Risks of armed conflict are mounting in Venezuela

The armed forces chiefs have backed President Nicolas Maduro against a US-supported 'interim government'

Defence Minister Vladimir Padrino Lopez and a group of high-ranking military officers yesterday backed President Nicolas Maduro and called for dialogue. The political conflict in Venezuela appears to be moving decisively in favour of the opposition, with vocal, official recognition from the United States, Canada, Brazil, the EU and the Organization of American States (OAS) for ‘interim president’ Juan Guaido. However, expectations of rapid decomposition of the Maduro government have proved optimistic, most particularly given the ongoing support for Maduro from the Venezuelan armed forces. Even if the situation unravels quickly and Maduro takes flight, the road ahead remains perilous.

What next

Despite muscular US backing, Guaido’s authority will ebb the longer Maduro can retain office. A disintegration of the political and security situation risks overspill into neighbouring Colombia and a wider Andean crisis.

Subsidiary Impacts

  • The Venezuelan military is the critical actor; an institutional declaration for Guaido would render Maduro’s position untenable.
  • Amid intense speculation of a US-backed military intervention, Washington has called for a weekend meeting of the UN Security Council.
  • Russia and China have issued statements supportive of Maduro and are expected to block US efforts to convene the Security Council.

Analysis

Events have moved quickly in Venezuela, but not quickly enough for the opposition. This has led the United States to assume a more combative position against Maduro, which in turn runs the risk of undermining the legitimacy of the domestic opposition movement.

International interventions

Following National Assembly President Juan Guaido's 'swearing-in' as interim president at a public rally on January 23, the domestic conflict has quickly acquired international dimensions, with countries forced to 'pick a side' (see VENEZUELA: Parallel powers will not resolve crisis - January 14, 2019).

After months of backseat driving through the 14-country Lima Group, the United States has taken the wheel and headed into direct confrontation with the Maduro government:

  • Secretary of State Mike Pompeo, Vice President Mike Pence and President Donald Trump have been vocal in their demands that Maduro leaves the country, issuing televised and social media threats to security officials and messages to the Venezuelan people. Washington is also seeking to leverage wider international support for Guaido, including through the OAS -- addressed by Pompeo yesterday -- and efforts to convene the UN Security Council.
  • The United States has rejected Maduro's expulsion of its diplomatic staff and has issued notice that it is ready to provide humanitarian and economic assistance to the Guaido 'presidency'.
  • In rejecting the Maduro government as sovereign, the United States will block financial transfers including from Venezuelan assets overseas, imposing de facto sanctions on the oil sector.

The muscular positioning assumed by Washington in recent days has transformed the dynamics of the domestic political situation in Venezuela. Having initially assumed a reconciliatory tone, including the possibility of amnesty for officials who defect from Maduro, Guaido has now adopted a more combative posture. He has moved to assume governance functions, including appointment of diplomats and issuing requests for foreign economic assistance for his interim presidency.

Guaido's hand has been strengthened by recognition from a swathe of countries, including heavyweight Lima Group members (Brazil, Colombia, Argentina, Peru, Chile and Canada) and the Inter-American Development Bank.

European countries including Germany, France and the United Kingdom have been more nuanced in their statements, but along with the European Council and European Parliament, they will not recognise Maduro as the legitimate president.

This external endorsement of Guaido, and the increasingly central role of the United States has served to make the situation more complex and has not brought the expected swift resolution hoped for:

  • The Venezuelan armed forces remain behind Maduro, issuing supportive statements from across a seemingly unified high command.
  • As yet, Maduro shows no sign of relinquishing power despite the United States and the opposition giving him a 72-hour deadline to leave.
  • Widespread anti-government protests, including in popular sectors that were traditionally the heartland of the Chavista movement, are drawing counter-mobilisations from Maduro supporters.

For its part, Maduro's government has been buoyed by 'alternative powers' and actors including Bolivia and Mexico at the regional level, and Russia and Turkey on the international stage.

China has emphasised its recognition of the Maduro government and alongside Russia, rejects foreign interference in Venezuela's political affairs. Both China and Russia have significant economic (primarily oil-related) interests in Venezuela that risk being affected either by US sanctions or by a change of government (see VENEZUELA: Foreign support will not bring investment - December 13, 2018).

Domestic difficulties

The challenge for Guaido is leveraging external support into domestic level change. The risks are that:

  • Guaido's 'interim presidency' becomes domestically discredited by the overt US influence behind his authority (see VENEZUELA: Incautious interventions will boost Maduro - September 21, 2018);
  • as opportunities for negotiation are jettisoned, senior Maduro officials -- including in the military -- will hunker down around Maduro as the benefits of defection diminish; and
  • splits over next steps and jockeying for influence will widen in the already rancorous opposition movement.

US backing may narrow Guaido's domestic support and entrench the military on Maduro's side

Guaido is from the Voluntad Popular party, which has a politically influential diaspora in the United States but not a broad domestic political base.

Moreover, having used Article 233 of the Constitution to step in as interim president -- on the basis that Maduro has usurped power -- Guaido has as yet not followed through on the requirement of that article to convene fresh elections within 30 days.

Uncertain outlook

Mexico and Uruguay have reiterated calls for dialogue, a position Spain is expected to endorse. Russia and China will also want a seat at the proverbial table given their significant financial and energy interests in Venezuela, 'vital interests' they see as increasingly threatened by the Trump administration.

Hard-line critics present dialogue as unpalatable, but the only alternative Guaido's supporters have is the overthrow of Maduro by force.

Whether this comes from the United States, from neighbouring countries, or even from disaffected military sectors within Venezuela, violent intervention brings the prospect of:

  • flight and overspill of armed Maduro supporters and former military officials into neighbouring Colombia, with the possibility of alliances with Colombian armed groups as that country's peace process disintegrates;
  • armed resistance from within Venezuela, and the prospect of civil war; and
  • a possible stepping up of Russian defence assistance to Maduro.

There will be no quick fix to a polarisation that is edging perilously close to armed conflict.

The danger of armed conflict within Venezuela is mounting

UN human rights chief Michelle Bachelet has called today for an independent investigation into claims of excessive use of force against protesters, with 26 people reported killed this week. Bachelet warned that events "may rapidly spiral out of control, with catastrophic consequences".

Events over this weekend will be decisive in swinging the balance of power behind either Maduro or Guaido. Whichever prevails, neither will be positioned to stabilise the situation quickly.

Even if Maduro takes flight, the international community will be aware from experience in other country contexts that removal of a leader does not parlay into a smooth regime change process.