US-North Korea summit would have modest outcome
Kim Jong-un and Donald Trump will meet face-to-face to talk about denuclearisation
US President Donald Trump is to meet North Korea’s leader Kim Jong-un in person before the end of May to discuss “permanent denuclearisation”, it was announced overnight. The message was conveyed by a South Korean delegation in Washington, briefing Trump on its talks earlier this week in Pyongyang. North Korea had said, the delegation reported, that it is “committed to denuclearisation” if regime security is not at risk. This follows months of escalating friction between North Korea and the international community that has seen Pyongyang ramp up its intercontinental missile and nuclear testing.
What next
There are areas where Trump and Kim could agree, but the two have wide policy differences and competing motivations; it would be expecting too much of one round of talks to resolve any or all of these, and to the satisfaction of the other actors involved. The most likely outcome of the meeting is a modest success with some easing of tensions, and similarly modest plans for future diplomatic engagement, if it is assumed that both sides -- especially Pyongyang, which made the offer -- are genuine in their intent, and that nothing between now and May derails preparations.
Subsidiary Impacts
- The risk of confrontation on the Korean Peninsula could be reduced while talks are being prepared.
- Trump may relax his hawkish trade policy in the interim, to avoid alienating partners he needs in managing Pyongyang, including Beijing.
- A successful Trump-Kim meeting could gain South Korea’s president political benefits.
- If significant moves towards denuclearisation did occur, Trump’s administration might revise its pro-nuclear defence strategy.
- Any sanctions relief could be politically beneficial to the Pyongyang regime, but too much opening up could undermine it.
Analysis
Pyongyang has been testing increasingly sophisticated missiles in recent months, including firing them over US ally Japan. North Korean missiles now can hit the US continental mainland; the Trump administration's fear is that North Korea could do so with nuclear-tipped projectiles (see NORTH KOREA: US and Chinese interests diverge - September 7, 2017).
Trump has publicly belittled Kim and threated "fire and fury" if the mercurial communist state does not comply with international calls to denuclearise and cease testing offensive weapons.
North Korea is listed in the Trump administration's security strategy as one of the leading global threats to the United States, and Trump had said that no US-North Korea talks would occur without North Korean denuclearisation commitments (see UNITED STATES: Contradictions weaken new security plan - January 23, 2018 and see UNITED STATES: Success of new nuclear arms not certain - February 6, 2018).
Trump has also called for Beijing to do its utmost to rein in Pyongyang. US officials have pushed for other countries to limit their economic engagement with North Korea, including South-east Asian states through which North Korea has surreptitiously traded and gained foreign currencies (see NORTH KOREA-SOUTH-EAST ASIA: Ties face headwinds - March 10, 2017).
The announcement
Recent weeks have seen a modest easing of tensions. This comes as Washington and the UN have introduced additional economic sanctions on North Korea, including recently on shipping firms. These sanctions have caused considerable economic difficulty for North Korea, which is increasingly struggling to work around them (see NORTH KOREA: Sanctions will lead to economic crisis - January 8, 2018).
North Korea sent a large delegation to the Olympic games, including senior officials, last month. Both Koreas paraded together under one flag, and there was one joint team sporting event (see NORTH KOREA: Olympic thaw will not defuse other issues - January 12, 2018).
This thaw allowed the South Korean government to dispatch a delegation to the North this week for talks; South Korea's President Moon Jae-in will meet Kim in April. According to South Korea's National Security Adviser Chung Eui-yong, with the delegation in Washington overnight, North Korea said that it:
- is "committed to denuclearisation";
- will stop nuclear and missile testing;
- accepts that US-South Korean military exercises will go on (the next are in March); and
- will hold in-person talks with Trump, something that no other US president has done.
Reacting on Twitter, Trump hailed "great progress" but cautioned that "sanctions will remain until an agreement is reached". Senior US officials remain wary that Pyongyang may be playing for time to complete its nuclear programme.
Trump's response has been measured so far
What might happen now?
Any talks would ostensibly be a bilateral exercise, but any discussion relating to North Korea brings in a mass of actors and agendas.
These sometimes compete. It is possible that any one of these -- or an unhelpful development elsewhere, for instance if Trump's trade policies (see UNITED STATES: Tariff spat may hit security and polls - March 6, 2018) alienate Beijing sufficiently to make it decide not to cooperate on North Korea -- could delay or derail the meeting.
If the talks go ahead, the following scenarios are possible:
No deal
Trump and Kim find no common ground and the talks break up. This could be amicably, in which case future talks could occur, or acrimoniously.
Modest success
The leaders find some common ground. They devise a formal programme for future communication. North Korea might restate its denuclearisation commitments and set out a tentative programme for them, in return for receiving some limited sanctions relief.
Major success
Both leaders find substantial common ground and agree a wide-ranging package of arms controls and sanctions relief. A treaty might eventually result, which could improve the longer-term security and diplomatic situation and reduce security risks on the Korean Peninsula.
Wheels within wheels
Assuming the talks occur, the most likely outcome, at best, is modest success. This is because both leaders will go into any meeting with an array of pressures, and could be constrained by the number of differing actors and agendas involved:
Trump
On the domestic politics side, Trump could benefit from these talks. If they are, or appear to be, successful (which in this context means the United States appearing not to have made too many concessions and Trump having gained face) then the president could burnish his foreign policy credentials. This could be to his benefit in 2020 when he seeks re-election, and potentially to the Republicans in the 2018 November midterm elections (see UNITED STATES: Midterms will dominate 2018 politics - January 11, 2018).
Equally, Trump will face pressure from allies Seoul and Tokyo not to make too many concessions to Pyongyang in search of a deal. Doing so could allow the North to take advantage that could worsen the security threat facing Japan, South Korea and the region.
Trump could be hampered by his lack of foreign policy experience and the diminution of the US foreign policy apparatus, which has lost key diplomatic personnel and regional expertise (see UNITED STATES: Diplomatic service will be degraded - February 14, 2018).
The State Department's spokesperson said this week that the department has the required personnel. Even if it does not, it is likely that in what could be a historic moment, the US foreign policy community would rally around the White House.
Kim
Both leaders would go into the talks with a range of pressures and aims
The arithmetic by which Kim approaches the talks depends on whether he and his government are sincere. If not, the talks could simply be a grand opportunity for Pyongyang to snub Trump, after months of him belittling Kim and the North Korean government.
Equally, Kim could be approaching talks with a view to achieving sanctions relief and opening a channel to negotiate and extract other concessions from South Korea.
Pyongyang could also calculate that this is an opportunity to open gaps between Washington, Seoul and Tokyo and the international community at large by appearing to be reasonable and cooperative, but ultimately doing little different.
On the other hand, if Kim achieved some sanctions relief, he could benefit politically among a population that has suffered. Conceding too much, however, could make him look weak.
