INTERNATIONAL: Al-Qaida is down but not out

Analysis

The term 'terrorism' can be problematic. It is often highly subjective, encompassing a wide range of militant movements and struggles. Western legal definitions, such as the 1989 UK Prevention of Terrorism act, tend to describe it as the political use of violence by non-state actors to spread fear among the public; the US Foreign Relations Authorization Act speaks of violence against non-combatants by subnational or clandestine groups. The most dynamic form of terrorism today is associated with the Salafist Islamic militancy, and al-Qaida in particular. However, the term is often also applied in some quarters to asymmetric guerrilla struggles against a better-organised and armed conventional enemy, such as the Allied forces in Afghanistan or Iraq, or the Israelis in the occupied territories.

Terrorists may be divided into three broad (and often overlapping) varieties:

• Jihadists. Individual jihadist groups usually launch attacks in their home countries, although they may receive training, support and guidance from abroad, including the nucleus around Osama bin Laden. Al-Qaida itself is now best conceptualised not as a specific organisation but a diffuse ideology of jihad able to win over existing movements and inspire new terrorists and cells (see INTERNATIONAL: Al-Qaida vulnerable in war of ideas - April 10, 2008).
• Insurgents. Guerrilla campaigns are the most sustained and account for the highest number of casualties, but in the main they are essentially reactive and local, and will not travel far beyond their home battlefield.
• Ethno-nationalists. A wide range of ethno-nationalist campaigns around the world, from the Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam (LTTE) in Sri Lanka to the Kurdistan Workers Party (PKK) in Turkey, employ terrorist methods. Again, these groups tend largely to confine their operations to their home countries, although in some cases their territories may cross national borders, such as the PKK's presence in both Turkey and Iraq.

State sponsors. Terrorism increasingly seeks shelter not in state sponsorship but anarchy; it finds havens in areas outside of effective state control, including Yemen, the Sahara and the Sahel, and the southern Philippines. While Iraq and Afghanistan are both homes to powerful local insurgencies, they are not especially comfortable havens for global terrorism.

The number of states actively supporting terrorism is dwindling:

• Iran. Tehran remains engaged in various ways, although this is by no means indiscriminate and is a carefully calibrated tool of policy. It supports Afghan, Iraqi, Lebanese and Palestinian militants as a means to undermine US power projection in the region, assert its claim to a say in the resolution of the conflicts and influence events in the Middle East.
• Syria. Damascus has a complex and sometimes contradictory policy. No longer a terrorist bankroller but an opponent of jihadist Islam, it regards instability in Iraq and Lebanon as opportunities and challenges to the United States and Israel. As a result, it does provide some support and sanctuary for elements operating there (according to US sources, 80-90% of all foreign fighters enter Iraq through Syria).
• Cuba and North Korea. Although technically still considered sponsors of terrorism by Washington, they no longer play any active role, simply refusing to comply with certain requests for information or extradition.
• Pakistan. While Islamabad's policy is to combat terrorism in all its forms, powerful elements within the government -- most notably its Inter-Service Intelligence agency -- appear to have colluded in the the Taliban's penetration of the Federally Administered Tribal Areas (FATA) and North-West Frontier Province (NWFP). This reflects either policy, or a failure of internal control within the government. These regions are the crucibles of Taliban and al-Qaida activity, giving them vital space in which to maintain training camps and media facilities.

Growth strategy. Al-Qaida's strategy depends on inspiring 'self-starters' and incorporating local movements. It seeks to win over existing terrorist movements by exploiting and identifying with local grievances:

• Europe. Al-Qaida is eagerly seeking to encourage alienated Muslims in Europe to launch more attacks like the July 2005 outrage in London and the Madrid railway bombings of March 2004. Al-Sahab, al-Qaida's media arm, has increased its output of videos geared for European consumption, distributed largely across the internet. This remains an intractable and unpredictable threat, especially because many of these terrorists will not have travelled to Pakistan, engaged in public protest or otherwise brought themselves to the attention of the authorities. In the United Kingdom alone, reportedly almost 2,000 individuals are being monitored. However, these groups tend to be scattered and amateurish.
• North Africa. The region is a quietly growing home to al-Qaida, which in time might even rival the FATA. In 2006, the Algerian Salafist Group for Preaching and Combat (GSPC) renamed itself Al-Qaida in the Islamic Maghreb (AQIM), aligning itself with international jihadism (see MIDDLE EAST: Al-Qaida affiliates face mixed prospects - August 13, 2008). Although the Algerian government exerts great pressure, its heavy-handed tactics could recruit further cells which could disperse into the wider region.

