IRAQ: US occupation plans invite colonial stigma

Analysis

Unofficial comments by senior administration officials in the last few days have made it clear that Washington has now settled the arguments concerning the immediate post-war governance of Iraq in favour of a proposal to install a temporary military government once Saddam Hussein's regime is overthrown. The US commander, General Tommy Franks, would secure the country and then run a US military administration alongside a 'civilian of stature' (yet to be named). In opting for this model, rather than an international transitional administration or a government of leading non-Ba'athist Iraqis, President George Bush and his advisers have decided that the advantages of exercising total control outweigh the disadvantages of appearing as a new colonial power (see IRAQ: International administration could follow Saddam - OADB, December 10, 2002, IV. ).

Advantages . Among the arguments that must have weighed heavily on the side of this new policy are the fact that it offers:

the ability to assure Turkey, Jordan and other key allies that the country will not be allowed to fragment into separate and possibly warring parts (see IRAQ: Dictator, democracy or chaos? – life after Saddam - OADB, September 18, 2002, I. );

greater scope to manage the post-war refugee situation and to encourage fleeing Iraqis to return to their homes rather than to flood over the borders into the neighbouring states;

freedom to pursue Saddam, his family and his associates and to prevent them from organising centres of resistance outside Baghdad;

power to upgrade Iraqi oil production and to bring it up to full capacity as quickly as possible so as to provide the revenues necessary for reconstruction (see IRAQ: Oil revenues insufficient to finance reconstruction - OADB, January 31, 2003, I. ); and

greater facility to underpin military victory and a change of regime with measures designed to improve the material lives of the Iraqi people in as short a time as possible.

Drawbacks . Nevertheless, there are many potential disadvantages:

1. Colonial control . The biggest danger is that, for the Iraqis themselves, as well as for the peoples of the rest of the Middle East, US occupation will seem like a replay of the British military occupation undertaken during World War I. This led to colonisation in the guise of a League of Nations mandate, and then to the British re-occupation of the country in 1941 and the creation of a collaborationist administration led by the royal family and the long serving prime minister, Nuri al-Sayid. Such a perception will be more than enough to offset current US attempts to present the overthrow of the Ba'athist regime as an act of liberation rather than a modern form of colonial control.

2. Sole responsibility . By monopolising the process of feeding Iraqis and then of master-minding the re-building of Iraq under retired General Jay Garner's new Office of Reconstruction and Humanitarian Assistance, the United States runs the risk of being held solely responsible for all the things which will inevitably go wrong. This is the more likely as the new office will probably be forced to replace the present, reasonably efficient, system of distribution managed by a combination of the Ba'ath Party and the UN Oil-for-Food programme with something much more ad hoc of its own devising. If the programme goes badly, Washington is more likely to ask for help from the international community or even to seek to hand over to an international administration, an option that does not appear to have been ruled out.

3. Diminished confidence . As the leader of the Iraqi National Congress, Ahmed Chalabi, has pointed out, the US plan to rely on the existing structures of government is unwise in that it would ultimately leave important decisions about the future of Iraq in the hands either of foreign occupiers or Saddam's officials. This will do much to undermine public confidence in any new regime as well as to encourage the very vendettas and acts of lawlessness which the United States needs to stop.

4. Handover problems . The occupying authority will face all the problems previously faced by the British in creating a legitimate government to which it can hand over power and which can sign treaties and deals regulating the future management of Iraqi oil. It must also know that any system of government left in place after a military occupation is likely to be regarded as provisional by the local population, to be overthrown or amended as soon as an opportunity presents itself. Exit will not be easy.

5. Exemplary aspect . To the world at large, the invasion of Iraq, followed by a military occupation, however short-lived, will be seen as the first real test-case of the new US doctrine of preventative intervention (see UNITED STATES: Pre-emption to be a seldom used tool - OADB, October 4, 2002, II. ) and thus have an exemplary character. If it seems to work, this will greatly facilitate Washington's ability to manage global conflict and also act as great encouragement to US allies, as well as a clear warning to any other regime which might wish to stand up to the Pentagon's military might.

By the same token, all those who oppose the United States, or who are fearful of its growing power, will see Iraq as a perfect opportunity to try to undermine the new Baghdad government. If it can be made to fail, this will be regarded as a great victory, not only by anti-US groups inside Iraq itself, but also by a large number of Middle Eastern, Islamic and other third world regimes. As a result, Iraq could well become a battleground for much the same type of clash between opposing international forces as Korea or Vietnam.

6. US politics . The notion of Iraq as an example of a new form of interventionism will be of vital concern to the US public. Already divided about the wisdom of launching a war of choice against Saddam, they have some idea of the opportunities involved in the post-Saddam reconstruction, but little appreciation yet of the dangers. It will be costly, especially if, as is likely, it lasts much longer than the two-year period currently being touted. It may well be thankless, and will probably involve a process of growing opposition to the US presence inside and outside Iraq. If the whole experiment comes to be regarded as fatally flawed or, worse still, a total failure, this will have serious consequences, not only for Bush's own political future, but also for the more assertive foreign and defence policies which he began to adopt after the terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001.