Russia cannot co-opt China to back it fully on Ukraine
Moscow has joined Chinese shows of strength but Beijing offers only general endorsement in its stand-off with the West
After President Vladimir Putin met his Chinese counterpart Xi Jinping on January 4, a joint statement set out their shared antipathy to US foreign policies and general expressions of sympathy for one another's regional difficulties. The document says China as well as Russia is against NATO expansion; in return Moscow objects to the US-UK-Australian AUKUS deal and the creation of any new security blocs in the Asia-Pacific region.
What next
The Russian-Chinese security relationship lacks the elements that would make for an alliance: approximate parity of power and a confluence of interests. China will offer rhetorical moral support, but no more, for Russia in its disputes with the United States, NATO and Ukraine. Moscow will moderate its political proximity to Beijing with independent relationships with South and South-East Asian states.
Subsidiary Impacts
- Russian energy export prospects have been boosted by Gazprom's second gas supply contract signed with China.
- Moscow will look to Beijing for economic help in the event of new sanctions.
- Although Russian-Chinese exercises enhance military inter-operability, their main aim is political.
- Beijing was unhappy about Russia's seizure of Crimea and will be concerned at moves towards independence for eastern Ukraine.
Analysis
Putin has made much of his visit, whose main purpose is to attend the start of the Beijing Winter Olympics, in contrast to the Western boycott.
China is a powerful partner, and Putin has no comparable friends as he tries to persuade the international community that Washington and NATO are at fault for causing the Ukraine crisis, and Russia the innocent victim.
Putin's statement (in a February 3 article for Chinese media) that the already "comprehensive partnership and strategic cooperation" has now attained an "unprecedented level" is hyperbolic, but it reflects his need to showcase the relationship.
The tone of the joint statement is at once assertive and defensive, arguing at some length that Russia and China are paragons of democracy and human rights under pressure from other powers seeking to destabilise their neighbours, and proposing an alternative model for the international order.
It carries reciprocal messages of support in each country's disputed neighbourhood:
- In the document, both sides say they are "against further expansion of NATO" and call on the alliance to move away from Cold War attitudes and respect other states' sovereignty.
- They call for the construction of non-threatening Asia-Pacific security arrangements in light of the United States's "negative influence on peace and stability" in that region.
- The statement says China "understands and supports Russia's proposals for European security guarantees".
- Russia reciprocates by repeating known positions on 'One China' and Taiwan.
The lengthy statement also addresses areas of cooperation on trade, climate change, COVID-19 responses, nuclear non-proliferation and -- in vague terms -- arms control (see RUSSIA/CHINA: Economic imbalance will deepen - March 9, 2021).
Russia secured Chinese assent to its view of NATO expansion
In November, Defence Ministers Sergey Shoigu and Wei Fenghe signed an agreement on military cooperation until 2025. The Russian defence ministry said they voiced "a shared interest in stepping up strategic military exercises and joint patrols", and noted that cooperation was especially relevant amid "increasing geopolitical turbulence and growing conflict potential in various parts of the world".
All this does not point to plans for a formal security alliance. Russia's ambassador to Beijing spelled this out on January 25. The nature of the Russian-Chinese relationship "renders the concept of 'let's be friends against someone else' impossible," Ambassador Andrey Denisov said. "So an alliance of this kind fundamentally can't be in question." (see RUSSIA/CHINA: Countries ill-matched for alliance - March 23, 2021).
Attending war games
One way for a military power to signal support is to participate in another's naval and ground forces exercises.
In August, Russian troops joined Chinese counterparts in exercises on Chinese territory.
In October, a Russian and Chinese naval task force conducted the first-ever joint circumnavigation of Japan's largest island, Honshu. It sailed through the Tsugaru Strait separating Honshu from Hokkaido to the north and returned via the Kanmon Strait between Honshu and Kyushu. This brought Russian and Chinese warships close to Japan's 5.6-kilometre territorial waters (Tsugaru) and a few hundred metres from the coast (Kanmon).
In November, strategic bombers from the two countries conducted their third flight over the Sea of Japan and the East China Sea. South Korea sent up fighter jets when the Russian-Chinese force entered its air defence identification zone.
In January, Russia and China together with Iran conducted their third joint naval exercises in the Indian Ocean.
Asymmetry
Russian participation was a clear signal of support for Beijing's display of force. Joint naval and air patrols underline China's robust policy towards Japan and South Korea -- a stance not shared by Russia.
Russia's military brinkmanship on its western flanks is far more provocative than China's regional actions. If Moscow hoped its signals of support for China would evoke reciprocal backing, this failed. From its perspective, this shows an asymmetry in expectations of, and readiness to offer, mutual support.
No Chinese troops took part in Russia's Zapad-2021 strategic exercises; participation would have been a declaration of support for Russia's use of military instruments (see RUSSIA/BELARUS: Wargames reinforce key message - October 4, 2021).
Beijing is unwilling to commit to Russian war games, or more
China's reticence was particularly notable because its own dispute with Lithuania offered an opportunity to share in Russian criticism of the EU (see LITHUANIA/CHINA: Taiwan could compensate for sanctions - January 24, 2022).
Ukraine
Beijing's stance on the Ukraine crisis can best be described as benign neutrality and (as in the joint statement) rhetorically supportive.
China criticised NATO for fuelling tensions in Europe and failing to address Russia's security concerns. It has not endorsed military action against Ukraine, with which it signed a bilateral investment agreement last year and which it hopes will become a major source of food imports.
Although Russian and Chinese officials denied that Xi asked Putin specifically not to take military action during the Winter Olympics, this is plausible (see RUSSIA: Moscow has options other than full invasion - February 3, 2022).
Kazakhstan
Beijing seems to have accepted Russia's brisk deployment of troops to Kazakhstan under a Collective Security Treaty Organisation mandate in January, probably (given the speed of the decision) without consultations with China (see RUSSIA/KAZAKHSTAN: CSTO becomes agile policy tool - February 1, 2022).
China accepted Kazakh and Russian narratives that blamed the unrest on unspecified 'foreign actors'.
This demonstrates that China respects Russia's claim to political and security dominance in the post-Soviet states despite its own large trade and investment in Central Asia.
Russia's other Asian interests
Moscow faces difficulties in trying to increase security cooperation with China without reducing its options in East and South-east Asia. It remains interested in diversifying its ties and presence in Asia so as not to become excessively dependent on Beijing (see SOUTH-EAST ASIA: Russian leverage will grow modestly - December 13, 2021).
Japan and South Korea were among the countries least willing to impose sanctions on Russia after 2014 and Moscow has pursued economic relations with both. Readiness to support Chinese activities may indicate a deviation from past Russian policy.
The Russian-Japanese territorial dispute over the South Kuril islands/Northern Territories is at an impasse, and Tokyo appears reluctant to invest more seriously -- politically and economically -- in bilateral relations. This may have generated enough impatience in Moscow for it to join China's air and naval manoeuvres (see RUSSIA/JAPAN: Japan islands deal impossible - November 18, 2021).
On the other hand, Russia reportedly suspended deliveries of S-400 air defence systems to China in July 2021 due to that country's frictions with India last year (see RUSSIA: Arms sales challenged by rivals and sanctions - May 11, 2021). Putin's trip to New Delhi in December (only his second trip abroad in the COVID-19 era) reaffirms Moscow's commitment to this relationship regardless of any Chinese irritation (see INDIA: US relations will not derail Russia ties - December 7, 2021 and see INDIA/RUSSIA: Ties will withstand external pressures - June 28, 2021).