Failing al-Qaida? However, al-Qaida's reputation is in crisis as it loses control over or respect within local insurgencies. Its efforts to win them over often prove short lived, as the contradictions between its global agenda and parochial concerns become increasingly visible and it proves to have little to offer:

• Iraqi tensions. While Al-Qaida in Iraq (AQI) maintains operational links with many local Sunni resistance groups, this alliance has been breaking down since 2007 (see IRAQ: Reduced foreign fighter role in Sunni insurgency - June 26, 2008). Furthermore, bin Laden's actual authority over AQI has always been questionable.
• North Caucasus rejection. Persistent terrorism in the Russian North Caucasus would seem to offer great opportunities to al-Qaida, but most local groups are bitterly resentful of the way they feel the jihadists allowed Moscow to defeat the resistance in Chechnya by dividing it.
• Relations with Taliban. The strategic alliance with the Taliban has frequently been brought into question. Al-Qaida's safe haven in northern Pakistan is largely on the Taliban's sufferance and relations between them are worsening.
• Cosmetic rebranding. In practice, while groups such as the Libyan Islamic Fighting Group and GSPC have notionally 'joined' al-Qaida -- often in an attempt to regain the initiative after a series of defeats -- this rarely has any major significance. Even AQIM, while adopting both suicide bombing and the rhetoric of global struggle, and as a result beginning to attack some foreign targets (including UN personnel and facilities), is still essentially domestically oriented. Likewise, while AQIM notionally also includes such movements as Al-Qaida in Mauritania, there is no evidence of any wider command structure or coordination.

Islamic backlash. There is a growing Islamic backlash against al-Qaida. In the past, it has been able to transmit a compelling narrative of resistance to political and religious persecution with modern technology through a wide range of new and traditional media. Most active members think they are carrying out rational attacks with a clear political motive. To characterise al-Qaida as a purely nihilist, destructive movement -- as do some sources -- is not just inaccurate, but flies in the face of the evidence of internal moral and ideological debate. However, its very diffuseness means that it has been unable to eliminate sociopaths or at least direct them to politically driven operations, with some elements motivated by the desire to 'punish' the West rather than any rational and positive strategy.

Al-Qaida's popularity in the Middle East is at a record low:

• Clerical critics. A growing number of senior clerics are criticising al-Qaida's tactics and bin Laden's leadership. Most significant was the open denunciation in September 2007 by the highly respected Saudi scholar Salman al-Oudah, one of bin Laden's former mentors and a man with impeccable Salafist credentials. He questioned whether bin Laden had let the means become the ends.
• Saudi counter-offensive. In the past, Saudi Arabia seemed to adopt an ambiguous position, but it is increasingly rising to the challenge. Not only is it stepping up its counter-terrorism policing, it is working to combat the ideology of al-Qaida, using religious scholars and rehabilitated jihadist prisoners.
• Internet debates. The internet is not only a tool of radicalisation, but is also helping to galvanise a backlash from within the jihadist movement. In early 2008, al-Qaida's second-in-command, Ayman al-Zawahri, took part in an online debate, which included a large number of hostile questions about the movement's tactics and spiritual mandate. In this way, the internet injects a degree of doubt and controversy into al-Qaida's propaganda campaigns.

Non-Islamic terrorism. For all the attention paid to jihadist terrorism, most attacks are motivated by separatism or similar ethnic and political causes. However, the movements involved are more traditional and predictable, with relatively strong discipline, clear hierarchies and an agenda which sees violence as a means to a political end:

• Latin America. The Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia (FARC) continues to be a challenge, although arguably it is in the process of changing into essentially a mercenary drug-trafficking organisation beneath the cover of Marxist rhetoric.
• South and East Asia. India, Sri Lanka, Indonesia and the Philippines are among those Asian countries especially beset by terrorism. While some are Islamic, most are political or ethnic in their motivations, including such Muslim groups as Abu Sayyaf in the Philippines.
• Europe. Most attacks come from separatist movements. According to Europol, the Basque ETA and Corsican FLNC were responsible for 88% of all terrorist acts in Europe in 2007. In Turkey, the PKK, while reeling from such attacks as February's major raid on its base in Zap in northern Iraq, has also scaled up its campaign in the past twelve months.

