forces have always been geared towards major conventional warfare in Europe, and are better equipped and trained than ever before.
Ahead of joint war games scheduled for February 10-20, Russia has sent an estimated 20,000-30,000 troops into Belarus, many brought by train (complete with heavy weapons) from eastern Siberia. Air defence missiles and a fighter jet squadron will be based in Belarus during the war games.
In contrast to the long-anticipated Zapad-2021, these exercises appear to have been initiated at the last minute. The impression created is of an additional force capable of striking southwards into Ukraine (see BELARUS/RUSSIA: Wargames add to Ukraine tensions - January 25, 2022).
Invasion scenarios
The US government and Western analysts have discussed various military options open to Russia.
Much of the Western commentary on this stems from a purported plan obtained by US intelligence.
An unconfirmed Russian plan is the common source for Western scenario-building
The plan, as reported by various media, sets out a sequence of elements:
- an initial troop deployment in Belarus;
- then a southern push along the coast of the Sea of Azov to create a land bridge to Crimea;
- associated operations in and around the separatist Donetsk People's Republic (DNR) and Luhansk People's Republic (LNR);
- amphibious landings to seize Ukraine's Black Sea coast west from Crimea to Romania; and
- finally, the 'main show': a massive ground invasion from western Russia, possibly aided by a southward push from Belarus, and a successful assault on Kyiv.
Some Western analysis treats these sequential elements as 'mix and match' options that could be undertaken individually or severally.
US and UK sources have also referred to the use of aircraft and missiles, along with cyberattacks, to destroy the Ukrainian military's weapons, infrastructure and command capacity.
Constraints on victory
If the invasion plan is implemented (and assuming it exists), it will not be accomplished easily.
A ground assault accompanied by air and missile strikes would cause large casualties among civilians and soldiers -- a reputational risk inside Russia as well as internationally.
Implementing any or all options would incur severe sanctions. US officials have clarified that they will not discriminate in the event of a 'small invasion'.
The advancing Russian army would be resisted by Ukraine's armed forces, numbering some 200,000, more capable and better armed than in 2014 and augmented by volunteer combat units and nationalist paramilitaries, though outmatched in the air.
Even if the initial advance skirted larger towns, besieging and capturing them would be bloody. Finding people to staff a puppet government, as outlined in a UK Foreign Office statement on January 22, would be the least of Moscow's problems (see RUSSIA: Plans for Ukraine may not be finalised - January 24, 2022).
Limited scenario
Moscow may also be engaged on a different set of calculations relating specifically to the DNR and LNR. Here it has two options: intervention or diplomacy. Either would be less risky and costly (in terms of Western penalties) than a full-scale invasion.
Actions restricted to rebel-held areas would carry much less risk
Intervention
Moscow's assertion that Western military assistance is encouraging Ukraine to launch an offensive against the DNR and LNR creates a pretext for changing facts on the ground.
One option, evident in a bill before Russia's parliament, is to recognise the DNR and LNR as sovereign states, as happened with Abkhazia and South Ossetia after the 2008 Georgian war.
There is little the West could do about this. For Russia, it would kill the 2015 Minsk 2.0 peace plan and remove a source of leverage on Kyiv. However, it would enable Russia to sign a defence pact with the DNR and LNR, and station forces there permanently.
Moves towards recognition might be preceded or accompanied by military intervention, possibly prompted by the kind of 'false flag' attack of which US officials have warned, or by the imposition of a unilateral 'peacekeeping' mission.
Western states would find agreeing sanctions difficult as long as fighting did not expand beyond current separatist-held areas.
Any escalation on the front line would warn of such a scenario.
Previously, observers from the Organisation for Security and Cooperation in Europe said recorded ceasefire violations had fallen by almost 70% since the start of 2022. This indicates that both sides were avoiding escalation. However, DNR officials today claimed that Ukrainian forces shelled an electricity substation using NATO-supplied artillery for the first time.
Diplomatic route
Throughout the current crisis, Russia has accused Kyiv of blocking implementation of the Minsk 2.0 agreement (see UKRAINE: Clashes reflect and worsen diplomatic impasse - February 27, 2020). Despite this, it appears willing to re-engage in diplomacy, as shown in a January 26 meeting between advisors from Germany, France, Ukraine and Russia (the 'Normandy four').
Another meeting is planned for mid-February, and President Zelensky has expressed hope that it will lead to a summit with all four heads of state (see UKRAINE: Policy dissonance adds complexity - February 1, 2022).
If Putin is prepared to accept that his larger demands on NATO are not going to be met, he may set aside time to secure substantive progress on Minsk 2.0 via diplomacy. As time goes on, this could shift assessments of the invasion threat from imminent to generic.
