SYRIA/US: Iraq differences threaten cooperation

President Bashar al-Assad yesterday reiterated Syria's opposition to US military action against Iraq. The improvement in US-Syrian relations since September 11 is due to Syria's unprecedented cooperation in the US-led war against al-Qaida. That cooperation has overshadowed their differences over terrorism and other issues. However, both sides now face the greater challenge of managing their differences over Iraq.

Analysis

Syria has been "completely cooperative" in investigating al-Qaida and individuals associated with it, according to a senior CIA official. That cooperation was highlighted by the recent revelation that Syria has saved American lives, according to Richard W. Erdman, the chief State Department Syria specialist. Syrian security services tipped off the CIA in the spring of this year about an impending al-Qaida attack on a US military base in a Gulf state. If successful, the operation would have killed a large number of US troops.

Damascus assistance. Syrian cooperation was also highlighted by an earlier revelation that a key figure in the September 11 plot, Mohammed Haidar Zammar, had been arrested in Morocco and sent to Syria for interrogation, with US knowledge. Although US officials have not been able to interrogate Zammar, they have submitted questions to the Syrians.

Furthermore, Damascus provided information on September 11 hijacker Mohammed Atta, who worked on an engineering project in the northern Syrian city of Aleppo in the mid-1990s. Damascus also supplied information on Ma'moun Darkazanli, a Syrian businessman who allegedly served as a financial conduit to al-Qaida members and prayed in the same mosque in Hamburg as Atta and Marwan al-Shehhi, who piloted the other hijacked plane that blew up the World Trade Center. Darkazanli also allegedly managed the bank accounts of Mamdouh Salim, a top al-Qaida member awaiting trial in the United States over the 1998 bombings of two US embassies in East Africa.

These are not the only areas of cooperation. For instance, Syrian officials have avoided arresting suspects so they can continue to monitor their conversations and movements and report back to the United States.

US legislation. Syria's unprecedented cooperation with the US-led war against al-Qaida was significant enough for President George Bush to exclude it from his 'axis of evil' in January. Moreover, despite the irritants in the US-Syrian relationship, the Bush administration has opposed the 'Syria Accountability Act of 2002', a measure that Israel's supporters in Congress introduced last April. Its sponsors seek to impose further economic and political sanctions on Syria -- beyond the existing restrictions resulting from Syria's inclusion on the State Department's list of state sponsors of terrorism -- on the grounds (inter alia) of its imports of Iraqi oil as well as its support for terrorism. Bush opposes the bill on the grounds that it ties his hands in the conduct of foreign policy.

Terrorism definition. However, the issue of terrorism is a major irritant. According to the US definition, laid out every year in a report to Congress, terrorism is "premeditated, politically motivated violence perpetrated against noncombatant targets by sub-national groups or clandestine agents, usually intended to influence an audience". In light of this, Washington has repeatedly demanded that Syria dismantle the Palestinian militant groups that are headquartered in Damascus and cease transshipments of Iranian arms and equipment to Hizbollah in the south of Lebanon.

Syria on the other hand distinguishes between 'terrorism' and 'legitimate resistance to foreign occupation'. For Damascus, the Palestinian and Lebanese struggle against Israeli occupation is a legitimate cause and should in no way be confused with wanton terrorism, such as that of al-Qaida. In light of this, Syrian support for these groups is likely to continue until Israel withdraws from the territories it has occupied since June, 1967.

Another irritant is the issue of Syria's sanctions-busting oil imports from Iraq. According to oil industry sources, Syria has been importing Iraqi oil (to the tune of 150,000 barrels of oil a day) via the Kirkuk-Banias pipeline in violation of UN sanctions since November 2000 (see SYRIA/IRAQ: Enmities set limits to relations with Baghdad - OADB, October 3, 2001, III. ).

In both cases, given Syria's cooperation, Washington has looked the other away. Moreover, US officials concede that Syria has not been directly implicated in terrorist activities since 1986. Furthermore, if the Bush administration seems less indignant than London (which has formally accused Syria of flouting UN sanctions against Iraq), it is because Washington's regional allies Jordan and Turkey are also importing Iraqi oil (82,000 barrels a day and 40,000 barrels a day, respectively).

