Analysis

The 2008 global financial crisis created significant doubts among African policymakers over the prescriptions of Western donor institutions, creating opportunities for Beijing to expand its promotion of its particular form of authoritarian state capitalism.

Trans-continental training

In December 2015, Chinese President Xi Jinping announced 40,000 training opportunities for Africans in 2015-18. More than 10,000 African officials undertake courses each year in Africa and China, covering topics from agro-industry to economic policy, cadre management and media strategy.

These opportunities are delivered through a network of institutions:

• There are 23 Chinese Agricultural Technology Development Centres across Africa, funded by the Chinese Ministry of Commerce and run by Chinese companies.
• Between 2010-12 China's Communication University trained more than 100 African journalists and government officials on 'international communication'. An Africa Communication Research Center opened in 2012.
• In the more than 60 Confucius Institutes across Africa, African diplomats learn China's language and political thought.
• At least 50 educational centres, involving companies, institutes and government departments, have been set up in China to host foreign government training programmes.

For China, the aim is both ideological and commercial, with training of senior officials, in particular, having a strong focus on commercial opportunities. In agriculture courses, participants can buy machinery or inputs presented to them (see CHINA/AFRICA: High risk limits agriculture appetite - October 14, 2014).

For example, through a training course from the International Centre for Bamboo and Rattan, China established two projects in Ethiopia worth 3 million dollars each. The project machinery came from a commercial partner, and the training institution served as a consultant in the transaction.

A second commercial approach is to enlist government officials in market research. Officials are given technologies and other inputs to test at home and provide feedback, with a view to generating an appetite for Chinese products within government circles.

Increasingly, Beijing is providing training to ruling party officials directly, blurring distinctions between party and state.

South Africa

In 2008, the ANC signed a memorandum of understanding (MoU) to enhance China's training of ANC members. An additional five-year agreement was signed in 2014. As of 2015, China had trained more than 2,000 ANC officials.

Subsequent ANC initiatives suggest heavy Chinese influence. For example, in 2014 China's Communist Party (CCP) initiated and is financing an ANC Political School and Policy Institute.

Modeled on the China Executive Leadership Academy Pudong in Shanghai, one of the top four party schools in China, the institute will teach classes on 'revolutionary traditions'. The ANC had earlier declared 2013-23 the 'decade of the cadre,' with the goal of placing every party member through a political school.

The ANC has long subscribed to a strategy of economic development through state-owned enterprises (SOEs), an approach Beijing is encouraging, along with the adoption of Chinese-style special economic zones (SEZs) (see AFRICA: Special economic zones have muted effects - August 15, 2013).

In April and May this year, some 20 Department of Trade and Industry officials participated in an SEZ capacity-building programme in Tianjin, covering topics such as infrastructure development, stakeholder engagement, finance and management.

China is also facilitating ANC efforts at censorship. Officials from the South African public broadcaster received training in Beijing during the 3rd Forum on China-Africa Media Cooperation, held in June 2016.

Zimbabwe

China's relations with President Robert Mugabe and his Zimbabwe African National Union-Patriotic Front (ZANU-PF) date back to the 1970s. Beijing has been a major influence over the government's approaches to economic development, party-building, and cadre training.

In 2005, Chinese authorities and ZANU-PF signed a MoU on party training programmes, which have since focused on economic development:

• In March 2016, a 15-member ZANU-PF delegation to Shenzhen received training on SEZs, grassroots party structures and grassroots mobilisation to implement party policies.
• An agreement signed between the Zimbabwe School of Mines and China's Ministry of Mines allows 150 young Zimbabweans to travel to China in 2016-19 to learn mine management.
• Through its Agricultural Technology Demonstration Center in Zimbabwe, China trains local farmers on crop cultivation and runs agronomy trials.

Zimbabwe relies on the Chinese model for its development plans, with Mugabe frequently pointing to China's success to vindicate his policies. However, this rhetoric often serves as a smokescreen for his administration's numerous failures.

Ethiopia

Ethiopia has been the closest adherent of China's economic and governance model. The ruling Ethiopian People's Revolutionary Democratic Front (EPRDF) has regularly participated in training programmes since 1994 (see ETHIOPIA: New cabinet gears up for next economic plan - October 21, 2015).

Since 2011, this has included dedicated courses on poverty alleviation, cadre management and -- in February 2016 -- on how to manage youth groups. Confucius Institute training of Ethiopian diplomats launched in 2010 as part of the Ethio-China Polytechnic College.

Policy assistance has focused on development through SOEs and SEZs, with the EPRDF regularly sending officials to party schools in China to learn how to run SOEs more profitably. Ethiopian Airlines -- Africa's leading carrier -- is a particularly successful example of an Ethiopian SOE.

Ethiopia's foreign investment policy, infrastructure initiatives and agricultural development all reflect strong Chinese influence.

Selective learning?

In policy circles, the 'China model' has become shorthand for a system of economic liberalisation without a political counterpart.

Many African states -- particularly authoritarian ones -- enthusiastically endorse the second part of the model, but are wary of reducing close government supervision of the economy. Instead, they tend to engage with Beijing's policy advice selectively, to the detriment of business-friendly reforms.

For example, Ethiopia has interpreted Chinese policy advice as legitimating its dominant-party policy system and state control of large swathes of the economy, stifling innovation and growth in areas such as information technology (see ETHIOPIA: Mobile banking begins a slow expansion phase - February 23, 2015).

Drawing on Chinese examples, South Africa's president in 2012 announced a new economic policy that places SOEs at the heart of infrastructure development.

However, the country's SOEs are in a weak position to do this: underperformance, graft and inefficiency hinders development and shaves 2-3% off annual GDP growth. Many SOEs are merely platforms to provide employment and extract rents for political elites.