IRAQ: Dictator, democracy or chaos?

Analysis

Most of the debate in Western capitals on US plans for regime change in Iraq has focused on three elements:

Whether the pursuit of regime change can be justified.

Whether war is a feasible and just instrument with which to bring it about.

What steps, eg a new UN Security Council resolution or a multilateral approach, are desirable and necessary to legitimise such action.

There has been little discussion of what might, and should, be the outcome if a conflict is successful in bringing about political change. While some thinking is being done in the vice-president's office and at the National Defense University, this issue is likely to move centre-stage in the near future.

Scenarios . Three broad scenarios convey the range of possible outcomes to a successful regime change strategy:

1. Authoritarian . Under this scenario, the existing Iraqi regime would be replaced, but with something partially resembling it in the form of a centralised state willing to resort to authoritarian methods. The West might not find such an outcome palatable, but would be powerless to prevent the emergence of such a regime, short of occupying and administering the country for an extended period of time, something it is most unlikely to want to do. Such an outcome would almost certainly find favour among regional states, such as Egypt and Saudi Arabia, which have sound reasons for fearing the alternatives. By contrast, Israel, which fears a strong Iraq, would dissent.

Nevertheless, there would almost certainly be important differences between such a regime and that of Saddam Hussein:

It would be more collegial in organisation, at least over the medium term, pending the working out of internal power balances.

While prepared to resort to armed force and internal surveillance, it is unlikely to be as brutal as its predecessor: it would have learnt some of the lessons about new international norms lost on Saddam.

It would be much better disposed towards the international community and in particular the United States. Despite popular resentment over the effects of sanctions, good relations with Washington would be needed to remove them, reschedule international debt and begin reconstruction.

2. Constitutionalist . This is the outcome favoured by the US administration in its public utterances. Such a formula would have the advantage of being nominally inclusive of all of the different ethnic and confessional communities in Iraq. However, such a process of inclusivity would also imply losers, notably the Sunni, Arab section of the population, that has traditionally dominated government. Sunni Arabs and others would view the establishment of a democratic system as a formal device through which to enshrine rule by the country's Shia, who comprise some 60% of the population. A constitutional process incorporating a strong federalist dimension, as demanded by Iraq's Kurds, would be regarded as the thin end of a secessionist wedge. The implication of either Shia pre-eminence or Kurdish secessionism would be treated negatively by Iraq's neighbours, notably Saudi Arabia and Turkey respectively.

One formula being contemplated in influential circles in Washington is the idea of the restoration of the Hashemite monarchy, which presided over Iraq until it fell in an army coup in 1958. Sherif Ali, who claims to be the closest surviving relative of family members murdered during the coup, is one of the main figures in the US-backed Iraqi National Congress. Moreover, Prince Hassan of Jordan, also a Hashemite, and who was the country's long-time crown prince before being edged out of the succession by an ailing King Hussein in 1998-99, was a recent visitor to Washington before ostentatiously visiting an Iraqi opposition meeting in London over the summer. Several advantages have been touted in favour of a restoration of a Hashemite monarch:

It would prove a unifying force, especially confessionally (the Hashemites tracing their lineage back to the tribe of the prophet and hence to a time before the Sunni-Shia schism), but also tribally in that, as outsiders (they originally came from the Hejaz in what is now Saudi Arabia) they are not closely identified with any one tribal or provincial grouping in the country;

It would prove a stabilising force, in that a constitutional monarchy would provide ballast for a political system within which others would compete for the right to govern the country.

It would be welcomed by powerful interests further afield, notably Israel (a peace treaty having been signed between Israel and Hashemite Jordan in 1994), but also by the United States and the United Kingdom, which generally have had a happy track record of dealing with the Hashemites.

However, a Hashemite restoration would also be problematic:

Aspiring strongmen in Iraq would oppose it and seek the position of unchecked head of the executive for themselves.

It might open up divisions within the Hashemites, most obviously between Sherif Ali and Prince Hassan and their supporters, but also more widely between Hassan and King Abdallah of Jordan.

Regional powers would oppose it, notably Saudi Arabia (whose rulers are old dynastic enemies of the Hashemites and would fear that Hashemite Jordan and Iraq would conspire to reacquire the Hejaz); Iran (in view of the heightened speculation over the last year about a possible restoration of the Shah's son); and Egypt (which regards itself as the leading Arab power in the region and so would perceive Hashemite ascendancy as inimical to its interests).

3. Fragmentation . Casting a shadow across discussion of regime change is the scenario of state collapse, political fragmentation and extended internal conflict. In the short term, such an outcome would involve considerable distress, with unrestrained score-settling, population displacement and refugee outflows, and a shortage of food and essential supplies. The collapse of central power would give a boost to parochial and traditional centres, especially tribal and religious leaders.

The power shift away from the centre to a multitude of peripheries would create new instabilities, exacerbated by regional powers that would seek local allies and work out regional power tensions through the use of proxies. Saudi and Syrian concerns over state break-up would lead to their seeking leverage via the Sunni centre; Iran would seek to wield influence via its extensive links to the Shia; and both Iran and Turkey would intensify use of Kurdish proxies to prevent spillover effects on their own Kurdish communities. In addition to the risk of 'Lebanonisation', there would also be the possibility of resource-based conflicts, notably between Kurds and Arabs over Kirkuk oil and gas, and among different Shia groups over the major prize of the southern Iraqi oil fields.

While many well-intentioned outsiders will desire the constitutionalist outcome, they may end up favouring the authoritarian scenario in order to avoid fragmentation. A move to a more constitutional system may take place in Iraq in the long term, as a function of aid conditionality or the widespread adoption of a global political model. However, Iraq will find it difficult to shrug off a political culture that has been characterised by the pursuit and exercise of hard power and an appeal to tribal and religious solidarities (see IRAQ: Saddam plans dynastic succession - OADB, November 1, 2001, IV. ).