Iraq differences. Although US-Syrian relations may survive these various threats, the prospect of US military action against Iraq poses a much greater challenge. In contrast to the position that Syria adopted during the 1990-91 Gulf war when it joined the US-led coalition against Iraq, Damascus has this time come out in strong opposition to a US assault against its neighbour and is most unlikely to provide any assistance, even discreetly. There are several reasons for this:

1. Fragmentation. Syria, like Turkey and Iran, fears that a US attack against Iraq will lead to the fragmentation of the country along ethnic and sectarian lines (see IRAN: US military plans for Iraq trouble Tehran - OADB, October 1, 2002, II. ; and IRAN: US military plans for Iraq trouble Tehran - OADB, September 19, 2002, I. ). The risk of Iraq's Kurds breaking away and establishing a separate, autonomous entity poses a major problem for all three. In the case of Syria, a Kurdish state in the north of Iraq would almost certainly rekindle the nationalist aspirations of Syria's Kurdish minority (11% of the population). Moreover, Syria fears that Turkey, its powerful northern neighbour and a military ally of Israel, will use Kurdish separatism as an excuse to intervene in Iraq, not only undermining the unity of a fellow Arab state, but also aggrandising itself and increasing Syrian fears of encirclement.

2. Regime change. Syria fears regime change in Iraq, even if Iraq's territorial integrity is maintained in the post-war era. That fear is premised not on Syrian devotion to rival Ba'athist Saddam Hussein, who tried to destabilise the Syrian regime on more than one occasion in the 1980s, but on the Bush administration's objective of installing the pro-western segment of the Iraqi opposition in power in Baghdad. From the perspective of Damascus, should Washington gets its way, Syria would then be surrounded by US power, making it in turn more vulnerable to Israel. Moreover, Damascus fears that externally induced regime change would serve as a precedent, with Syria a future, if not the next, US (or Israeli) target. Damascus, like Riyadh (see SAUDIA ARABIA/US: Saudi Iraq policy could backfire - OADB, October 15, 2002, I. ), would prefer a successor authoritarian regime to emerge.

3. Wider plot. Damascus is concerned about broader redrawing of the Middle East map. Syrian officials suspect that a US attack against Iraq may be part of a joint US-Israeli 'plot' that seeks to re-install the Hashemite dynasty in Iraq (see IRAQ: Dictator, democracy or chaos? – life after Saddam - OADB, September 18, 2002, I. ) and to implement Israeli Prime Minister Ariel Sharon's 'Jordanian option' -- the eviction of the Palestinians from the West Bank and their relocation to Jordan. The latter would both strengthen Israel and deprive Syria of its 'Palestinian card', thereby reducing its leverage over Israel and thus its ability to secure the return of the Golan Heights.

4. Iraqi market. Syria fears the loss of its Iraqi market. In addition to the estimated 1 billion dollars that Syria earns annually as a result of its imports of Iraqi oil (imports at discounted prices free up Syria's own oil production for export), Iraq has in the past two years become an important outlet for many of Syria's otherwise unmarketable products. Earnings from non-oil trade with Iraq are also said to amount to around 1 billion dollars annually, an income that keeps the stagnant Syrian economy afloat.

5. Refugees. Like Jordan (see JORDAN: US action against Iraq offers risks and benefits - OADB, September 23, 2002, IV. ), Syria is concerned that a US attack will almost certainly create another huge flight of Iraqi refugees into neighbouring countries. Another mass exodus of Iraqis into Syria will strain Syria's economy further, as the country is already home to 500,000 Palestinian refugees and an undetermined number of Iraqi Gulf war refugees.

Conclusion

Although the improved post September 11 US-Syrian relationship has been strong enough to weather the two sides' differences so far, the prospect of war in Iraq presents a much more serious challenge. The divergence of interest over Iraq is such that hard-liners on both sides may be able to exploit it to open up these differences again and put relations on a collision course.