Government responses. Although governments are inevitably often playing catch-up to terrorist initiatives, there are indications of progress:

• Policing. Law enforcement is becoming increasingly effective. This is helped by improved international intelligence-sharing and cooperation, despite the inevitable disputes over politics, jurisdiction and definitions.
• Counter-radicalisation. Combating the ideology of jihadism is difficult but not impossible, and Western governments are slowly coming to terms with the need to counter al-Qaida's propaganda. However, they find it harder to replicate such models as Saudi Arabia's. Their ability to mobilise Islamic scholars without compromising them is limited and a commitment to multi-culturalism is often an obstacle to a forthright campaign to characterise certain religious perspectives as 'wrong'.
• Terrorist havens. Pressure on terrorist bases is producing results, although Washington for the moment may have to step back from direct intervention in Pakistan's tribal areas. Pakistani President Asif Ali President Zardari has warned that he will not tolerate any violation of Pakistan's sovereignty, even in the name of fighting terrorism.

Conducive environment. Terrorists are able to exploit a wide range of modern developments:

• Media appetite. The rolling news cycle multiplies the impact of terrorist attacks and terrorists' opportunities to spread their message.
• Cyberspace. The internet is an increasingly important locus for terrorist activities, from recruiting members to coordinating operations (see INTERNATIONAL: Can digital attacks be acts of war? - June 13, 2008). According to EU counter-terrorism coordinator Gilles de Kerchove d'Ousselghem, there are some 5,000 jihadist websites worldwide.
• Globalised economy. Even local attacks have a global impact. Activity in the Niger Delta against pipelines, for example, risks driving oil prices up again on world markets.
• Organised crime. Efforts to limit the terrorists' ability to move and launder their cash through traditional means such as hawala money-brokers have been successful, but organised crime is increasingly willing to offer its services, albeit at a high premium.

Al-Qaida resilience. Although al-Qaida is in crisis, it is too soon to regard it as dead, and there are grounds to expect an upsurge in activities:

• Pre-election terror. Al-Qaida has long been aware of the political impact of its attacks, the Madrid bombings influencing the Spanish election. With the approach of the US presidential election, chatter on jihadist websites and communications suggests an attempt to step up attacks on the United States -- the bomb at the US embassy in Yemen on September 17 could be its first fruits. While attacks on the US mainland are very unlikely, US facilities and personnel abroad may be at greater risk.
• Oil. Bin Laden has long been interested in the political implications of destabilising international oil markets, and al-Qaida is increasingly interested in targeting production and transport infrastructure, both to drive up direct costs and create market uncertainty. The eventual (if unrealistic) hope is that this will bankrupt the United States. A document circulating on jihadist websites since June has encouraged campaigns against facilities in Iraq, Saudi Arabia, Sudan and Yemen.
• Protecting Pakistani base. If driven from Pakistan, al-Qaida will suffer both a blow to its morale and further degradation of its capabilities. The Islamabad bombing, and an earlier attack at Wah, followed warnings from Tehrik-e-Taliban Pakistan against government operations in the tribal areas (see US/PAKISTAN: Bombing highlights urgency of reform - September 22, 2008).
• Local collapse. Various al-Qaida affiliates are also increasingly adopting an apocalyptic strategy of working for local economic collapse, both to bring down governments and create chaos from which they can rise and recruit -- and potentially create a new safe haven. The Kataeb Jund al-Yemen (Soldiers of Yemen Brigades), for example, has not only launched a series of attacks against oil facilities in the past year, but also targeted tourism in a bid to undermine the national economy.

Outlook. While there are grounds for cautious optimism, with al-Qaida's authority on the ebb, there are also reasons to remain vigilant:

• Persistent jihadism. Al-Qaida's millenarian agenda, while not necessarily responsible for the largest number of attacks, encourages indiscriminate and massive attacks without any concern for the political consequences.
• WMD 'megaterrorism'. While al-Qaida no longer has the resources and cohesion to launch a major, long-term operation, which probably rules out the creation and use of nuclear devices, there is still the scope for the use of other weapons of mass destruction (WMD) -- radiological 'dirty bombs' or chemical and biological agents. In recent months, one jihadist internet forum has hosted discussion on how UK and Danish water supplies could be poisoned.
• Reversible decline. An especially successful attack might help re-establish al-Qaida's authority. Above all, events seeming to vindicate its message that the Islamic world is under threat -- such as an Israeli attack on Iran -- would give it a tremendous propaganda coup.