East-west divide between EU member states will deepen
EU expectations of the rapid integration of post-communist states have faded
Central-East European (CEE) countries, except the Baltic states, are more or less failing to build positive images, successful coalition strategies and influence in Brussels. Growing internal challenges to liberal democracy in these countries, a slower level of integration than initially expected and low levels of constructive involvement in EU affairs have exhausted solidarity with newcomers and lowered confidence in their ability to deliver rapid change.
What next
To maintain EU support at the political and popular levels, Central-East European (CEE) member states must be seen to be making progress in such indicators as democratic standards, prosperity and functional collaboration with Western member states. They will increasingly be seen by older member states as lacking coherent agendas in Brussels and as second-rate players in EU affairs.
Subsidiary Impacts
- Increased acceptance of the east-west divide will lead to further constraints and financial conditionality for newer EU member states.
- This will hobble the enlargement process and its transformative pull on the Eastern Partnership and Western Balkan countries.
- Russia will fill the gap left by the EU’s loss of authority and eroding soft power.
- Westward emigration will continue to depopulate eastern member states, requiring new strategies to compensate for smaller labour forces.
Analysis
The EU's eastward expansion was laden with great expectations. However, it is now clear that building prosperous democratic regimes in the post-communist region requires greater effort, time and investment than initially expected.
Failed expectations
The progress made by these countries is overshadowed by their failures to adapt quickly to the demands of the legal-liberal order imported from the West:
- Governments in Hungary, Poland and Romania are tampering with the democratic institutional design they accepted in 1989.
- The main governing parties in Croatia and Bulgaria -- the Croatian Democratic Union and Citizens for Bulgaria's European Development respectively -- are limiting the potential electoral success of multiple ultra-conservative, ethnically based and homophobic movements by adopting some of their discourse (see EUROPE: ‘Nationalism-lite’ will contaminate mainstream - December 17, 2018).
- In the Czech Republic, ANO 2011 and current Prime Minister Andrej Babis took power pledging to take a stand against corruption and cleanse politics, but are clinging on to office against accusations that they too are corrupt.
The exposure of elite corruption coupled with the determination of those elites to hold onto power is eroding confidence in parliament and political parties.
- This raises the possibility that the Czech Republic may follow the path taken by Hungary.
- Corruption scandals and the killing last February of journalist Jan Kuciak have plunged Slovakia into a crisis of popular confidence in the government (see SLOVAKIA: Most-Hid party will decide government’s fate - March 5, 2018), leading to a surge in the election of independents in November's municipal elections.
- In Slovenia, the demise of corporatism, distrust in political parties and the personalisation of politics are calling into question the robustness of democratic state-building (see SLOVENIA: Inconclusive elections will mean instability - June 8, 2018).
All these phenomena amount to a degraded vision of the future for newer EU members. While many of the same elements can be observed in the political environment in Western Europe, the much younger democratic institutions and elites of the new democracies do not have the same level of resistance when facing similar challenges.
In addition, the perception that they have failed to meet expectations is costing them political support in Brussels and acceptance at the European popular level. Such perceptions are enhanced in the larger context of increased nationalism among segments of West European societies, which increasingly see the eastern states as backward sources of cheap labour that exploit EU membership for their own ends.
Unsuccessful coalition strategies
At the same time, CEE member states are failing to participate in the Brussels 'knowledge culture' and develop strategies to influence policymaking. After the 2004-07 accession waves, the newer EU member states lost interest in deep regional cooperation. They have left unchanged coalition-building patterns that have for years failed to gain them any influence.
CEE involvement in pan-EU affairs is low
Analysing the strength of networks between different EU members shows the principle of 'core-periphery Europe' working in practice. Countries such as Germany, France, Italy, the Netherlands and Spain look for one another's input and so have the largest coalition potential, rarely reaching out to CEE. When they did reach out in 2018, mostly to the Visegrad Four (V4) of the Czech Republic, Hungary, Poland and Slovakia, the results were disappointing.
At the same time, CEE countries regularly reach out to the larger member states, mostly unsuccessfully, having failed to build a common agenda among themselves.
Such member states as Romania, Bulgaria, Slovenia and Croatia are the least connected and perceived as the least influential of the former communist bloc. Romania's presidency of the Council of the EU, generally perceived as uninspired, only confirms expectations of underperformance (see ROMANIA: EU presidency will show up peripheral status - January 3, 2019).
The V4 format offered a useful model for discussing and representing common interests collectively. Expectations that it might remain a permanent feature within EU sub-regional partnerships and could be extended to other members have now largely dissolved.
The hawkish posturing of Poland and Hungary renders V4 ineffective. The smaller Czech Republic and Slovakia are in no position to compensate for their diverging interests or to maintain V4 as a reference point for European policies.
CEE countries' effectiveness is mostly negative
Slovenia and Croatia have preserved pre-accession reflexes by continuing to block each other in such important areas as Croatia's admission into the Schengen area, and finding common cause in obstructing Serbia's accession into the EU.
Lack of leadership
Few credible pro-European leaders have emerged from CEE. Bulgarian Prime Minister Boyko Borisov has some clout in Brussels and profits from his party's membership of the European Peoples' Party (EPP), the parliament's strongest political grouping, despite his and his party's many weaknesses.
Romanian President Klaus Iohannis, a front-runner for such a position from within the EPP, has mostly squandered his potential by isolating himself from European politics since he took office in 2014.
Iohannis is well regarded but fails to lobby informally
By comparison, the small country of Estonia is generally perceived as having fared much better in its EU presidency and has developed strong connections with the EU core. Latvia and Lithuania are trying to follow suit and the Baltic states continue to be singled out as former communist countries with few problems.
EU security
Romania and Bulgaria, the last members to be admitted to the EU, benefited from significant UK and US support. The strategy of overlapping NATO and EU borders to the east was a strong inducement for EU member states to accept the 2007 enlargement.
To this day, securing the EU's eastern border remains a core interest, enhancing solidarity between large member states and CEE. This will not change. Brexit and US President Donald Trump's ambiguous support for NATO, coupled with Russia's aggressive activity in Ukraine and the Black Sea, will continue to attract Western EU interest in and financial support for developments in this area.
Outlook
Democracy is still a highly prized commodity for CEE citizens and their support for it remains at levels similar to those of citizens of Western Europe. However, political elites are damaging the fabric of democratic institutions in most CEE countries by weakening their transformative effect.
The slowing of these institutions' democratic progress will continue to overshadow other improvements and lead to an overall perception of failure.
The way Brussels actually operates is much closer to a 'two-speed' EU than the official version of a Europe of equals.
